








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Santos Raposo, P. M. (2013). Flexibility of the labor market. CentER, Center for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Flexibility of the labor market
Pedro Santos Raposo

Flexibility of the labor market
Proefschrift
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan Tilburg University op gezag
van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. Ph. Eijlander, in het openbaar
te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties
aangewezen commissie in de aula van de Universiteit op
vrijdag 26 april 2013 om 10.15 uur door
Pedro Miguel Santos Raposo,
geboren op 2 mei 1977 te Lissabon, Portugal.
Promotor:
prof. dr. ir. J.C. van Ours
Commissieleden:
prof. dr. A.H.O. van Soest






1.1 Motivation and questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Reduction of Standard Working Hours 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The reduction of the workweek in Portugal . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Economics of working hours reduction . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Previous studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.6 Stylized facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7.1 Individual worker empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7.2 Aggregate empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3 Joblessness 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
CONTENTS
3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.1 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.2 Comparability of the DWS Surveys . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Econometric methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1 Censored quantile regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.2 M&M decomposition method . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.3 Relevance of methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 Composition and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.1 Covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4.2 Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.5 Changes in the unemployment duration distribution . . . . 70
3.5.1 Composition Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5.2 Changes in the conditional duration . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Interpreting the results in a simple mixture model . . . . . 75
3.7 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4 Determinants of earnings losses of displaced workers 91
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 Earlier literature on earnings losses of displaced workers . . 97
4.3 Wage setting in Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 The Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal data set . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.4.2 Sample Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.3 Identification of displacements due to firm closure . 108
4.4.4 Identification of displacements due to collective dis-
missal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
vi
CONTENTS
4.4.5 Identification of individual dismissals . . . . . . . . 111
4.4.6 Identification of non-displaced workers . . . . . . . 111
4.5 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.5.1 Jacobson et al. (1993) statistical specifications . . . 112
4.5.2 Individual unobserved fixed effect contribution . . . 114
4.6 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.6.1 Sensitivity of losses to comparison group . . . . . . 130
4.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
vii

To my parents and to Tania

Acknowledgements
First I would like to thank my advisor Jan van Ours for all his efforts
in supervising this thesis. Jan has supervised my research since my very
first year in Tilburg. He was always available to dedicate his valuable
time, precision and expertise to the success of my PhD. I am extremely
indebted to him for everything I have learned and achieved in Tilburg. It
has been a privilege to be his student.
I am also very thankful to Pedro Portugal, who has been mentoring me
since my visit to the Bank of Portugal. I am deeply grateful for everything
he has taught me, and for the things he has done for me.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Portuguese Founda-
tion of Science and Technology, FCT [SFRH/BD/21906/2005].
I thank Joop Hartog, Tobias Klein, Matteo Picchio and Arthur van
Soest for their time and effort in reviewing my manuscript and for agreeing
to be on my PhD committee. I would like to thank Chris Muris for his
critical feedback on the drafts of all my papers and for his continuous
support.
During my PhD, I have benefited from the stimulating research envi-
ronment and hospitality encountered at the Bank of Portugal. I gratefully
acknowledge financial support by the Bank of Portugal. I would like to
send a special word of recognition for all inputs, help and support given
by António Antunes. I would also like to thank João Vale Azevedo, Fran-
cisco Dias, Luca Opromolla, Fátima Teodoro, Pedro Próspero Lúıs and
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This dissertation is on the flexibility of the labor market. Although all the
chapters were written with different motivations, there are links between
them. This introduction summarizes the thesis while highlighting the
links between the chapters. In section 1.1, after we elaborate on the
common research theme, we develop the motivation of the thesis and the
main research questions. In section 1.2 we summarize the research and
the main conclusions.
1.1 Motivation and questions
The Great recession has represented the most severe deterioration of the
labor market conditions since the late 1940s. Several labor market indica-
tors such as, labor force participation, unemployment, employment, and
hours have been affected. Labor force participation has declined both at
the intensive but also at the extensive margin. We have been experiencing
world wide increasing unemployment rates and unemployment durations
and it is not clear where the solution lies. This dissertation analyzes sev-
eral dimensions of the labor market in an attempt to understand the effect
of government policy, the reasons why unemployment durations might go
up and the consequences of job loss for earnings.
1.1. Motivation and questions
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that each deal with a
different dimension of flexibility of the labor market. First a policy change:
reduced working hours. Second, changes in unemployment dynamics:
increased unemployment duration and third, job loss and its consequences
for earnings of displaced workers.
In this dissertation the following questions are discussed:
• What are the effects of a working time reduction?
• Why did the median unemployment duration go up in the U.S. since
the early 1990s?
• What are the determinants of earnings losses of displaced workers?
Do occupational or firm specificities explain part of the earnings
losses?
Chapter 2 addresses the first question. This chapter investigates the
effects of a working time reduction, under full wage compensation, in
Portugal from 44 to 40 hours. We find that workers involved in this change
reduced their job separation rate and increased hourly wages, keeping
monthly earnings approximately constant. The working hours reduction
also affected workers working less than 40 hours per week; they were
more likely to lose their job. Finally, we find evidence that the working
hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job
destruction.
The second question is addressed in Chapter 3. Composition effects
related to age played a significant role. However, apart from this rather
mechanical impact, important structural changes, were at play. We have
identified a major force reshaping the unemployment duration distribu-
tion: the change in sensitivity of the signal of schooling increased the
median unemployment duration by 2.7 weeks. We argue that the signal-
ing power of schooling during the recent low-unemployment environment
faded significantly. When the unemployment rate is low, the informa-
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tion that is passed to the employer through the schooling signal does not
promote more job offers to the more educated unemployed.
In Chapter 4 the last question is addressed. We find that the earnings
losses are rather severe and persistent, representing around 50 percent of
the pre-displacement wages, six years after the separation event. Those
losses are explained by the joblessness experience of the displaced workers.
We explore the sources of those losses, and we find that the allocation
into lower-paid job titles accounts for half of the total average wage loss.
Sorting into low wage firms also plays a significant role in explaining the
wage loss of displaced workers.
1.2 Summary and conclusions
In the past decades, working hours have been reduced in many coun-
tries, with the idea that a reduction of working time per worker would
increase the number of employed workers. Chapter 2 looks at the impact
of a 1996 Portuguese law that reduced the maximum standard workweek.
Our study is distinct from Varejão (2005) who investigates the effects at
the establishment level. We investigate the effect of the working time
reduction at the level of the individual worker allowing for an interaction
between individual and firm effects. We analyze the impact of the reduc-
tion of the workweek assuming that the policy change resembles a natural
experiment. The treatment group consists of all individuals who worked
more than 40 hours in October 1996; the control group consists of workers
who worked 35-40 hours in October 1996. The working hours categories
are defined on the basis of the situation in October 1996, just before the
introduction of the working time reduction. Assuming that the workers
working less than 40 hours per week were not affected, the general calen-
dar time effects are represented by the calendar year dummies, assuming
that the differential development of the affected workers is represented by
the working hours categories. When investigating the policy impact we
3
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know that the adaptation of hours comes mainly from the labor demand
side and therefore, it is important to consider firm information. We con-
sider that it might be that the treatment effects are influenced by the
firm share of workers that worked more than 40 hours per week. After
all, firms’ costs of the working hours adjustment increase with the share
of workers affected. The reduction of the maximum standard workweek
from 44 to 40 directly affected about half of all workers in Portugal since
they had a standard workweek of more than 40 h. Initially, the reduction
of working hours was compensated by the use of overtime. Hourly wages
of the affected workers increased, reducing their monthly earnings only
slightly. Workers in the category 40-42h were less likely to separate from
their firm. Due to spillover effects at the firm level the working hours
reduction also affected workers working less than 40 hours per week.
The possible worksharing mechanism as a reaction to the reduction
of the working time is also considered in Chapter 2. Employment effects
of working hours reductions are not easy to establish empirically and
indeed previous studies examine the impact of working hours reductions
on the employment position of individuals but do not address overall
employment effects. The main reason for the lack of evidence on the
overall employment effects concerns the lack of information about the
number of workers that find new jobs through the birth of firms.
We use a longitudinal Portuguese matched worker-firm dataset called
Quadros de Pessoal (QP - “Lists of Personnel”). Reported data cover
all the personnel working for the establishment in a reference week in
October (see Cardoso (2006) for details). Every year QP gathers infor-
mation for more than 250 thousand firms and 2.5 million workers. We
use information for the time period 1994-1998. QP collects information
on both standard and overtime hours in the reference month; a poste-
riori we transform them into weekly hours. Standard hours are defined
as the hours worked during a normal week at the going wage. Overtime
hours are the weekly hours worked at an overtime premium (50% for the
4
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first hour, 75% for additional hours). Monthly earnings are the monthly
payments associated with the standard workweek. We use the national
consumer price index to transform nominal earnings into real ones. The
hourly wage is computed as the ratio of monthly earnings and standard
hours of work.
At the individual level it is rather straightforward to use workers work-
ing above the “new” standard hours before the policy change as the treat-
ment group and workers working at or below the “new” standard hours
before the policy change as a control group. However, establishing the
overall employment effects is a nontrivial exercise as there is no control
group for firms that were created after the introduction of the policy
change. In this paper we attempt to establish overall employment effects.
There was considerable regional, sectoral and firm-size variation in the
share of workers who were affected by the working hours reduction. If the
reduction in working hours affected employment, it is likely to have had
a bigger impact when the share of affected workers was high. Therefore,
we can exploit the variation across labor markets to assess the impact of
the workweek reduction. To do so we perform an analysis on the level of
labor markets defined by industry, region and firm size. This aggregate
approach allows us to study job creation and job destruction as well as
worker accessions and separations and thus the net employment effects.
Previous empirical studies suggest that reductions of standard working
hours do not have positive employment effects and attribute this null ef-
fect due to adjustment of the hourly wage. However, previous studies only
measure partial employment effects, while in our study we consider overall
employment effects. We find evidence that under full wage compensation,
the working hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through
a fall in job destruction. We can only speculate about why reducing stan-
dard working hours in Portugal increased employment whereas in other
countries no such effects occurred. Most likely, the increased flexibility in
the use of the standard workweek made it easier to adjust the workforce at
5
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the intensive margin rather than at the extensive margin. To the extent
that this reduced labor costs, job destruction was also reduced, causing
positive employment effects. The reduced labor costs didn’t stimulate
job creation which may have to do with strict employment protection in
Portugal.
Under full wage compensation, each hour becomes more expensive and
the worker becomes cheaper in relation to hours. One could expect an
increase in hiring, but given the difficulty to fire workers in Portugal, the
firm will not fire, instead it will fire less workers. Therefore, the working
hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job
destruction.
Since the early 1990s unemployment duration in the U.S. increased
substantially relative to unemployment rates. In Chapter 3, we rely on
censored quantile regression methods to analyze the changes in the U.S.
unemployment duration distribution. Quantiles seem appropriate to an-
alyze unemployment duration for two main reasons. First, the method-
ology estimates the whole quantile process of duration time conditional
on the attributes of interest, which constitutes a complete characteriza-
tion of the distribution of duration time. Quantiles provide a natural way
of characterizing important concepts such as short- or long-term unem-
ployment, by focusing on the relevant tails of the duration distribution.
Second, from a methodological standpoint, it is worth observing that
quantile regression provides a unified and flexible framework for such an
analysis.
The data used in this inquiry is taken from the U.S. Displaced Worker
Surveys of 1988 and 2008. The DWS is a retrospective survey that has
been conducted biennially since 1984. It contains information on the na-
ture of the job loss and the subsequent joblessness duration of workers
displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or abolition of shift or
position. The DWS is particularly well suited to study the distributional
shape of unemployment duration because, unlike the CPS, it is a repre-
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sentative sample of the flow of displaced workers and because it provides
information on completed spells of unemployment.
Changes over time in the distribution of unemployment duration may
be framed as resulting from changes in the distribution of the conditioning
variables such as the age distribution or from changes in the conditional
distribution of duration itself. We use Machado and Mata (2005) method
to disentangle those effects. The basic building block is the estimation
of the conditional distribution by quantile regressions; then, by resorting
to resampling procedures, one estimates marginal distributions consistent
with the estimated conditional model as well as with hypothesized distri-
butions for the covariates. Comparing the marginal distributions implied
by alternative distributions for the covariates one is then able to perform
counterfactual exercises that isolate the different effects contributing to
the overall change.
Composition effects related to age (but not gender) played a significant
role. But, apart from this rather mechanical impact, important struc-
tural changes, captured in the changes of the regression coefficients, were
at play. We have identified a major force reshaping the unemployment
duration distribution: the change in sensitivity to schooling increased the
median unemployment duration 2.7 weeks. We argue that the signal-
ing power of schooling during the recent low-unemployment environment
faded significantly. When the unemployment rate is low, the informa-
tion that is passed to the employer through the schooling signal does not
promote more job offers to the more educated unemployed.
The determinants of earnings losses of displaced workers are addressed
in Chapter 4. The first goal in this study is to investigate the monthly
earnings losses by following Jacobson et al. (1993) (JLS) methodology, in-
cluding transitions to zeros whenever the individuals are out of work. The
second objective is to extend the Jacobson et al. (1993) (JLS) method-
ology by incorporating firm and job title fixed effects in the monthly
wage equation (excluding transitions to zeros), allowing us to estimate
7
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the monthly wage losses of displaced workers. We decompose the monthly
wage losses into their main sources using the methodology developed in
Gelbach (2010).
Potential losses of displaced worker can be related to the firm and
job-title that they held before and after displacement. The heterogeneity
among firms’ wage policies is very large and accounts for more than one
third of the wage total variation (Torres et al. (2012)). Different wage
policies are favored by the existence of industry rents (due to unionization
or incentive pay premiums) or the operation of wage efficiency policies.
In such an environment, the worker may benefit from engaging in job
search to locate the firms with more suitable (more generous) wage offers.
Good matches will be made and survive. Bad matches will be resisted and
undone. However, with the occurrence of a displacement event, successful
job searchers may loose their “job shopping” investment.
The role of job-title heterogeneity explaining total variation is also
significant (around 50 percent). Job-titles summarize the general and
specific skills of the worker, in particular those that are industry and oc-
cupation specific. Given the way those job titles were identified, they
may also reflect the bargaining power of the workers. Because job-titles
contain the skill requirements of the position held by the worker, it will
also retain the hierarchical standing of the workers. Again, with the event
of a displacement, a human capital will be destroyed, largely associated
with the loss of his pre-displacement job-title. This was previously mea-
sured by looking at the effect of industry and occupation mobility. We
now address directly this source of wage loss by looking at job-title fixed
effects.
To properly incorporate these plethora of wage determinants a wage
equation with three high-dimensional fixed effects - worker, firm, and
job title - will be estimated using a nationally representative matched
employer-employee data set - Quadros de Pessoal. The universal coverage
of the employed population in the private sector in Portugal combined
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with the appropriate tools, create the optimal conditions for this exercise.
We found that the earnings losses are rather severe and persistent, rep-
resenting 51 percent (48 percent and 52 percent) of the pre-displacement
wages for firm closures (collective dismissals and individual dismissals),
six years after the separation event. Those losses are largely explained
by the joblessness experience of the displaced workers, during which labor
earnings are absent. Wage rates also tumble for displaced workers, in com-
parison with non-displaced workers, amounting to a 19 percent monthly
wage fall in the case of firm shut downs, and 14 percent in the case of
collective dismissals, and 10 percent in the case of individual dismissals,
six years after displacement.
We found that the allocation into lower-paid job titles plays the most
important role in explaining the wage losses of displaced workers, ac-
counting for half of the total average wage loss in the case of firm closure,
and 54 percent in the case of collective dismissals, but not in the case of
individual dismissals, where it accounts only for 11 percent of the loss.
Given the way those job titles were identified, they may also reflect the
bargaining power of the workers. Because job-titles contain the skill re-
quirements of the position held by the the worker, it will also retain the
hierarchical standing of the workers. Again, with the event of a displace-
ment, a human capital will be destroyed, largely associated with the loss
of his pre-displacement job-title.
Sorting into low wage firms also plays a significant role for workers
displaced through firm closures, accounting for 40 percent of the total
average wage loss, and 44 percent in the case of collective dismissals, and
71 percent of the loss in the case of individual dismissals. Different wage
policies are favored by the existence of industry rents (due to unionization
or incentive pay premiums) or the operation of wage efficiency policies. In
such an environment, the worker may benefit from engaging in job search
to locate the firms with more suitable (more generous) wage offers. How-
ever, with the occurrence of a displacement event, successful job searchers
9
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may loose their “job shopping” investment.
Overall, it is difficult to draw general conclusions regarding such dif-
ferent specific topics. Less hours will allow for the same work to be shared
by more workers. However, unemployment duration is longer (not only in
Europe but also in the U.S.) and flexibility is needed in terms of increas-
ing labor mobility and therefore reduce the duration of the unemployment
spell. The information that is passed to the employer through the school-
ing signal does not promote more job offers to the more educated unem-
ployed. This finding raises the importance of discussing the interest of
providing vocational training in order to help these workers to find a job.
In terms of earnings losses of displaced workers we know that these losses
are large and persistent. These losses are largely explained by the long-
term joblessness. The wage losses experienced by the displaced worker
are explained by the allocation into lower-paid job titles and sorting into
low wage firms. Severe losses in the returns to the job-title may represent
a job downgrading due to depreciation of specific human capital. Here,
retraining programs may be also of some help. Losses related with the
firm fixed effect may mean that a worker is moving from a “good” match
to a “bad” match. If this phenomenon is pervasive, job search assistance
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This chapter investigates the effects of a working time reduction in Por-
tugal.1 December 1, 1996 Portugal introduced a new law on working
1This chapter is based on two papers that have already been published, the first
called “How working time reduction affects jobs and wages” is published in the Eco-
nomics Letters (Raposo and Van Ours (2010b)) and the second paper is called “How a
reduction of standard working hours affects employment dynamics” and it is published
in De Economist (Raposo and Van Ours (2010a)). Both papers analyze the same policy
change of a reduction in standard working hours from 44 hours to 40 hours. However,
since each paper had a different objective of analysis, two distinct methodologies were
used. In the first paper (Raposo and Van Ours (2010b)), we investigated how working
time reduction affects jobs and wages allowing for an interaction between individual
and firm effects. In the second paper (Raposo and Van Ours (2010a)), we study how
this mandatory reduction affected the overall level of employment through job creation
and job destruction. In this chapter we describe the Portuguese policy reduction of
the workweek, the theoretical framework, the literature review and the used data set,
aspects common to both papers. In Section 2.7 we keep the two approaches more
2.1. Introduction
hours which gradually reduced the standard workweek from 44 hours to
40 hours.2 The main reason for implementing this mandatory reduction
of working hours was to speed up convergence of Portuguese traditionally
long hours of work to the European average.3 The contribution of this
chapter to the literature on working hours reduction is threefold. First,
we present a more detailed analysis of potential effects. In order to as-
sess the working hours reduction policy we analyze its effects on normal
hours of work, overtime hours, hourly wages, monthly earnings and the
probability of job loss. Second, we use matched worker-firm data which
allow us to study the effects of working hours reduction taking firm effects
into account. Finally, we are able to investigate the overall employment
effects.
Employment effects of working hours reductions are not easy to es-
tablish empirically and indeed previous studies examine the impact of
working hours reduction on the employment position of individuals but
do not address overall employment effects. The main reason for the lack
of evidence on the overall employment effects concerns the lack of infor-
mation about the number of workers that find new jobs through the birth
of firms. At the individual level it is rather straightforward to use work-
ers working above the “new” standard hours before the policy change as
the treated group and workers working at or below the “new” standard
hours before the policy change as a control group. However, establishing
the overall employment effects is a nontrivial exercise as there is no con-
trol group for firms that were created after the introduction of the policy
change.
clearly separated. Therefore, in Section 2.7.1. we follow closely Raposo and Van Ours
(2010b) and present the individual analysis in terms of individual jobs and wages. In
Section 2.7.2. we follow closely Raposo and Van Ours (2010a) in order to investigate
the overall employment effects we perform an analysis at the level of well-defined labor
markets.
2This working hours reduction is also studied by Varejão (2005). Our study is
distinct from his study because we also take potential firm effects into account.
3Since Portugal joined the European Union in 1986, Portugal engaged in a broad
economic and political process of convergence towards the European Union average.
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In the first part of the chapter we investigate how the Portuguese
working time reduction affected individual jobs (Raposo and Van Ours
(2010b)) while the main difference in the second part of the chapter in
comparison with previous literature is that we attempt to establish the
comprehensive employment effects by performing an analysis at the level
of well-defined labor markets (Raposo and Van Ours (2010a)).
We assume that there is considerable regional, sectoral and firm-size
variation in the share of workers who are affected by the working hours
reduction. If the reduction in working hours affected employment it is
likely to have had a bigger impact when the share of affected workers
is high. Therefore, we can exploit the variation across labor markets to
assess the impact of the workweek reduction. Accordingly, we perform
an analysis on the level of labor markets defined by industry, region and
firm size. This aggregate approach allows us to study job creation and
job destruction as well as worker accessions and separations and thus the
net employment effects.4
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. After present-
ing the reduction of the workweek in Portugal in section 2.2, section 2.3
discusses the economics of working hours. In section 2.4 we discuss the
results from previous studies and in section 2.5 we present our data fol-
lowed by a section with stylized facts. In Section 2.7 we report the results
of our empirical analysis. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The reduction of the workweek in Por-
tugal
In Portugal, the 1990s were a decade with low unemployment rates; ap-
proximately 3-4% points below the EU-15 average. Portugal is considered
to have a regulated and centralized labor market, with minimum wages,
4In a similar set-up Stewart (2002) exploits regional variation in wages across the
UK to establish the impact of the introduction of the minimum wage.
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strong employment protection, and collective bargaining widely applied
(Cardoso (2006)). Standard working hours in Portugal are not only regu-
lated by law but also by collective agreements at the level of the industry
or the profession.5
In December 1996, a new law was introduced with the aim of reducing
the standard workweek from 44 to 40 hours. The law was not passed as
a tool to create jobs and reduce unemployment but was introduced be-
cause the newly-elected government wanted to speed up the convergence
of Portuguese traditionally long hours of work to the European average
(Varejão (2005)).
The new law implied first, by 1st December 1996, all workweeks above
42 hours should be reduced by 2 hours; workweeks below 42 hours but
above 40 hours should meet the new standard of 40 hours per week.
Second, by 1st December 1997, all workweeks still above 40 hours should
meet the standard.
Workers were still allowed to work overtime, with an overtime premium
of 50% for the first hour and 75% for additional overtime hours. Of course,
with the reduction of standard working hours, hours in the range 40-44
became more expensive so the firms had an incentive to reduce working
hours. In order to compensate firms for the reduction in working hours
the new law introduced some flexibility. The reduction was implemented
taking into account that the standard workweek could be defined on a
4 months average. Furthermore, the maximum number of daily working
hours could be increased by 2 provided that it did not exceed 10 hours
per day and 50 hours per week.6
5Usually firms cannot select themselves into a particular working hours agreement;
only 5% of the workers are covered by firm-level agreements.
6The change in regular working hours was not a clean experiment in the sense that
also the possible use of overtime hours was made more flexible.
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2.3 Economics of working hours reduction
Shorter working hours may be introduced through mandatory laws or
may be the result of bargaining between unions and firms (See also Boeri
and Van Ours (2008)). A reduction of the workweek can be introduced
for several reasons. Shorter working hours may increase the standards
of living or it may be according to preferences of workers. Sometimes
work sharing, i.e. reductions in the length of the working week leading
to more jobs, is motivated as a tool to reduce unemployment. The idea
is that if working time per worker is reduced then employment, counted
as the number of workers, will increase. This of course is only true if the
reduction of the working hours does not affect labor demand too much,
i.e. if there is a ‘lump of labor’ which can simply be redistributed at
no costs. In a competitive labor market it may be that workers want
to organize a reduction in working hours because this would increase
their marginal product of labor (Marimon and Zilibotti (2000)). The
mandatory reduction of working hours would give the workers market
power so they could increase their wage. Of course, individual workers
would like to deviate from the agreement and work longer hours at a
higher wage. in the same way as producers have an incentive to deviate
from a cartel agreement. Another reason for a mandatory reduction of
working hours arises when employers have monopsony power. Manning
(2003) argues that in a monopsony not only the wage rate is less than the
value of marginal product but the firm can also induce the worker to work
more than would be optimal for the worker given the monopsony wage.
In the same way as a minimum wage can be welfare improving in case of
a monopsony, working hours reduction can also be welfare improving.
Whatever the reason for a working hours reduction, the question arises
if there is an employment effect. From a theoretical point of view it is
not obvious whether working hours reductions will increase or reduce
employment. Lets assume that technology is represented by a Cobb-
Douglas production function Y = HγN where 0 < γ < 1, which implies
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that output is proportional to the number of workers while due to physical
constraints there are diminishing returns to hours of work in production.
Labor costs per worker are given by
W = b+ wH + θw(H −Hs)d (1)
where H is working hours, Hs is the standard working hours, d is a dummy
variable that has a value of 1 if H ≥ Hs and a value of zero otherwise,
b represents the fixed costs per worker that are independent of working
hours.7 These are mainly the costs of hiring, firing as well as training
costs, w is the hourly wage rate, θ (θ > 0) is the overtime premium. As-
suming a competitive product market with price equal to 1, the expression
for the profits of the firm is given by
Π(H,N) = HγN −WN (2)
The firm chooses H and N such that profits are maximized. The first
order conditions for a maximum are:
∂Π
∂N
= Hγ − b− wHs − θw(H −Hs)d = 0 (3)
∂Π
∂H
= γHγ−1N − w(1 + θd)N = 0 (4)
Solving these two equations we obtain the optimal number of hours as:
H∗ =
γ(b− θwHsd)
(1− γ)w(1 + θd)
(5)
When the standard number of hours is reduced the employment effects
depend on the new optimal number of hours (H∗∗). We distinguish three
situations:
7In theory, overtime should fluctuate as demand fluctuates and therefore, overtime
is not exogenous. The use of overtime is not very volatile in Portugal and it is re-
stricted to a small number of firms. In our approach we interpret the results as being
conditional on the presence of overtime (d).
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Situation 1 occurs when the optimal number of hours is below the new
standard; situation 2 occurs when the optimal hours are higher than the
new standard but lower than the old standard and situation 3 occurs
when the optimal number of hours is higher than the old standard, i.e.
the essence is ∆d.
Under situation 1 the optimal number of hours is independent of the
standard number of hours.8 Therefore the change in the standard number
of hours does not affect either the level of hours or the level of employ-
ment. If the new optimal hours choice is in situation 2, the hours and
the employment effects depend on the overtime premium and on the fixed
labor costs (see also Calmfors and Hoel (1988)). For illustrative purposes
consider the following example. A firm has N workers working 42 hours
at a wage w with fixed costs b. So total wage costs are N ∗ (42 ∗ w + b).
Assume that as in Portugal, the standard workweek is reduced from 44
to 40 hours while the total labor input is unaffected. Now the firm has
to choose between attracting new workers in which case the total wage
costs become 42
40
N ∗ (w ∗40+ b). Or, the firm does not do anything, which
implies that it has to pay for overtime work for which premium is 50%
(as is the case in Portugal for the first overtime hour) and an overtime
premium of 75% for the second hour. Then, the total wage costs become
N ∗ (40 ∗w+ 1.5 ∗w+ 1.75 ∗w+ b). It is straightforward to see that the
firm will expand its workforce if b < 25 ∗ w while it will leave hours and
employment unaffected if b > 25 ∗ w. Note that this threshold is quite
high as it is equivalent to half of the weekly wage. This makes it very
likely that firms will follow the first strategy, i.e. reduce working hours
8Note that if in equation (5) there are no overtime hours d = 0, in which case the
optimal number of working hours is given by H∗ = bγw(1−γ) .
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and expand the workforce.
In situation 3, workers already worked overtime and the hours reduc-
tion causes employment to fall. This is because the hours reduction has
made the employment of a marginal worker more expensive while the
price of marginal hours has not changed. Therefore, firms will reduce
the production factor which became more expensive (employees) and will
use more of the input of which price has not changed (hours). Heteroge-
nous firms may react differently to a reduction in standard working hours,
which makes it difficult to predict the economy-wide employment effects.
2.4 Previous studies
The most recent research on workweek reductions has studied the effects
on employment and labor costs. For Germany, Hunt (1999) studies the
employment effects of restrictions in hours exploring the cross-industry
variation in reductions in standard hours. Starting in 1985, (West) Ger-
man unions began in an uncoordinated way, to reduce the standard hours
on an industry-by industry basis, in an attempt to raise employment.
Hunt (1999) uses the German socio-economic panel for 30 manufacturing
industries over the period 1984-1994. The question about actual hours
refers to an “average” week, while the question about “last month” spec-
ifies overtime, rather than actual hours. Both reported actual hours and
actual hours calculated as standard hours plus reported overtime are pos-
sible overestimates. For workers paid hourly in manufacturing, actual
hours fell by 0.88-1 hour in response to a one-hour fall in standard hours.
Hunt (1999) finds no positive employment effects of the gradual work-
ing time reduction that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Andrews et al.
(2005) using German establishment-level panel data, for the period 1993-
1999 estimate the policy effect on employment comparing firms employ-
ment according to the use of overtime. Instead of making use of the
number of hours that individuals work each week to construct the treat
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and control group, they use the overtime hours worked on each firm. An-
drews et al. (2005) also find no evidence of positive employment effects of
working hours reduction in Germany.
For France, Crépon and Kramarz (2002) study the 1982 reduction of
the workweek from 40 to 39 hours using the panel data from the French
labor force survey 1977-1987 that runs in April every year. Their identi-
fication strategy explores the variation in hours worked to set up a quasi-
experimental design. Hence, all those who work 40 hours in 1982 are
potentially affected by the forthcoming reduction, whereas all workers
employed 39 hours at that date are not affected. They find evidence that
the policy change reduced hours and it didn’t create jobs and increased
unemployment. However, they did not measure the net effect on employ-
ment. Estevão and Sá (2008) study the further reduction of the workweek
in France from 39 to 35 hours in 2000-2002 by comparing individuals em-
ployed in large and small firms, before and after the law. They match
data from 1993 to 2002 from the French labor force survey with firm-level
data from the French Registry of Firms (SIRENE). They find an increase
in labor turnover but no effect on aggregate employment.
Skuterud (2007) presents an analysis of the Canadian province of Que-
bec, where the standard workweek was gradually reduced from 44 to 40
hours between 1997 and 2000. This experiment provides an interesting
test for a standard workweek reduction to have a worksharing effect be-
cause the legislation contains no obligation or suggestion of any kind of
wage compensation. He uses the monthly Canadian labor Force Survey
over the period 1996-2002. Quebec’s gradual reduction of the work week
was meant to have an impact on employees in Quebec who are paid on an
hourly basis and not covered by a union contract. He addresses this possi-
bility by adding a comparison group within the jurisdiction experiencing
the policy change, resulting in a triple difference estimator. Skuterud
(2007) finds that, despite a 20% reduction among full-time workers in
weekly hours worked beyond 40, the policy failed to raise employment at
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either the provincial level or within industries where hours of work were
affected relatively more. Varejão (2005) investigates the effects of a 1996
working time reduction in Portugal using employer-employee matched
dataset (Quadros de Pessoal) between 1995 and 1999. He does the anal-
ysis at the level of the establishment using establishment characteristics
to explain differences in the effects of the workweek reduction and finds
that firms’ reaction to the policy is affected by the presence of minimum
wage earners and the use of overtime hours.9 Chemin and Wasmer (2009)
explore geographic disparities to study the 2000 35-hour reform in France.
They use the French labor force survey between 1996 and 2003. They use
the historical difference of the region Alsace-Moselle as control group find-
ing no significant impact of the 35-hour reform on employment growth.
Sánchez (2010), studies the 2001 reduction of standard weekly working
hours from 48 to 45 hours in Chile. He uses the EPS Panel (Encuesta
de proteccion social) between 2002 and 2005 to study whether employees
who worked 46-48 hours before the policy change lost their jobs more of-
ten than those not affected by the policy. He finds that this policy change
did not have positive or negative employment effects.
In addition to the country studies Kapteyn et al. (2004) analyze cross-
country differences in actual working hours which they interpret as work-
sharing assuming that the reductions in actual working hours are driven
by changes in standard hours. There is ample empirical evidence that
actual hours follow standard hours. The analysis of Kapteyn et al. (2004)
is based on data from 16 OECD countries from the individual labor force
statistics over the time period 1960-2001. They find that work-sharing
has a significant positive long-run effect on the wage rate and a positive
9Our study is distinct from his study because we also take potential firm effects into
account. The analysis allows us to make a distinction between workers that worked
40-42 hours and workers that work more than 42 hours before the policy change. The
analysis also allows us to study the effects of the working hours reduction on workers
who themselves were not directly affected. In this chapter we attempt to establish
the comprehensive employment effects by performing an analysis at the level of well
defined labor markets. Our analysis allows us to distinguish the net employment
between worker flows.
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but insignificant long-run effect on employment.
In conclusion, considering the previous research, employment effects
will depend on how hourly wages react to the reduction of the workweek.
Under full wage compensation, although there are some country specific
differences, one can expect that the employment effects will be null or
negative if hourly wages increase significantly in reaction to the standard
workweek reduction.
2.5 Data
We use a longitudinal data set matching firms and workers in the Por-
tuguese economy, called Quadros de Pessoal (QP – “Lists of Personnel”).
The Quadros de Pessoal data are collected annually by the Ministry of
Employment through an inquiry that every establishment with wage-
earners is legally obliged to fill in. Reported data cover all the personnel
working for the establishment in a reference week in October. Every year
QP gather information for more than two hundred thousand firms and two
million workers (see Cardoso (2006) for more details). Our data cover the
period 1994 until 1998. QP collects information on both standard and
overtime hours done in the reference month; a posteriori we transform
them into weekly hours. Standard hours are defined as the hours worked
during a normal week at the going wage. Overtime hours in a week is the
time worked at an overtime premium (50% for the first hour, 75% for ad-
ditional hours). Monthly earnings are the monthly payments associated
with the standard workweek. We use the national consumer price index
to transform nominal earnings into real ones. The hourly wage is com-
puted as the ratio of monthly earnings and standard hours of work. The
worker is considered to be separated from the firm if he changes employer
or leaves the sample.
In Section 2.7.1 our analysis focuses on workers, both males and fe-
males, who are full-time wage earners, i.e. workers working more than
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35 hours per week.10 We dropped individuals with missing information
on normal hours of work and monthly earnings. The period before the
introduction of the working hours covers October 1994 to October 1996
(See Appendix for detailed descriptive statistics). According to the way
the law was implemented, the impact of the law is expected to take more
than a year to completely take effect. We consider the situation in Octo-
ber 1997 to represent the after 1 year effects of the December 1996 change
in law, while the situation in October 1998 is assumed to represent the
after 2 years effects.11
In Section 2.7.2 in order to estimate the impact of the reduction in
hours on the overall level of employment we aggregate the firms to the level
of labor markets defined by industry (7 categories), region (4 categories)
and size of the firm (3 categories). Thus we perform our analysis at the
level of 84 labor markets.12
2.6 Stylized facts
Table 2.1 shows that in the period October 1994-1996 on average 22%
of the Portuguese workers had a standard workweek between 40 and 42
hours, while 30% had a workweek of more than 42 hours. So, half of the
Portuguese workers were not affected by the reduction in standard work-
ing hours because through collective agreement their standard workweek
was already below the new standard. By October 1997 the percentage
of workers working more than 40 hours decreased to 38 and by October
10The main reason is that workers working less than 35 hours may have a different
attachment to the labor market.
11In section 2.7.1 we exploit a 10% random sample using the Stata sampling proce-
dure “sample2”. This procedure allows the creation of a random sample by clusters of
observations. Once an individual is randomly chosen all observations of this individual
are sampled. Thus a sample with the original panel characteristics of the population
is created.
12For some of these labor markets we did not use information from every year. We
removed some outliers, where the change in job creation rate and employment growth
was strongly negative.
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1998 only 9% of the workers worked more than 40 hours.
Table 2.1: Proportion of workers in each hour category; standard
working hours
October ∆ ∆
1994-1996 1997 1998 1994/6-97 1997-98
<35 11 8 11 -3 3
35-40 37 54 80 17 26
40-42 22 23 8 1 -15
>42 30 15 1 -15 -14
Total 100 100 100 0 0
Given that in period t an individual is working in a certain hour cat-
egory, in the next period, he might continue working in the same hour
category, he might change hour category and work overtime or not or fi-
nally, he might lose his job. Table 2.2 shows the proportion of workers in
all three situations. Although the majority of individuals do not change
their hour category, the fraction of individuals that change hour category
is large specially in the categories over 40 hours. There is a large fraction
of individuals that lose their job (21 to 29%), specially in the categories
over 40 hours. However, the probability that an individual will lose his
job does not seem to be related with the legislation change.
We observe a clear change in hours’ categories, specially after 1996
there is a clear decrease in the number of hours worked. From part c
and d of table 2.2 we see that after 1996, the treated group has a clear
tendency to go more to lower hour categories and go less to higher hour
categories. Thus, the policy change clearly affected the hour distribution
of the individuals in the treated group.
According to the Portuguese National Institute (INE), firms pay over-
time hours mainly up to 10 hours per week. In 1996 there was a clear
increase in the use of overtime hours and the effect lasted up to the early
years of 2000. Even being frequently used the proportion on the overall
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Table 2.2: Transition rates given usual hour category in t
t+ 1
t Loose job < 35 35-40 41-42 > 42 Total
a. 1994-1995 35-40 22 4 61 12 1 100
41-42 25 2 11 59 3 100
>42 29 3 10 25 33 100
b. 1996 35-40 21 3 70 6 0 100
41-42 24 2 30 43 1 100
>42 25 2 14 45 14 100
c. 4 35-40 -1 -1 9 -6 -1 0
41-42 -1 0 19 -16 -2 0
>42 -4 -1 4 20 -19 0
d. 44 41-42 0 1 10 -10 -1 0
>42 -3 0 -5 26 -18 0
Notes: Panel c is the difference between panels a and b respectively for each hour category. Panel d
uses panel c to compute the difference respectively between 41-42 and more than 42 hours category
and the 35-40 hour category.
use of payed overtime hours of work decreased significantly in our sample.
The histograms in figure 2.1 (panel a and b) show the proportion of full-
time workers employed on each number of hours. The fraction of workers
working more than 40 hours clearly decreased and almost disappeared
after 1997.
Besides checking the impact of the policy on the individual level it is
interesting to include the firm characteristics especially, because it is also
a firm decision to react to the policy and therefore it does not matter to
see the worker individual perspective without given a context on the firm
level. First, we must understand some stylized facts from firm dynamics
in Portugal. The firm flows in Portugal during the 1990s are very high
reflecting a firm turnover of around 35% every year.13 This indicates
that one third of the firms every year is either starting or ceasing its
activity. The entry rate of firms increased between 1996 and 1997 (3%).
In opposition the rate of firm exits remained high but decreased by 2%
13The average firm size between 1986 and 2008 is 11 workers. And it has decreased
from 18 in 1986 to 9 workers in 2008.
24
Chapter 2. Reduction of Standard Working Hours










30 35 40 45 50
normal weekly hours
1994-1996 1997-2000











30 35 40 45 50
Total weekly hours
1994-1996 1997-2000
(b) Histogram of usual plus overtime hours worked
in the same period.
We are interested in the behavior of certain types of firms in what
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concerns their reactions in terms of use of overtime, firing and hiring. We
already explained that the use of overtime might have affected the reaction
of firms towards the policy. After the policy change we saw that certain
overtime hours became more expensive than before. Nonetheless, some
firms might need to continue using overtime or other firms whose workers
were working between the old and the new standard might start using
overtime. We find that the proportion of individuals working overtime
inside each firm is around 30% and it was not affected by the policy
change in 1997. The proportion of firms that have between 0 and 10% of
their workers doing overtime is 9% before the policy change and decreased
to 7% in 1997. There is not much variation in the use of overtime which
seems to indicate that the policy change did not affect each firms decision
about the use of overtime. The proportion of firms using overtime before
1996 was not very significant (5%) and it was not affected by the policy
change.
Table 2.3: Means of variables (annual percentages)
1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1996-98
∆e 3.9 3.7 6.6 5.2
JC 18.7 18.6 20.4 19.4
JD 14.8 14.9 13.8 14.2
WA 37.1 36.6 38.6 37.5
WS 33.1 32.9 32.2 32.5
Notes: ∆e represents the net employment employment between two subsequent dates. JC, JD, WA
and WS represents respectively, job creation, job destruction, worker accession and worker separation.
October data.
Table 2.4: Job flows and worker flows; 1994-1998
Firm Firm Firm Firm Total Job Total Job Net Worker Worker
New Expansion Contraction Closure Creation Destruction Employment Accession Separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1+2) (3+4) (5) (6)
1994-95 8 9 6 7 17 14 3 33 30
1995-96 7 8 7 8 15 15 0 31 31
1996-97 10 9 6 7 18 13 5 35 30
1997-98 9 9 6 9 18 15 3 34 31
Notes: Change in employment between two subsequent dates as percentage of the average employment
at these two dates; October data.
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Table 2.3 shows the means of the variables we use in the aggregate
analysis. We define job and worker flows as usual (see Appendix). Table
2.4 shows that total job creation in the period October 1994-95 was 17%
while in the year thereafter it was 15%. Job creation increased to 18%
in the period October 1996-97 and October 1997-98. On the other hand
total job destruction in the period October 1994-95 and October 1995-
96 was around 14-15% while it decreased to 13% in the period October
1996-97. In the year thereafter job destruction increased again to 15%.
Thus, immediately after the policy was implemented in December 1996
job creation increased and job destruction decreased causing net employ-
ment to increase 5%. In the year thereafter job creation was constant
while job destruction increased somewhat, causing employment to grow
3%. Of course, these developments in job flows and worker flows may
have been affected by the working hours reduction, but they may also be
influenced by changes in the Portuguese economy. In an economy known
to be characterized by very high levels of firm creation and firm closures
(Mata and Portugal (1994)) it is not strange to see that after 1996, job
creation increased mainly through new firms. The main reason behind
the decrease of the job destruction is not so clear, firm closure or firm
contraction. The last two columns in Table 2.4 show that worker acces-
sions fluctuate more than worker separations. It is also clear that worker
turnover rates are high. Every year about one third of all Portuguese
workers leave their job and find a new job.14
14Blanchard and Portugal (2001) argue that those high turnover rates in Portugal




2.7.1 Individual worker empirical analysis
Exploratory analysis
We analyze the impact of the reduction of the work week assuming that
the policy change resembles a natural experiment. The treated group
consists of all individuals who worked more than 40 hours in October
1996; the control group consists of workers who worked 35-40 hours in
October 1996.15
The new law implied first, by 1st December 1996, all workweeks above
42 hours should be reduced by 2 hours; workweeks below 42 hours but
above 40 hours should meet the new standard of 40 hours per week.
Second, by 1st December 1997, all workweeks still above 40 hours should
meet the standard. Note that the data in Quadros de Pessoal is collected
in October. Thus, looking at Equation (6) we see how the empirical results
after 1 and 2 years can be interpreted as responses to the first and second
policy change. To analyze the effects of the working week reduction we
estimate the following equations:
∆yit = αt+βxit+(δ1h4042,i+δ2h42p,i)d96,t+(δ3h4042,i+δ4h42p,i)d97,t+εit (6)
where ∆y, the dependent variable, represent changes in standard hours,
overtime hours, hourly wages, monthly wages and job separation rate (de-
fined by the instantaneous probability of leaving the job), for individual
i in the period from October in year t to October in year t+ 1. Further-
more, the αt represent calendar year fixed effects, x represents a vector of
personal characteristics, h4042 and h42p are dummy variables representing
15To exploit the natural experiment character of the working time reduction we focus
on workers that are close to the “threshold” of 40 hours per week and ignore workers
on part-time jobs (less than 35 hours).
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working hours categories (40-42 hours and >42 hours per week), d96,t and
d97,t are dummy variables for the post reform period, respectively, first
year and second year. d96,t measures the effect between october 1996 and
october 1997 and therefore it can be interpreted as a response to the first
policy change (possibly with some lag). d97,t measures the effect between
october 1997 and october 1998 and therefore it can be interpreted as a
response to the second policy change. Finally, β is a vector of parameters,
the δ’s are also parameters while ε is an error term.
In a policy change evaluation it is fundamental to rule out bias from
self-selection as individuals are not randomly assigned to the treatment.
The individual’s decision to work more than 40 hours in October 1996
is independent from a possible outcome or the treatment effect. Proper
identification in a difference in difference framework relies on two impor-
tant assumptions. The first is the assumption of common time effects
across groups, and the second assumes there are no systematic compo-
sition changes for each group. The group of non-treated is statistically
equivalent to the treated group in all dimensions except treatment status
(Blundell and Dias (2002)). Thus, the control group is a good counter-
factual of what would have happened to the treated group in the absence
of the change in the law. Our empirical design already ensures these
assumptions along two dimensions. First, the common trends assump-
tion presumes that treated and controls experience common trends or,
in other words, the same shocks. Second, the empirical model that we
explore controls for observed and unobserved permanent heterogeneity,
which enhances the comparability between the two groups.
The working hours categories are defined on the basis of the situation
in October 1996, just before the introduction of the working time reduc-
tion. Assuming that the workers working less than 40 hours per week
were not affected, the general calendar time effects are represented by the
calendar year dummies and assuming that the differential development
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of the affected workers is represented by the working hours categories,
the parameters δ1 and δ2 of the interaction terms represent the treatment
effects. The relevant parameter estimates are presented in the upper part
of Table 2.5.
As expected standard working hours go down substantially. Overtime
hours increase in the first year, but in the second year they are approx-
imately constant. Apparently, the initial reduction of standard working
hours is partly compensated by an increase in overtime hours although
this effect is small. Hourly wages for workers affected increase, leaving
monthly earnings approximately constant.16 Somewhat surprisingly the
affected workers in the category 40-42 hours have a lower probability to
lose their job than non-affected workers. This may be explained by the
flexibility that firms could use on this group of workers.
So far, we ignored firm information. However, it might be that the
treatment effects are influenced by the firm share of workers that worked
more than 40 hours per week. After all, firms’ costs of the working hours
adjustment increase with the share of workers affected. To investigate
this possibility we add to equation (1) a number of interaction terms:17
∆yit = αt + βxit + {ζ1.ni + (δ1 + ω1ni)h4042,i + (δ2 + ω2ni)h42p,i}d96,t
+(ζ2.ni + δ3 + {ω3ni)h4042,i + (δ4 + ω4ni)h42p,i}d97,t + εit (7)
where ni represents the share of workers in the worker i’s firm who worked
more than 40 hours in October 1996. To the extent that the ω’s differ
from zero the composition of the workforce affects the treatment effect.
The ζ parameters represent “spillover” effects on workers who themselves
were not directly affected. As shown in the lower part of Table 2.5, these
workers increase the number of hours they work if the proportion of af-
16This was also found by Hunt (1999) in Germany and is attributed to the influence
of unions demanding no decline in monthly earnings.
17And, we also added to the equation ni, ni.d96,t, ni.d97,t, to make sure that the
ω-parameters represent the treatment effects.
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fected workers in the firm is large. These workers also have a bigger
probability to separate from their firm when the proportion of affected
workers is larger.
Table 2.5: Parameter estimates of the individual analysis
Standard Overtime Hourly Monthly Job
hours hours wage (%) earnings (%) separation (%)
a. Personal characteristics
Effects after 1 year
h4042 δ1 -1.54 (36.4)** 0.06 (2.7)** 3.66 (13.5)** -0.53 (1.8)* -4.95 (13.6)**
h42p δ2 -3.57 (95.3)** 0.08 (4.7)** 8.26 (34.9)** -0.56 (2.2)** 0.01 (0.0)
Effects after 2 years
h4042 δ3 -0.90 (18.6)** 0.05 (2.2)** 2.93 (11.5)** 0.43 (1.5) -5.73 (16.4)**
h42p δ4 -2.38 (55.2)** 0.02 (1.4) 5.88 (25.9)** 0.05 (0.2) -0.01 (0.3)
R
2
0.091 0.0003 0.014 0.004 0.040
b. Personal and firm characteristics
Effects after 1 year
h4042 δ1 -2.53 (20.5)** 0.02 (0.3) 6.06 (7.2)** -1.44 (1.6) -3.64 (3.4)**
h4042.n ω1 -0.01 (0.1) -0.01 (0.1) -2.39 (2.1)** -1.47 (1.2) -3.33 (2.3)**
h42p δ2 -4.47 (36.0)** 0.00 (0.1) 9.96 (13.2)** -1.61 (1.9)* 0.31 (0.3)
h42p.n ω2 -0.20 (1.2) 0.03 (0.4) -1.34 (1.3) -1.39 (1.2) -1.97 (1.5)
h3540.n ζ1 1.89 (19.9)** 0.09 (2.4)** -1.44 (2.3)** 3.61 (5.3)** 1.83 (2.3)**
Effects after 2 years
h4042 δ3 0.01 (0.1) -0.11 (1.7)* 0.78 (1.1) 0.76 (0.9) -1.27 (1.3)
h4042.n ω3 -2.42 (12.6)** 0.21 (2.3)** 3.21 (3.3)** -3.63 (3.2)** -10.18 (7.3)**
h42p δ4 -1.92 (14.2)** -0.02 (0.5) 5.38 (8.1)** 0.66 (0.8) 5.24 (6.0)**
h42p.n ω4 -1.73 (9.3)** 0.04 (0.6) 0.75 (0.8) -4.02 (3.7)** -11.09 (8.9)**
h3540.n ζ2 1.49 (15.1)** 0.03 (0.8) -0.14 (0.3) 4.30 (6.9)** 5.11 (6.9)**
R
2
0.094 0.0003 0.014 0.004 0.040
F -statistic 168.34** 2.06** 20.45** 9.05** 18.19**
Notes: Ordinary least squares; first four columns based on 415,863 observations, the fifth column
based on 536,997 observations; parameter estimates of control variables are not represented; control
variables include calendar year fixed effects, working hours dummies for categories 40-42 hours and
more than 42 hours, industry (10 categories), region (7 categories), education (8 categories), wage
(5 categories)(not included in the wage and earnings regressions), size of firm (4 categories) and
tenure. The estimates in the lower part of the table also contain firms’ share of workers working
more than 40 hours per week and the interaction terms between this share and calendar time fixed
effects. The population includes all full-time workers in the private sector working between 35 and 50
hours. Absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses; The F -statistic concerns
a comparison of the estimation results in the lower and the upper part of the table; a **/* indicates
that the coefficient is different from zero at a 5%/10% level of significance.
Table 2.5 also shows that ω1 and ω2 are often insignificantly different
from zero indicating that in the first year the composition of the work-
force is not very important. However, since the other ω-parameters often
differ significantly from zero, in the second year the treatment effect is
31
2.7. Empirical analysis
influenced by the workforce composition.
Table 2.6 gives an idea of the size of the firm effects. The treatment
effects are calculated on the basis of the parameter estimates of the lower
part of Table 2.5 and concern the marginal effects evaluated when 25 and
50% of the firms workforce worked more than 40 hours before the policy
change. From these calculations we draw two conclusions. First, the
treatment effects are bigger – in absolute terms – for workers who worked
more than 42 hours per week, with one exception, the job separation
rate. Workers in the category 40-42 hours are less likely to separate than
workers working fewer or more hours. Our second conclusion concerns
the firm effects. Most of the treatment effects do not depend on the
share of workers working 40 hours or more. Firm effects are significant
but quantitatively not very important. The only exception concerns the
job separation rate in the second year. Somewhat surprisingly, these are
more favorable the higher the share of workers working more than 40
hours. Our interpretation of this phenomenon is that there are negative
spillover effects affecting workers that worked less than 40 hours per week.
2.7.2 Aggregate empirical analysis
Set-up of the analysis
By using market level data we can take the creation of new firms in
a particular market into account because they are part of employment
creation in that market. The way these labor markets are affected by
the working hours reduction depends on how many workers are affected
within these labor markets.18 As a definition of policy intensity we use
a variable n, defined as the share of affected workers inside each labor
18Obviously, the hourly wage may have been affected by the reduction of standard
working hours. However, this does not affect our reduced form analysis, in which
we relate the change in standard working hours to the employment effect without
attempting to distinguish between the various determinants of this change.
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Table 2.6: Treatment effects of the individual analysis
Weekly working hours 35-40 40-42 >42
% of workers affected 25 50 25 50 25 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effects after 1 year
Standard hours 0.5 0.9 -2.5 -2.5 -4.5 -4.6
Overtime hours 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hourly wage (%) -0.4 -0.7 5.5 4.9 9.6 9.3
Monthly earnings (%) 0.9 1.8 -1.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3
Job separation (%) 0.5 0.9 -4.5 -5.3 -0.2 -0.7
Effects after 2 years
Standard hours 0.4 0.7 -0.6 -1.2 -2.4 -2.8
Overtime hours 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Hourly wage (%) -0.0 -0.1 1.6 2.4 5.6 5.8
Monthly earnings (%) 1.1 2.2 -0.1 -1.1 -0.3 -1.4
Job separation (%) 1.3 2.6 -3.8 -6.4 2.5 -0.3
Notes: The percentage of workers affected concerns the workers that worked more than 40 hours per




Figure 2.2: Market level distribution of the share of workers work-
ing more than 40 hours per week; October 1994-96
Notes: n is the share of affected workers inside each labor market working more than 40 hours at the
relevant October dates. 0-0.1 means 0 to 10% of the total number of workers are affected.
market working more than 40 hours at the relevant October dates. The
distribution of n in the period October 1994 to October 1996, shortly
before the working hours reduction, is presented in Figure 2.2. Clearly
the policy intensity varies a lot between the different labor markets. Over
time there are some changes in the distribution but by and large the
distribution of n in various years looks very much alike.
To analyze the year 1 effects of the working week reduction in labor
market k represented by industry, region, size we estimate the following
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equation:
ykt = αt + αk + βnkt + δnkt.dp + εkt (8)
The dependent variables are job creation rate (JC), job destruction rate
(JD), worker accession rate (WA) and worker separation rate (WS) and
change in employment (∆e) from t to t + 1, where t runs from October
1994 to October 1996. Furthermore, the αt represents calendar time fixed
effects, the αk represent time-invariant labor market fixed effects, dp rep-
resents a dummy variable for the post reform period, and n represents the
share of individuals that worked more than 40 hours in October of year
t. The main parameter of interest is δ, representing the treatment effect.
Finally, ε represents an error term.
Exploratory analysis
To give an idea about the relationship between the share of workers work-
ing more than 40 hours per week and employment growth, job creation
and job destruction Figure 2.3 presents an exploratory analysis. The hor-
izontal axis shows the share of workers working more than 40 hours per
week in October 1996, shortly before the mandatory reduction in the stan-
dard working week was implemented. The vertical axis shows changes in
the period October 1996 to October 1997 in employment growth (panel
a), job creation (panel b) and job destruction (panel c).
As shown in panel a of Figure 2.3 the higher share of 40+ hours
workers, the higher the change in employment growth. The slope of the
straight lines in Figure 2.3 represent an estimate for δ.19 Indeed, the slope
19Note that if we take first differences of equation 8 over the period 1995-96 we find:
∆yk,95−96 = α96 − α95 + β(nk,96 − nk,95) + δnk,96 + εk,96 − εk,95 (9)
such that if n didn’t change too much between 1995 and 1996 we find:
∆yk,95−96 ≈ α∗ + δnk,96 + ε∗ (10)
In a linear regression we find for δ (absolute t-statistics based on robust standard
errors): panel a: 0.090 (1.8), panel b: 0.017 (0.6), panel c -0.074 (2.2).
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Figure 2.3: Changes in employment growth, job creation and job destruc-
tion; 1996-1997










































































is positive in panel a indicating that the larger the share of workers in-
volved in the reduction of the standard workweek, the higher employment
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growth.
Panel b shows that there is no such relationship with job creation, while
from panel c it is clear that job destruction is affected by the reduction
of the standard workweek: the larger the share of workers involved in
the reduction of the standard workweek, the lower the change in job
destruction.
Parameter estimates
The parameter estimates for δ from equation 8 estimated over the period
1994-97 are presented in the first column of Table 2.7. As shown, the
change in employment is significantly affected. The higher n, the higher
employment growth. Conditional on the other characteristics of the labor
market, an average labor market with an n of 0.5 experiences an employ-
ment growth of almost 5%. As shown, job creation and worker accessions
are not affected by the reduction of the standard workweek. However, job
destruction and workers separations are negatively affected. Apparently,
labor markets confronted with a reduction of the standard workweek re-
duce job destruction and thus increase employment. This would be in
line with predictions from the theoretical model. Limiting the estimation
period to 1995-97 hardly affects the parameter estimates (column 2).20
Replacing ykt for t = 1996 in equation 8 by the averages for the pe-
riod 1996-98 we also estimated the year 2 effects of the working hours
reduction. The parameter estimates are presented in the third and fourth
column of Table 2.7. The results are very much the same as before.
The market level analysis allows us to make a distinction between
worker accessions to new firms and worker accessions to firms that survive.
Similarly, we can make a distinction between worker separations from
firm closures and worker separations from surviving firms. Table 2.8 also
shows how the working hours reductions affects the flow of workers to and
20This is evidence that the common trend assumption holds.
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Table 2.7: Baseline estimates of the aggregate analysis
1 year effect 2 years effect
1994-97 1995-97 1994-98 1995-98
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆e 0.097 (2.1)** 0.125 (2.2)** 0.091 (1.8)* 0.110 (1.8)*
JC 0.013 (0.5) 0.012 (0.4) 0.006 (0.2) -0.002 (0.1)
JD -0.084 (3.1)** -0.113 (3.3)** -0.085 (2.4)** -0.113 (2.5)**
WA 0.020 (0.6) 0.030 (0.9) -0.004 (0.1) -0.007 (0.2)
WS -0.082 (2.3)** -0.096 (2.1)** -0.097 (2.2)** -0.117 (2.2)**
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Notes: All estimates also have the share of 40+ hours workers (n) as explanatory variable in addition
to labor market fixed effects (84) and calendar period fixed effects (3); absolute t-statistics based on
robust (cluster) standard errors in parentheses (Bertrand et al. (2004)); a **/* indicates that the
coefficient is different from zero at a 5%/10% level of significance.
Table 2.8: Sensitivity analysis; distinguishing between surviving firms and
firms being born/dying
1 year effect 2 years effect
1994-97 1995-97 1994-98 1995-98
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firms being born and dying
∆e 0.089 (2.6)** 0.112 (2.6)** 0.061 (1.8)* 0.083 (2.1)**
WA 0.045 (1.9)* 0.048 (1.8)* 0.019 (0.9) 0.019 (0.8)
WS -0.044 (2.7)** -0.064 (2.7)** -0.042 (1.9)* -0.064 (2.2)**
Surviving firms
∆e 0.008 (0.3) 0.013 (0.4) 0.030 (1.1) 0.027 (0.8)
WA -0.025 (0.9) -0.019 (0.7) -0.024 (0.8) -0.026 (0.8)
WS -0.038 (1.4) -0.032 (1.0) -0.055 (2.1)** -0.052 (1.7)*
Observations 249 165 250 165
Labor markets 84 84 84 84
Note: see footnote Table 2.7.
from these different types of firms. The working hours reduction mainly
affects worker flows to new firms and from firm closures. Conditional on
the other characteristics of the labor market, firms being born and dying
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on an average labor market with an n of 0.5, experience an employment
growth of almost 5% after 1 year, where half of this effect comes from
worker separations and half comes from worker accessions. After 2 years
the effect on net employment is positive but smaller (3.5%) and it comes
mainly from the reduction of worker separations. The effects to and from
surviving firms are much smaller after 1 year, but after 2 years the effects
are very similar.
2.8 Conclusions
The reduction of the maximum standard workweek from 44 to 40 hours
directly affected about half of all workers in Portugal since they had a
standard workweek of more than 40 hours. We study this working hours
reduction that was introduced in Portugal in 1996.
Initially, the reduction of working hours was compensated by the use of
overtime. Hourly wages of the affected workers increased, reducing their
monthly earnings only slightly. Workers in the category 40-42 hours were
less likely to separate from their firm. Due to spillover effects at the firm
level the working hours reduction also affected workers working less than
40 hours per week. Our analysis allows us to say something about how
the working time reduction affected workers who themselves where not
directly affected because they already worked below 40 hours, but who
were indirectly affected when part of the workforce at their firm worked
more than 40 hours. We show that indeed these workers were affected.
We attribute this to the overall cost of the working hours adjustment for
the firm which increase with the share of workers affected. Therefore the
estimates presented are in fact a lower bound of the true effects because
due to spillover effects also the control groups may have been affected.
Previous empirical studies suggest that reductions of standard work-
ing hours do not have positive employment effects. However, previous
studies only measure partial employment effect while in our study we
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consider overall employment effects. In our analysis we exploit regional,
sectoral and firm-size variation in the share of workers who were affected
by the working hours reduction. A working hours reduction is likely to
have had a bigger impact when the share of affected workers was high. To
investigate this we perform an analysis on the level of labor markets de-
fined by industry, region and firm size. We find evidence that the working
hours reduction had a positive effect on employment through a fall in job
destruction. We can only speculate about the reason why reducing stan-
dard working hours in Portugal increased employment whereas in other
countries no such effects occurred. Most likely, the increased flexibility in
the use of the standard workweek made it easier to adjust the workforce
at the intensive margin rather than at the extensive margin. To the ex-
tent that this reduced labor costs, job destruction was reduced, causing
positive employment effects. The reduced labor costs did not stimulate
job creation which may have to do with the strict employment protection
in Portugal.
Previous studies found null or negative employment effects due to the
adjustment of hourly wage. We add to the literature because we find
evidence that under full wage compensation and if it is difficult for firms
to adjust the workforce one can expect positive employment effect via a
decrease in job destruction.
2.9 Appendix
Appendix A - Measuring job flows and worker
flows
We define job and worker flows as usual (Davis and Haltiwanger (1999)).
We denote the level of employment at firm j in period t as ejt: the average
number of employees at the start and the end of the period. We denote
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the change of employment at firm j during period t as ∆ejt; the change
is calculated as the difference between the number of workers at the end
of the period and the number of workers at the beginning of the period.









where S−t represents the subset of firms with ∆ejt < 0. In the same way








where S+t represents the subset of firms with ∆ejt > 0. These measures
of job flows underestimate the true values of gross job destruction and
creation. Even if at the level of an individual firm employment change
equals zero there might be some job creation and job destruction going
on. With heterogeneous workers, jobs and firms making the distinction
between job and worker flows is fundamental.
If F is the number of workers that left the firm in a particular period,
and H denotes the number of workers that entered the firm in that period,


















By definition, it holds that:
JCt − JDt = WAt −WSt = ∆et (15)
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A surviving firm is a firm that is reported in our data both in 1996 and
in the current year (t). The birth of a new firm is reported if it is the
first time this firm is reported in our data. We consider there exists a
firm closure if a firm is reported as having gone out of business at time t
if that year is the first year it fails to report.
Appendix B
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Table 2.9: Descriptive statistics
All h40p h3540
Age (years) 36 35 37
Male 62 62 62
Standard hours 40 41 38
Overtime hours 0 0 0
Monthly earnings (2008 euros) 782 650 956
Hourly wage (2008 euros) 1.45 1.15 1.83
Tenure (in months) 108 102 116
Education (percentages)
Less than basic school 3 3 2
Basic school 41 49 30
Lower Secondary 22 26 18
Upper Secondary 15 11 20
Bachelor 13 8 20
College 1 1 3
Master 3 1 6
PhD 2 1 2
Firm size (percentages)
Less than 19 26 30 21
19 - 89 26 28 23
90 - 550 25 25 25
More than 550 23 16 31
Industry (percentages)
Food, textiles 1 1 1
Mineral products 1 0 1
Manufacturing 38 45 30
Electricity 1 2 0
Construction 8 6 10
Trade 22 24 18
Transports 8 6 11
Banking, insurance 8 2 15
Business services 7 6 9
Other services 6 7 5
Region (percentages)
North 35 43 25
Algarve 2 3 2
Center 17 18 14
Lisbon 38 28 53
Inland 4 4 4
Azores 1 2 1
Madeira 2 2 1
No. Observations 415863 236282 179581
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (mean) used in the analysis to
construct the sample. The second column shows statistics computed using
all workers and on the third and fourth columns they are computed using
the sample of individuals working more than 40 hours and less than 40 hours
respectively. The units are explained in front of the variables while gender,






The U.S. labor market has changed significantly since 1985 up until the
financial crisis.1 Unemployment rates shifted downward to 5 percent or
below. This trend toward lower unemployment rates was largely driven by
lower unemployment inflows (Hall (2006)) and higher job finding prob-
abilities (Shimer (2012)). Concurrently, however, mean elapsed unem-
ployment duration surprisingly trended up. Indeed, average unemploy-
ment duration reached 18 weeks in 2008. Figure 3.1 shows that the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS) series of unemployment rates and median
elapsed weeks of unemployment used to be very well-aligned until the
end of the eighties. The two series began diverging significantly in the
early nineties and the gap has widened ever since (see Figure 3.1). In a
sense, the American job market, with these rising unemployment rates
and unemployment duration, resembles more the European.
The striking evolution of unemployment in the United States has not
gone un-noticed. A number of studies have examined the question of why
1This chapter is based on a joint paper with Pedro Portugal and José António
Machado that has been published as a working paper, called “Joblessness” (Raposo
et al. (2010)).
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the unemployment duration became so much longer (Baumol and Wolff
(1998); Valletta (1998); Abraham and Shimer (2001); Juhn et al. (2002);
Mukoyama and Sahin (2009); and, Aaronson et al. (2010)).
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Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey.
Units of the graph: Unemployment rate in % and median unemploy-
ment duration in weeks.
Explanations for the recent rising trend of average unemployment du-
ration rely either on the compositional changes of the labor force or, more
fundamentally, on the emergence of some economic mechanisms.2 Exam-
ples of the former explanation include Abraham and Shimer (2001). They
use CPS data for the period 1968 and 2000 to estimate labor-market-
transition rates to show that the aging of the baby-boom generation and
the increased labor force attachment of women contributed to the ob-
2The influence of methodological changes in the CPS surveys has also been studied
(see, e.g., Abraham and Shimer (2001)).
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served enlarged share of long-term unemployed. According to the au-
thors the growing stability of women’s employment is also determinant to
understand why their unemployment rates decreased and unemployment
duration has increased. Aaronson et al. (2010) examine aggregate data
based on interrupted spell durations from the CPS, and also find that
the unemployment duration increase can be explained by demographic
changes (age and gender), i.e. older workers have longer durations and
there are now more older workers. Juhn et al. (2002) use employment
data from the 1968-2001 annual demographic files that supplement the
CPS. They estimate equations for unemployment transitions and unem-
ployment durations and they claim that joblessness among less-skilled
men has taken the form of time spent out of the labor force rather than
unemployment per se.3 Valletta (1998) uses data from the CPS account-
ing for the 1994 CPS redesign to estimate unemployment duration and
unemployment incidence by reason regressions. He reports that the in-
crease in average unemployment duration was produced by the joblessness
experience of displaced workers. Duca and Campbell (2007) use U.S. an-
nual data from 1960-2005 to apply simulation techniques. They attribute
the rise in unemployment duration to both ageing of the population and
a decline in job turnover, which might stem from decreased job security.
Three main economic explanations have been offered for the observed
lengthening of the average duration of unemployment. In the first uptake,
Baumol and Wolff (1998) construct a simple model and use time series
data for the U.S. to conclude that institutional factors like changes in the
unemployment insurance, in the rate of unionization, and in the minimum
wage cannot account for the observed increase in unemployment duration.
Instead they link average duration of unemployment to technical change,
arguing that the acceleration of technical change has raised the share
of the labor force that is unemployed in any period because plants close
3The relaxation of the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Secu-




more often. Second, Mukoyama and Sahin (2009) evaluate a search model
which they calibrate using CPS data covering the period 1971 and 2002.
They note that increased within-group wage inequality, which translates
into higher uncertainty about wage offer distribution, is likely to lead to
longer periods of job search. Finally, Juhn et al. (2002) maintain that
long-term changes in joblessness have been produced by adverse shifts in
labor demand (lower long-term demand), reflected in low levels of hiring
(Aaronson et al. (2010)).
In this chapter, we rely on censored quantile regression methods to an-
alyze the changes in the U.S. unemployment duration distribution. Quan-
tiles seem appropriate to analyze unemployment duration for two main
reasons. First, the methodology estimates the whole quantile process of
duration time conditional on the attributes of interest, which constitutes
a complete characterization of the distribution of duration time. Quan-
tiles provide a natural way of characterizing important concepts such as
short- or long-term unemployment, by focusing on the relevant tails of
the duration distribution. Second, from a methodological standpoint, it
is worth observing that quantile regression provides a unified and flexible
framework for such an analysis.
Changes over time in the distribution of unemployment duration may
be framed as resulting from changes in the distribution of the conditioning
variables such as the age distribution or from changes in the conditional
distribution of duration itself. We use the Machado and Mata (2005)
method to disentangle those effects. The basic building block is the es-
timation of the conditional distribution by quantile regressions; then, by
resorting to resampling procedures, one estimates marginal distributions
consistent with the estimated conditional model as well as with hypoth-
esized distributions for the covariates. Comparing the marginal distribu-
tions implied by alternative distributions for the covariates one is then
able to perform counterfactual exercises that isolate the different effects
contributing to the overall change.
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The data used in this inquiry are taken from the nationally represen-
tative Displaced Worker Surveys of 1988 and 2008. The DWS is a retro-
spective survey that has been conducted biennially since 1984. It contains
information on the nature of the job lost and the subsequent joblessness
duration of workers displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or
abolition of shift or position. The DWS is particularly well suited to
study the distributional shape of unemployment duration because, unlike
the CPS, it is a representative sample of the flow of displaced workers and
because it provides information on completed spells of unemployment.4
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set,
providing a careful comparison of the two Displaced Worker Surveys used.
Section 3 outlines the econometric methodology. The basic regression
results and the Machado and Mata decomposition results to sort out the
forces behind the changes in unemployment duration are presented in
Section 4 and 5. Section 6 deploys a mixture model to help interpret the
results and section 7 includes a sensitivity analysis. Section 8 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 General Description
The data used in this inquiry are taken from the nationally representative,
Displaced Worker Supplement to the February 1988 and 2008 Current
Population Survey. The dataset - and changes in the survey, including
the wording of the core displacement question and the recall period over
which information on job loss is recorded - are well described elsewhere
(see, for example Farber (1999)), so that only brief introductory remarks
are required here. The DWS has been conducted biennially since 1984.
The survey asks individuals from the regular CPS if, in any of the three
4It is demonstrably harder to characterize the distribution of an unemployed pop-




years preceding the survey date, they had lost a job due to plant closing,
an employer going out of business, a layoff from which the individual
was not recalled, or other similar reasons. If the respondent has been
displaced, he or she is asked a series of questions concerning the nature
of the lost job and subsequent labor market experience, in particular, the
time to find another job.
It contains information on the nature of the lost job and subsequent
joblessness for workers displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or
abolition of shift or position. Such data can be supplemented by extensive
information on the personal characteristics of the worker contained in the
parent CPS. The choice of the 1988 and 2008 surveys was guided by the
need to use a comparable framework to the greatest extent. The 1988
DWS survey was the first to provide information for a single spell of
joblessness (until 1986 the recorded jobless duration included multiple
spells of joblessness). The 2008 survey is the most recent available survey
with adequate data on joblessness duration. Still, there remain some
issues of comparability that will be discussed below.
The DWS has a number of advantages over administrative data. First,
unlike the unemployment registry, the DWS survey covers both recipients
and non-recipients of unemployment benefits. Second, because it is ret-
rospective, the information on unemployment duration is not censored at
the time of the exhaustion of benefits. And, third, the DWS allows the
identification of transitions of displaced workers to another job without
any intervening spell of unemployment.
It is important to collect information on job-to-job transitions because
a non-negligible portion of the displaced worker does not observe a job-
lessness experience. It is however worth noting that the incidence of this
type of employment adjustment did not change from the 1988 survey to
the 2008 survey.5
5From an analytical point of view, one is interested, of course, in all the routes taken
by the workers following the occurrence of a displacement event. The consideration of
direct job-to-job transitions creates, however, some ambiguity in the measurement of
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There are inevitably some shortcomings of the DWS data. Retrospec-
tive data are subject to recall bias - individuals experiencing displacement
in past years may be more likely to understate their jobless duration than
are more recent job losers - and respondents are prone to round (to months
and quarters) their reported spells of unemployment. Beginning with the
1994 survey, however, the period over which job loss is measured has
been reduced from five to three years, which should reduce the recall bias
problem.
As mentioned above, since the 1988 survey the measure of unemploy-
ment has referred to the length of the single spell of joblessness that
followed the displacement event and resulted in reemployment. To be
sure, the definition still does not require the unemployed individual to be
engaged in active search, so that this single spell may include intervals of
suspended job search/withdrawal, but it no longer includes multiple spells
of joblessness. A more recent innovation which affects the 2008 survey is
that the DWS unemployment data are no longer top coded (at 99 weeks
of joblessness). An additional source of right censoring in the data stems
from our inclusion (via the CPS) of those individuals who failed to find
work after displacement but who were nevertheless economically active as
of the survey date. Overall, the proportion of censored observations is, in
our sample, around 17-19 percent.
Although we included those who wanted but never found employment
after losing their jobs - as well as those individuals who transitioned di-
rectly into reemployment without any intervening spell of joblessness -
we excluded individuals who were not economically active at the time of
the survey. Further, because the nature of displacement is not well de-
fined for certain individuals and sectors, those employed part time and in
agriculture at the point of displacement were also excluded, as were those
aged less than 20 years and above 61 years. These restrictions yielded
unemployment duration. We shall discuss below the practical consequences of using




a sample of 2,837 (63% from the original data) individuals for 1988 and
2,199 (70% from the original data) for 2008.
3.2.2 Comparability of the DWS Surveys
There are a number of comparability issues that need to tackled. First,
and most importantly, whereas the 1988 survey is a five-year retrospec-
tive data set of displaced workers based on the question ‘In the past five
years, that is since January 1983, has ...lost or left a job because of a plant
closing, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which...was not
recalled, or other similar reason?”, the 2008 survey is a three-year ret-
rospective data set based on the question “During the last three calen-
dar years, that is, from January of 2005 through December of 2007, did
(name/you) lose a job, or leave one because a plant or company closed or
moved, (your/his/her) position or shift was abolished, insufficient work,
or another similar reason?”. If the response to the job loss core question
was positive, the respondent was asked whether the reason for displace-
ment was 1) plant closing, 2) slack work, 3) position shifted or abolished,
4) seasonal job ended, 5) self-employment failed, and 6) other reasons.
In line with the CPS definition of job displacement, only the first three
situations will be considered in this chapter.
Even though the slight change of wording is unlikely to raise any major
comparison problems, the reduction of the retrospective period is poten-
tially more serious. Since there is information on the year of displacement
of the worker, one can minimize this problem excising from the 1988
sample the individuals displaced in 1983 and 1984.6 But this procedure
does not completely solve the issue. If an individual experienced multiple
spells of joblessness (which affects a fraction of displaced workers) the
interviewer has instructions to record the episode where the worker lost
the job with the longest duration. It may well occur that after loosing
6Displacements that occurred during January of 1988 were also excluded. The 2008
survey does not include, by construction, workers displaced in 2008.
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a long-tenure job during 1983 or 1984 an individual was displaced again
during the 1985-1987 period. In this case, this displacement from a short-
duration job is not registered. There is a clear implication for distortion
of the distribution of job duration, with short job durations being likely
to be under represented in the 1988 survey in comparison with the 2008
survey. But there is no unambiguous implication for the distribution of
unemployment duration.7
Second, even though unemployment rates were falling and labor mar-
ket conditions were improving over the survey periods, the cyclical condi-
tions were not identical. In fact, the average state unemployment rate at
the time of displacement is 2.4 percentage points lower in the 2008 survey
than the 1988 survey. We expect that by conditioning the unemployment
duration distribution on the unemployment rate, we will be able to isolate
the impact of the business cycle.
Third, in both surveys the displaced workers are asked whether they
received advance notice of impending their lay-off, but in the 2008 survey
this question is restricted to written notice, where in the 1988 survey the
individuals distinguish between informal and written notice. In order to
make this variable as comparable as possible we will consider as notified
only those workers who received written notice at least two months before
the date of displacement.
Apart from these three comparability issues, which were considered
in the analysis, we are convinced that the two DWS surveys provide an
adequate framework for characterizing the evolution of the unemployment
experience of displaced workers throughout the period 1985 up to 2007.
7Some checks can, however, be implemented. First, one can compare the job du-
ration distribution for the 1983-1984 period with the 1985-1987 period. Second, one
can exclude from both samples workers with fewer than two years of tenure in the
pre-displacement job. And third, one can use our decomposition methodology to sim-
ulate the 2008 unemployment distribution with the 2008 job duration distribution.
In all cases we arrive to the conclusion that the issue of multiple job spells does not




Comparing this counterfactual sample with samples of durations from the
actual marginals for 2008 and 1988, it is possible to derive Oaxaca type
decompositions for the entire distribution, rather than for just its mean.
We use the methodology M&M proposed in Machado and Mata (2005)
to decompose the observed changes in unemployment duration between
1988 and 2008, in those due to changes in the conditional distribution of
durations (the β’s) and those stemming from changes in the joint distri-
bution of the covariates. Other decompositions of interest often involve
isolating the contribution of a single covariate and a single coefficient.8
In this chapter we introduce a methodological innovation in terms of
implementing censored quantile regressions to control for left censoring
but also random right censoring. The censoring correction methodology
is presented below.
3.3.1 Censored quantile regressions
Let Ti represent the duration of the “most representative” unemployment
spell of individual i and zi be the vector of covariates for the ith obser-
vation. We consider statistical models specifying , the pth (p ∈ (0, 1))
quantile of T as
Qy(T )(p|z) = z′β(p) (1)
where y is measured in log and β(p) is a vector of QR parameters, varying
from quantile to quantile.
Our sample provides information on complete unemployment dura-
tions, but there are some incomplete spells (right censoring). More-
8In the implementation of the method in this chapter we made the lower percentile
equal to 0.10 and the upper percentile equal to 0.90. We estimated the quantile
regression coefficients at equally spaced intervals of length 0.005. We then draw 1000
(= m) of such estimates with replacement. A code in STATA with the whole procedure
is available on request.
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over, to avoid problems with taking logs of very short spells (0 or close
to 0 weeks) we, arbitrarily, censored durations inferior to 0.25 at 0.25
weeks. The sample information we consider may thus be represented by
(y?i , zi), i = 1, . . . , n where y
?
i = min[max(yi, l), ui], ui denotes the upper
threshold for yi and l the left censoring point (l = log(0.25)). When
observation i is not censored ui was taken to be the potential censoring
duration (for instance, for a spell of six weeks starting in March 2007,








p ε for ε ≥ 0
(p− 1) ε for ε < 0,
(Powell (1984, 1986)). Estimation was performed iteratively using Buchin-
sky (1994) ILPA procedure with the modification suggested by Fitzen-
berger (1997). The censored quantile algorithm is programmed in STATA
as a do-file.9 For the estimation of standard errors for the individual coef-
ficients we resort to the bootstrap. Since the errors from the QR equation
are not necessarily homogeneously distributed, to achieve robustness we
resample (y, z, l, u) following the method of Bilias et al. (2000).
Due to censoring, it may not be possible to identify the whole quantile
process. Let (pl, pu) represent the range of quantiles that can be consis-






I(l + ξ < x′iβ(p) < ui − ξ)xix′i}
is uniformly positive definite in n for some ξ > 0 (Fitzenberger (1997),
Theorem 2.1).
9The algorithm is available upon request.
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Finally, we apply the estimator defined in equation (1) in the M&M
decomposition.
3.3.2 M&M decomposition method
Machado and Mata (2005) propose a generalization of the Blinder-Oaxaca
(BO) decomposition to a quantile framework using Monte Carlo meth-
ods. The decomposition method starts from the distribution of individ-
uals’ characteristics and the estimation of quantile coefficients to obtain
the unconditional distribution of unemployment duration, which are then
used to conduct counterfactual exercises.10
The M&M algorithm is as follows:
1. Generate pi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} from a standard uniform distribution;
2. Estimate the corresponding β̂t(pi), i.e. estimate the pth regression
quantile of y on zi;
3. Generate a random sample of size m from a given z; denoted z∗i ,
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
4. Obtain Q̂y(T )(p|z∗) = z∗
′
β̂(p), which is a random sample from the
marginal distributions of durations times implied by the model pos-
tulated for the quantile process and by the assumed joint distribu-
tion of the covariates.
The M&M algorithm generates a sample from the unconditional dis-
tribution of y for periods 0 and 1. From the algorithm it is clear that
the estimator is a function of both characteristics and parameters ob-
tained by estimating quantile regressions. This yields its applicability to
10Decomposition methods suggest a way for performing the detailed decomposition
for the structural effect that has clear drawbacks (Firpo et al, 2011). The detailed
decomposition of the wage structure effect arbitrarily depends on the choice of the
omitted group and therefore its interpretation is not clear. The omitted group is
defined as a nonwhite, single female who did not receive any written notice and whose
displacement is not due to firm closure.
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perform a decomposition analysis of changes in unemployment duration
distribution.
The traditional response to this problem is to restrict the comparisons
to the means of the two distributions (the so called BO decomposition). If
we model the conditional expectation of the variable of interest in period
t as E[y(t)|z] = z(t)βt (t = 0, 1), the decomposition reads
E[y(1)]− E[y(0)] = {E[z(1)]− E[z(0)]}β1︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariates
+E[z(0)][β1 − β0]︸ ︷︷ ︸
coefficients
.
That is, the change in the mean of y is decomposed in the contribu-
tion of the changes in the conditioning variables and the changes in the
conditional mean function itself. It is clear, however, that looking just
at means is overly restrictive as a method for analyzing cases such as
unemployment duration inequality, where the critical indicators relate to
spread and tail weight.
In M&M , Machado and Mata propose a method to decompose the
changes in a given distribution(y) in two periods (indexed by 0 and 1)
in several factors contributing to those changes: that is, an BO type




cond. distrib.y(0)|z → cond. distrib.y(1)|z
In M&M we estimate the marginal distribution of y by combining
the conditional distribution estimated by quantile regression with any
hypothesized distribution for the covariates. Comparing the marginal
distributions implied by different distributions for the covariates one is
then able to perform counterfactual exercises.
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We are interested in four types of counterfactual simulation exercises.
First, we want to estimate the density function of unemployment duration
in 2008, corresponding to the 1988 distribution of covariates. When z is
an estimate of the actual distribution of the covariates in the population,
the resulting sample of durations is drawn from the actual marginal dis-
tribution. In this case, z∗i may be obtained by drawing with replacement
from the rows of z, the regressors’ data matrix. considering a regression
using the distribution of the covariates in 2008 (t = 1), then the resulting
durations will constitute a simulated sample from the marginal distribu-
tion of durations that would have prevailed in 1988 (t = 0) if all covariates
had been distributed as in 2008 (assuming, of course, that the β vector
was estimated with 1988 data and that workers had unemployment du-
rations according to 2008).11 To compute this decomposition just follow
the algorithm above but drawing the bootstrap sample of the third step
from the rows of z(0) instead of z(1).
In the second decomposition exercise, we estimate the density function
of unemployment duration in 2008, corresponding to the 1988 coefficients.
This way it is possible to decompose the observed changes in those due
to changes in the conditional distribution of durations (the β′s). To do
this decomposition exercise just follow the algorithm above for t equal to
1 but estimate the corresponding β̂t(pi) for t equal to 0.
The third and fourth decomposition exercises involve isolating the con-
tribution of a single covariate or a single coefficient. Thus, we substitute
a single covariate zj(0) or a single coefficient β in step 2 of the previous
11The samples generated in the counterfactual exercises are not a true sample of
the distribution since they are based on estimates rather than on true parameters of
the distribution. For the counterfactual exercise unconditional quantiles are required,
that is, a set of unemployment duration values that are not dependent on the charac-
teristics but that completely characterize the distribution of unemployment duration.
Therefore, we need to estimate the marginal density function of unemployment dura-
tions. The difficulty lies in estimating a marginal density that is consistent with the
conditional distribution defined in equation (1). However, Machado and Mata (2005)
and Albrecht et al. (2009) show that when the size m of the sample is large enough
the M&M procedure yields consistent and asymptotically normal estimators of the




Finally, by computing four differences between the conditional distri-
bution in 2008 and the four counterfactual simulation exercises we obtain
all the possible decomposition combinations that we will discuss in section
3.5.
3.3.3 Relevance of methodology
In this section we explore the potential of the methodology as a tool for
analyzing duration data. We start by explaining the relevance of using
quantile regression models instead of the traditional models specified in
terms of hazard functions. We show the relevance of using M&M quantile
decomposition method, instead of either the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposi-
tion or other known decomposition methods and finally, we present an
overview of recent studies that have been using quantile decomposition
method.
Hazard models are the most popular frame for duration analysis and
therefore it is important to relate them with models for conditional quan-
tile functions. Both constitute a complete characterization of the condi-
tional distribution of duration, employment and unemployment in partic-
ular.
Quantile regressions are a natural and flexible alternative for the anal-
ysis of duration data in general and unemployment duration in particu-
lar. The analysis of various moments on the unemployment duration
distribution affords important insights into the different determinants of
short or long term unemployment duration. Distinguishing between short
and long duration is particularly important in countries with tight em-
ployment protection legislation. In these countries, if a worker faces the
prospect of losing her job this will mean that it will be difficult for her
to find another job and therefore this will induce the individual to suffer
a long unemployment spell. Quantile regressions can be specified accord-
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ing to (1). A typical example of an hazard function is the Accelerated
Failure-Time (AFT) model which implies that,
QlogT (p|x) = x′β + σQε(p). (2)
From the comparison of these two equations (1 and 2), the advantages
of QR models over conventional proportional hazard models are clear.12
Quantile regressions provide a more complete characterization of all the
duration distribution. This methodology allows for the whole distribution
not only the mean but also the median, skewness, tail behavior and all
the distribution points to depend on the covariates.13. The conditional
quantiles allow sufficient flexibility for some regressors to have a propor-
tional impact, while others depict effects that are duration dependent.
The QR model allows for the covariates to have different effects at differ-
ent regions of the distribution. And we know that there are variables such
as industry, that exert a statistically significant influence throughout the
entire distribution. On the other hand, covariates such as age, education
and firm size are more relevant in the tails.
Quantile regressions when compared to more traditional hazard rate
models have three disadvantages (Fitzenberger and Wilke (2005)). First,
quantile regressions involve only time-invariant covariates. Second, tra-
ditional hazard rate models account for competing risks in a direct way.
Third, the method does not account for unobserved heterogeneity.14
Machado and Portugal (2002) show that quantile regressions can over-
come some forms of neglected heterogeneity and baseline misspecification
12For an explicit and complete characterization of the link between quantile and haz-
ard functions, see Machado and Portugal (2002) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2005).
13There are hazard models in which the beta varies over of the support of the outcome
variables (See Donald et al. (2000)).
14The presence of unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the covariates is a serious
problem in regression analysis. Furthermore, even when the error term is uncorrelated
with the covariates it is well known that unobserved heterogeneity biases the results
towards negative duration dependence. In the present analysis we shall assume, as
is conventional, that the regressors are uncorrelated with the error term. Also, our
decomposition is not affected by the role of duration dependence.
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in proportional hazard models. In addition, quantile regression analysis
offers further advantages for studying duration data. First, the censored
quantile regression estimator enables the accommodation of incomplete
duration data. Second, quantile regression are analytically connected to
hazard models but they have the advantage of imposing fewer distribu-
tional assumptions.
From a methodological vantage point, Machado and Portugal (2002)
reveal that the conditional quantiles encompass the proportional hazard
models, as they allow sufficient flexibility for some regressors to have a
proportional impact, while others depict effects that are duration depen-
dent.
And why should one be interested in using M&M decomposition
method instead of other decomposition methods? In labor economics, but
also in many other fields, many researchers are interested in understand-
ing causal relationships. This is a very useful instrument to understand
policy implications. On one hand, there are the composition effects re-
lated with changes in the attributes of the population. On the other hand,
there are the structural effects related with changes in the determinants
of unemployment duration. This means that it is important to under-
stand how the increase in the proportion of older workers influenced the
unemployment duration but it is also interesting from a policy point of
view, to understand if older individuals are differently retained by firms.
These decomposition methods allow to disentangle effects between com-
position and structural effects. This kind of exercise is made possible
by estimating effects for each subpopulation and then run counterfactual
exercises by simulating the effects by substituting the covariates and the
coefficients for each subpopulation.
The most simple example is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method,
which is suitable to compute this kind of decompositions when one is in-
terested in the mean of the variable of interest. After 2000 the most
important development in decomposition methods has been the extended
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use of decomposition methods beyond the mean to other distributional
parameters (Fortin et al. (2011)). Such an example of semi-parametric
decomposition method is the one proposed in Machado and Mata (2005).
In a comprehensive overview of decomposition methods that have been
developed since the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, Fortin et al. (2011)
find that decomposition have helped uncover the most important fac-
tors behind changes in the distribution of wages. This characteristic of
decomposition methods has motivated a large number of studies since
Blinder-Oaxaca was proposed in order to try to provide formal economic
explanations for those distributional changes. As Albrecht et al. (2009)
mention in their paper, “several recent papers use the quantile regression
decomposition method proposed in Machado and Mata (2005)”. Although
M&M is computationally demanding, the success of the method has been
attributed to the fact of providing a natural and data undemanding way
of performing a detailed decomposition of the distribution of the variable
of interest.
3.4 Composition and Structure
The basic pieces of information to our counterfactual analysis are the
changes in the attributes (covariates) of the jobless population and the
changes in the distribution of duration for any given level of those at-
tributes (“structure” or coefficient changes). The latter are estimated by
censored quantile log-linear regressions (Koenker and Bassett (1978) and
Powell (1984, 1986)).
3.4.1 Covariates
Descriptive information on the two samples is provided in Table 3.1 and
Figure 3.2. The composition of the 2008 sample differs from that of 1988
in some important ways.
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Married female 0.17 0.18
Schooling (years) 12.5 13.2
Tenure (years) 4.54 4.81
Close 0.46 0.35
Written notice 0.05 0.10
State unemployment rate 7.06 4.67
Unemployment insurance 0.61 0.46
Proportion censored 0.17 0.19
Proportion duration is zero 0.12 0.12
Unemployment Duration (median in weeks) 8 8
Unemployment Duration / UR (Quantil 25) 0.28 0.43
Unemployment Duration / UR (Quantil 50) 1.13 1.28
Unemployment Duration / UR (Quantil 75) 2.83 3.43
Total number observations 2837 2199
Note: UR represents the state unemployment rate.
The median unemployment duration is stable between the 1985-87 pe-
riod and the 2005-07 period. This indication is best understood in the
empirical survival functions (Kaplan-Meier estimates) exhibited in Fig-
ure 3.2. Although this leftward shift is noticeable at both tails of the
joblessness distribution, upper quantiles increased relative to the mean
unemployment rate, as pointed out by Abraham and Shimer (2001) (Ta-
ble 3.1). This indication is stronger if one considers the conventional
measure of unemployment duration, where direct transitions without an
intervening unemployment spell are excluded.
The proportion of direct job-to-job transitions (joblessness spells with
duration equal to 0) did not change. In both periods these individuals
involved in job-to-job transitions were not significantly different from the
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Married female 0.18 0.17
Schooling (years) 13.2 13.8
Tenure (years) 5.4 4.7
Close 0.63 0.44
Written notice 0.09 0.22
Unemployment insurance 0.10 0.07
Number observations 341 255
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
rest of the displaced group (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
Displaced workers in the latter survey are older and better educated
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than during the eighties, reflecting the aging of the baby-boom generation
(see Figure 3.3). The proportion of female workers among displaced also
increased sizably, probably because labor market participation rates of
women increased and so did the risk of being displaced over the relevant
period.
The likelihood of receiving formal notice of job lay-off more than dou-
bled in the 2008 survey, probably due to the introduction of the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, which was enacted in 1988,
which made pre-notification of displacements mandatory for mass-layoffs
or shut-downs generated by large firms (Addison and Blackburn (1994)).
Interestingly, despite the change in the reference period of job dis-
placements (from five to three years), there are no significant changes in
the distribution of job duration in the pre-displacement job (see Figure
3.3). It may still happen, however, that workers that are now displaced
have longer tenure than before.
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In a nutshell, displaced workers are older, more educated and experi-
enced and more likely to be female than before.
3.4.2 Coefficients
We characterize the conditional distributions of jobless duration by quan-
tile regression (QR) models.
Empirical results for selected quantiles from fitting the QR model are
given in Tables (3.11) and (3.12) for both surveys. Focusing on the 1985-
1987 survey, the regression coefficient estimates are fairly conventional.
Tenure coefficient is to be interpreted as the effect of tenure on unem-
ployment duration over and above that resulting from age. It is known
as a stylized fact that with the increase in age, as individuals get older,
an unemployed individual will get less job offers (Gielen and van Ours
(2006)). Age reduces escape rates and therefore it originates an increase
in unemployment duration, proxying the reduced arrival rate of job offers
with age. On the other hand, individuals with more tenure on the last
job, invested more in specific firm human capital and presumably they
had higher wages. Therefore, once they lost their job they will have more
difficulty to adjust their wage to a lower level (higher reservation wages)
(Addison and Portugal (1989) and Kletzer (1989)). And this is the reason
why they will stay more time unemployed. The impact of tenure is sta-
tistically significant only at high quantiles. The result for race is familiar
and captures the poorer opportunities facing non-whites as a result of
both objective and discriminatory factors.
The familiar (opposing) effects of marital status on reemployment
probabilities - positive for males and negative for females - are also ob-
tained. The result for married males presumably picks up a household
head effect, and thus likely reflects the higher opportunity cost of unem-
ployment for married males and their greater search intensity.
It is worth noting that the variables that have significantly higher ef-
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fects during the early phase of the unemployment spell very likely reflect
the influence of on-the-job search (advance notice of displacement and dis-
location by plant closing) or human capital (as captured by schooling). In
the latter case it can be argued that larger human capital endowments are
associated with greater job opportunities and higher opportunity costs of
unemployment that necessarily erode with the progression of the unem-
ployment spell. A number of explanations can be suggested here. Human
capital depreciation, unobserved individual heterogeneity correlated with
the measures of human capital, or stigmatization would lead to a fading
human capital effect on the transition rate out of unemployment.
Schooling enhances the chances of getting a job, but much more so for
low durations. It can be argued that larger human capital endowments
are associated with greater job opportunities and higher opportunity costs
of unemployment that necessarily erode with the progression of the unem-
ployment spell. A number of explanations can be suggested here: human
capital depreciation, unobserved individual heterogeneity correlated with
the measures of human capital, or employers’ stigmatization of long-term
unemployed, would lead to a fading human capital effect on the transi-
tion rate out of unemployment. Like schooling, written pre-notification
(defined as written notice of at least three months) and job loss by reason
of plant closure have significantly higher effects during the early phase of
the unemployment spell. This pattern reflects the influence of on-the-job
search. Faced with the prospect of an imminent discharge, the worker
will engage in on-the-job search. If successful, he or she will experience a
short spell of unemployment (Addison and Portugal (1992)). Identically,
workers displaced by reason of plant closing — in comparison with work-
ers dismissed due to slack work or position shifted or abolished — benefit
from an essentially short-term advantage conveyed by job search assis-
tance and early (and unmistakable) warning of displacement (Gibbons
and Katz (1991)).
Despite broad qualitative agreement between the regression coefficient
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Table 3.3: Unemployment duration regression results for 1985-1987
Q20 Q50 Q80
Age 0.012 (0.006) 0.022 (0.005)* 0.014 (0.004)*
Male 0.031 (0.188) 0.335 (0.142)* 0.307 (0.116)*
White -0.282 (0.176) -0.269 (0.135)* -0.377 (0.112)*
Married -0.332 (0.155)* -0.281 (0.119)* -0.160 (0.098)
Married female 0.634 (0.249)* 0.818 (0.190)* 0.470 (0.154)*
Schooling -0.122 (0.025)* -0.050 (0.018)* -0.047 (0.013)*
Tenure -0.001 (0.011) 0.011 (0.008) 0.018 (0.006)*
Close -0.730 (0.118)* -0.433 (0.090)* -0.182 (0.074)*
Written notice -0.643 (0.262)* 0.234 (0.199) -0.004 (0.161)
Constant 2.206 (0.418)* 2.065 (0.313)* 3.519 (0.253)*
Observations 2818 2674 2522
Notes: The dependent variable, unemployment duration, is measured in logs.
Quantile regression results based in 2837 observations.
estimates from the two surveys, there are, nevertheless, some differences.
For their magnitude and potential impact on the unemployment duration
distribution (see section 4.5.3), two are most striking.
First, the sharp decrease in the sensitivity of duration to schooling
throughout the distribution. One may speculate that as displaced work-
ers became more educated and experienced, the signaling power of school-
ing faded significantly. Second, the intercept also dropped sharply which
reflects an overall shift to the left of the distribution of durations. The
intercept will capture (among other things) all the time-varying common
factors and, so, will certainly reflect the improved business cycle condi-
tions in 2008.
Also worth noticing, but of limited quantitative impact, are the follow-
ing findings. The jobless distribution became independent of gender: the
market treats female and male displaced workers similarly (Abraham and
Shimer (2001)). Although the being displaced by plant closing still sig-




Table 3.4: Unemployment duration regression results for 2005-07
Q20 Q50 Q80
Age 0.018 (0.005)* 0.023 (0.004)* 0.018 (0.004)*
Male -0.043 (0.161) -0.051 (0.116) 0.036 (0.134)
White -0.538 (0.146)* -0.243 (0.106)* -0.433 (0.122)*
Married -0.135 (0.147) -0.231 (0.106)* -0.269 (0.122)*
Married female 0.351 (0.225) 0.208 (0.163) 0.292 (0.188)
Schooling -0.048 (0.024)* -0.015 (0.017) -0.028 (0.018)
Tenure 0.004 (0.010) 0.030 (0.007)* 0.033 (0.008)*
Close -0.425 (0.118)* -0.283 (0.084)* -0.176 (0.096)
Written notice -1.203 (0.186)* -0.204 (0.127) -0.049 (0.142)
Constant 0.844 (0.410)* 1.437 (0.288)* 3.030 (0.328)*
Observations 2159 2102 1943
Notes: The dependent variable, unemployment duration, is measured in logs.
Quantile regression results based in 2199 observations.
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3.5 Changes in the unemployment duration
distribution
Changes over time in the distribution of unemployment duration may
result from changes in the distribution of the conditioning variables (e.g.,
labor force characteristics such as the age distribution) or from changes in
the conditional distribution of duration itself (which may be thought of as
changes in the way those labor force characteristics impact duration, the
“coefficients”). The first is a composition effect and the second may be
thought of as a “structural effect” (as in Autor et al. (2008)). Machado
and Mata (2005) proposed a method (hereafter, M&M decomposition) for
disentangling those effects. The method resorts to resampling procedures
and it is based on the estimation of marginal distribution of the variable
of interest consistent with a conditional distribution estimated by quantile
regression, as well as with any hypothesized distribution for the covariates.
Comparing the marginal distributions implied by different distributions
for the covariates one will then able to perform counterfactual exercises
and identify the sources of the changes in the distribution of duration over
the twenty-year period (see chapter 3 for further details).
The results are presented in Table 3.5. The first two columns of this
table refer to the marginal wage distributions in 1988 and 2008, while the
third column presents the estimates of the overall changes which occurred
during the period. The next three columns decompose total changes into
changes due to the covariates (the 2008 estimated marginal versus the
counterfactual 2008 marginal density if all attributes were distributed
as in 1988); changes due to changes in the coefficients (the counterfac-
tual 2008 marginal density if all attributes were distributed as in 1988);
and residual changes, that is, changes unaccounted for by the estimation
method.
Between the 1988 and 2008 survey, the distribution of unemployment
duration shifted to the left, most notably at higher percentiles. Whereas
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unemployment duration decreased by 1.2 weeks at the median it decreased
by 4.2 weeks at the 8th decile (see the third column of table 3.5). It is
clear from columns 4th and 5th that (aggregate) changes in the coefficients
were more influential driving the overall displacement of the unemploy-
ment duration distribution than (aggregate) changes in the covariates.
“Coefficient changes” are everywhere larger, in absolute magnitude, than
“covariates changes”. Interestingly, whereas “coefficient changes” led to
shorter durations above the median duration, “covariates changes” gen-
erated longer durations at the highest percentiles. At the 8th decile, un-
employment duration increased by 3.1 weeks due to changes in covariates
but decreased by 7.3 weeks due to changes in the coefficients.
Table 3.5: Contributions to changes in the quantiles of the unemployment
distribution (weeks)
Marginals Aggregate contributions
1988 2008 Change Covariates Coefficients
10 th quant. 0.293 0.251 -0.042 0.001 -0.043
0.266;0.320* 0.214;0.289* -0.087;0.0030 -0.038;0.0410 -0.182;-0.107*
20 th quant. 1.460 1.186 -0.274 0.126 -0.399
1.405;1.514* 1.141;1.231* -0.342;-0.205* 0.068;0.183* -0.542;-0.488*
30 th quant. 2.945 2.494 -0.451 0.353 -0.805
2.881;3.010* 2.428;2.560* -0.542;-0.360* 0.266;0.441* -0.978;-0.919*
40 th quant. 4.969 4.215 -0.753 0.646 -1.399
4.854;5.083* 4.122;4.309* -0.897;-0.609* 0.521;0.771* -1.690;-1.576*
50 th quant. 7.727 6.523 -1.204 1.031 -2.235
7.574;7.880* 6.400;6.645* -1.388;-1.020* 0.855;1.206* -2.564;-2.412*
60 th quant. 11.613 9.796 -1.817 1.571 -3.388
11.392;11.834* 9.628;9.964* -2.077;-1.558* 1.342;1.800* -3.713;-3.456*
70 th quant. 17.519 14.433 -3.086 2.320 -5.406
17.188;17.849* 14.153;14.714* -3.487;-2.684* 1.967;2.674* -5.602;-5.282*
80 th quant. 26.392 22.197 -4.195 3.137 -7.332
26.039;26.745* 21.796;22.597* -4.720;-3.670* 2.628;3.646* -6.978;-6.594*
90 th quant. 41.963 37.981 -3.983 3.815 -7.798
41.333;42.594* 37.291;38.670* -4.980;-2.985* 2.813;4.818* -8.498;-7.752*
Notes: Median and 95% interval estimates (in weeks) of the changes in
the quantiles (2008“minus” 1988) of the marginal and of the counterfac-
tual distributions (based on 1000 replications).
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3.5.1 Composition Effects
As hinted above, the composition of the displaced workers (and the un-
derlying economic environment) changed significantly between surveys:
displaced workers became older and more educated; the proportion of
females increased; written pre-notification of impending lay-off became
more common; and the macroeconomic conditions improved. Overall,
these changes produced longer jobless durations for all percentiles. A
finer analysis, one that would enable us pinpoint the most influential re-
gressors, requires the estimation of the impact of each of those changes
on the conditional distribution of durations.
Using the techniques described in the methodology it is possible to
isolate the contribution of the changes in the distribution of each covariate
to the changes in the distribution of durations of joblessness spells. As it
turns out, solely one explanatory variable exhibit a statistically significant
composition effect: age (see Table 3.6). The results displayed in table 3.6
are obtained from the difference between predicted duration under 2008
covariates and coefficients and predicted duration for 2008 covariates and
2008 coefficients, except the covariate under examination which will take
its 1988 values.
The ageing of the population translated into longer durations most
notably, for the long-term unemployed (that is, those in the right tail of
the unemployment duration distribution). Here, we estimate that at the
90th quantile duration is 2.5 weeks (11%) longer in 2008 than it would
have been if the age of the population had been distributed as in 1988.
As for gender, in particular, no significant impact is detected. The larger
share of women in the population of displaced workers did not affect the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5. Changes in the unemployment duration distribution
3.5.2 Changes in the conditional duration
The major changes in the conditional distribution were a fall in the sen-
sitivity of duration to the level of schooling of the displaced workers, the
attenuation of the gender effect, and a sharp downturn in the intercept,
which affects the white married males, with average schooling and tenure,
displaced without notice and by reasons other than plant closing (see ta-
ble 3.7). The values exhibited in table 3.7 are computed as the difference
between estimated duration for the 2008 population and all 2008 coef-
ficients, except the coefficient under scrutiny, which will take its 1988
value.
A one point percent increase in the male population generates a much
larger unemployment duration decrease in the 2008 survey than in the
1988 survey. Indeed, if the male population regression coefficient of 1988
prevailed, the median unemployment duration would be 1.4 shorter (28%).
The increase in the tenure and the age coefficients implied an increase
in median duration of 1 week and an increase at the 8th decile of 3.6
weeks (16%). It appears that, in the most recent displacement survey,
being older translates into a even slower transition into employment than
it was the case in 1988.
The fall in the schooling coefficient implied an increase in median
duration of 2.7 weeks (54%). It appears that, in the most recent dis-
placement survey, being more educated no longer translate into a faster
transition into employment as it was the case in 1988. With some trep-
idation, we offer the tentative explanation that schooling is relatively
more helpful in high unemployment than in low unemployment environ-
ments. It can be argued that under low unemployment regimes there is
less heterogeneity among unemployed individuals (a higher proportion of
truly unemployable workers), which will mean longer durations for a given




Using an argument similar to Blanchard and Diamond (1994) (foot-
note 6, page 423) being more educated is a weaker correlate of good
quality when the unemployment is low.
3.6 Interpreting the results in a simple mix-
ture model
Suppose that job-offers arise as a Poisson process with rate λ, and that
there are two types of workers, A and B, with
λA > λB
The proportion of types A in the unemployment stock at t is denoted
by q(t). If all job offers are taken, the unemployment duration survivor
function at t is
S(t) = q(t) exp{−λAt}+ (1− q(t)) exp{−λBt}
It may be instructive to learn how in such a simple model one can
generate the global patterns highlighted by the empirical analysis. Our
empirical model identified two chief culprits:
• A composition effect: the ageing of the jobless population;
• A structural effect: the reduced sensitivity of unemployment dura-
tion to schooling.
The ageing of the baby boomers may be captured by a decrease in q,
the proportion of individuals with higher exit rates.
∂(1− S(t))
∂q(t)
= exp{−λBt} − exp{−λAt} > 0.
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Where Q(τ) is the duration quantile function. That is, a decrease in q
(“ageing baby boomers”?) would increase the quantiles and, in particular




where f(t) denotes the (exponential) p.d.f. of the two subpopulations.
Therefore, there is a value of t (t? = ln(λB/λA)/(λB − λA)), such that,
∂2(1− S(t))
∂t∂q(t)
< 0, for t < t? and
∂2(1− S(t))
∂t∂q(t)
> 0, for t > t?.
The impact of changes in q on duration quantiles in thus predicted to be
U-shaped. For 1/λB = 16 weeks and 1/λA = 2 weeks, t
? ≈ 2 weeks. So in
the range that QR can estimate it is natural to find an increasing effect.
In this exceedingly simple framework, the structural shock identified
by the empirical analysis must be modeled by a reduction in the arriving
rates of job offers, namely of λA (identifying A as the group with more
schooling). Blanchard and Diamond (1994) argue that the exit rate from
unemployment would be a decreasing function of unemployment duration.
According to their “ranking assumption” ( firms prefer to hire individuals
that are unemployed for the least time), it is natural to infer that unem-
ployment duration erodes the role of schooling as a signal of (unobserved)
worker quality. The impact of such a change is
dS(t) = −t[θ(t)dλA + (1− θ(t))dλB]S(t)
where
θ(t) = q(t)SA(t)/S(t)
Thus, if λA < 0 and dλB < 0, dS(t) > 0, and, consequently, the duration
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quantile function will shift to the right.
3.7 Sensitivity analysis
In this chapter we characterized the evolution of the unemployment ex-
perience of displaced workers throughout the period 1985 up to 2007 con-
sidering the two DWS survey extremes of the period interval, 1988 and
2008. Nevertheless, the methodology requirement of choosing only two
moments in time could be driving the results. Therefore, it is important
to consider another DWS survey in order to investigate how sensitive the
results are to the choice of 1988 and 2008.
In this section, we replicate the analysis of section 4.5 for the time
period 1988-1998. We chose 1998 as a final year because it fulfills the
following three attractive features. First, it allows for a period of analysis
that is big enough to use the proposed methodology in order to find any
effect. Second, it is exactly in the middle of the base period of analysis,
allowing to detect any changes and related effects in the unemployment
distribution excluding clearly any possible influence of the 2008 distribu-
tion. Finally, in 1998 the unemployment rate was falling as in 1988 and
in contrast with the increasing unemployment rate in 2008 (Figure 3.1).
The results of the comparison are given in tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10.
There is a broad agreement, at least in terms of sign and statistical sig-
nificance of the regression coefficients, in particular if we take the main
effects as comparators. Between the 1988 and 1998 survey, the distribu-
tion of unemployment duration shifted to the left, most notably at higher
percentiles. Whereas unemployment duration decreased by 2.4 weeks at
the median it decreased by 6.3 weeks at the 8th decile (see the third col-
umn of Table 3.8). It is clear from columns 4th and 5th that (aggregate)
structural changes in the labor market played a pivotal role.
In table 3.9 we observe the individual role of the composition changes
and we find smaller effects between 1988 and 1998. The results confirm
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that the composition effects, in particular those related to age, appear
to have played an important role. There is a new result between 1988
and 1998 but it is small in magnitude. We find that composition effects
related to schooling decreased unemployment duration by 1 week at the
8th decile.
In table 3.10 we observe the individual role of the structural changes
and we confirm the presence of major forces reshaping the unemployment
duration distribution over period 1988-1998. Thus, there is a higher effect
of unemployment duration to the male population, a higher effect of the
unemployment duration to age; and we confirm the fall in the effect of
the unemployment duration to the schooling levels. Although the sign
and statistical significance is similar to the one find in the period 1988
and 2008, the magnitude of the effect of schooling and gender was smaller
and the age effect was larger up to 1998. Indeed, if the male population
regression coefficient of 1988 prevailed in 1998, the median unemployment
duration would be 0.8 shorter. The fall in the schooling coefficient implied
an increase in median duration of 1.2 weeks instead of 2.7 weeks (Table
3.7). Age implied between 1988 and 1998 an increase in the unemployment
duration by 5.7 weeks at the 8th decile while between 1988 and 2008 the
increase was by 2 weeks at the same decile. This difference in terms of
magnitude seems to indicate that the role of schooling and gender have
demonstrated an increasing trend along the period while the effect of age
is loosing significance.
The results using 1998 instead of 2008 are in line with the baseline
results. There are small differences in terms of magnitude, but in general
we conclude that our results do not seem to be sensitive to the choice of
the period of analysis.
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Table 3.8: Contributions to changes in the quantiles of the unemployment
distribution (weeks)
Marginals Aggregate contributions
1988 1998 Change Covariates Coefficients
10 th quant. 1.273 1.094 -0.179 -0.116 -0.064
0,001;0,001* 0,001;0,001* 0,000;0,000* 0,000;0,000* 0,000;0,000*
20 th quant. 2.248 1.971 -0.278 -0.027 -0.251
0,002;0,002* 0,002;0,002* 0,000;0,000* 0,000;0,0000 0,000;0,000*
30 th quant. 3.342 2.846 -0.496 -0.013 -0.483
0,003;0,003* 0,003;0,003* -0,001;0,000* 0,000;0,0000 -0,001;0,000*
40 th quant. 5.036 3.785 -1.251 0.044 -1.296
0,005;0,005* 0,004;0,004* -0,001;-0,001* 0,000;0,0000 -0,001;-0,001*
50 th quant. 7.709 5.291 -2.417 0.169 -2.586
0,008;0,008* 0,005;0,005* -0,003;-0,002* 0,000;0,000* -0,003;-0,003*
60 th quant. 11.687 8.036 -3.651 0.335 -3.986
0,011;0,012* 0,008;0,008* -0,004;-0,003* 0,000;0,001* -0,004;-0,004*
70 th quant. 17.631 12.634 -4.997 0.621 -5.619
0,017;0,018* 0,012;0,013* -0,005;-0,005* 0,000;0,001* -0,005;-0,005*
80 th quant. 26.275 20.000 -6.275 0.544 -6.819
0,026;0,027* 0,020;0,020* -0,007;-0,006* 0,000;0,001* -0,006;-0,006*
90 th quant. 42.267 33.907 -8.360 0.546 -8.906
0,042;0,043* 0,033;0,034* -0,009;-0,007* 0,000;0,0010 -0,008;-0,008*
Notes: Median and 95% interval estimates (in weeks) of the changes in
the quantiles (1998“minus” 1988) of the marginal and of the counterfac-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The starting point of this chapter was the evidence that measured unem-
ployment duration in the U.S. increased substantially relative to unem-
ployment rates. Here, the decomposition method proposed by Machado
and Mata (2005) was employed in order to disentangle the contribution of
the changes generated by covariates distribution and the conditional dis-
tribution. The estimation indicates that structural changes in the labor
market played a pivotal role.
Composition effects related to age (but not gender) played a significant
role. But, apart from this rather mechanical impact, important structural
changes, captured in the changes of the regression coefficients, were at
play. We have identified a major force reshaping the unemployment du-
ration distribution: the change in sensitivity to schooling, increased the
median unemployment duration 2.7 weeks.
We argue that the signaling power of schooling during the recent low-
unemployment environment faded significantly. When the unemployment
rate is low, the information that is passed to the employer through the
schooling signal does not promote more job offers to the more educated
unemployed. The information that is passed to the employer through the
schooling signal is blurred when the unemployment rate appears to be
very low. This finding raises the importance of discussing the interest of
providing vocational training in order to help these workers to find a job.
Formal written pre-notification off impending redundancy leads to
more intensive on-the-job search. This raises the importance of informa-
tion asymmetry regarding the displacement decision. Identically, workers
displaced with formal advanced notice benefit from an essentially short-
term advantage conveyed by job search assistance and early warning of
displacement.
This study raises a number of future lines of research. An extensive
analysis of the CPS microdata should enable us to better characterize
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the link between the business cycle and the compositional changes of the
stock of the unemployed workers. Furthermore, the information contained
in the CPS can be explored to study the impact of recent changes in the
unemployment insurance rules and to uncover the role of home ownership/
mortgage on worker mobility decisions.
Finally, a note of caution is in order. These results rely solely on the
joblessness experience of displaced workers and may not apply to other
unemployment experiences, for example, the unemployment experience of




Appendix A - Description of variables
Unemployment duration: The period an individual was unemployed
for workers displaced by reason of plant closure, slack work, or abolition
of shift or position. Measured in weeks.
Age: It registers the age of the individual. We restricted our analysis
to individuals with age between 19 and 62 years old.
Male: It is a dummy that assumes value 1 for male individuals.
White: It is a dummy that refers to the race of the individual and it
assumes value 1 for individuals that are white.
Married: It is a dummy that refers to the marital status of the
individual and it assumes value 1 for married individuals.
Married female: It is a dummy that refers to the marital status of
the individual and it assumes value 1 for married female individuals.
Schooling: Registers the number of complete years of schooling.
Tenure: Self reported duration of last job spell before displacement.
It is measured in years.
Close: Plant closing.
Written notice: It is a dummy that assumes value 1 if the individual
was notified of future displacement. We consider as notified only those




Appendix B - Hazard and quantile regres-
sion
A comparison across different model specifications, meaning quantile re-
gression, Cox proportional hazard and accelerated failure time is given
in Tables (3.11) and (3.12) for both surveys. According to the propor-
tional hazard rate specification, the exponential hazard rate is given by
λi = e
Xiβ and λi = e
−Xiβ in the accelerated failure time specification. It
is important to notice three aspects before comparing the results from the
three specifications. First, the change in signs. Second, the coefficients
from the proportional hazard and the accelerated failure time specifica-
tions will have the same magnitude but with opposite signs. Third, the
sign of the expected duration in the accelerated failure time specification
(1/λ = eXiβ) is equivalent to the quantile regression model.
There is a broad agreement, at least in terms of sign and statistical
significance of the regression coefficients, especially if we take the highest
quantiles as comparators. The main exception is the regressors related to
marriage. Female married individuals have a smaller effect in the quantile
regression models than in either Cox or AFT models. Age and tenure in
the previous job reduce the escape rates out of unemployment. Being
unskilled decreases the chances of getting a job. We find the conventional
opposing effects of being married on the probability of finding a job -
positive for males and negative for females. A non-white has longer un-
employment duration, whereas an individual displaced due to firm closure
has decreased duration. The effects of pre-notification are statistically not
significant.
Although the estimates from the Cox and the AFT model are on
average precise, in some cases they provide an oversimplified vision of the
impact of the covariates on the exit from unemployment. For regressors
such as age, male and tenure, the proportional hazard estimates provide a
good approximation as the impact of those covariates is roughly duration
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Table 3.11: Unemployment duration regression results for 1985-1987
Quantile Regression
Q20 Q50 Q80 Cox AFT
Age 0.012 (0.006) 0.022 (0.005)* 0.014 (0.004)* -0.010 (0.002)* 0.014 (0.003)*
Male 0.031 (0.188) 0.335 (0.142)* 0.307 (0.116)* -0.197 (0.061)* 0.265 (0.084)*
White -0.282 (0.176) -0.269 (0.135)* -0.377 (0.112)* 0.183 (0.056)* -0.248 (0.078)*
Married -0.332 (0.155)* -0.281 (0.119)* -0.160 (0.098) 0.158 (0.051)* -0.227 (0.070)*
Married female 0.634 (0.249)* 0.818 (0.190)* 0.470 (0.154)* -0.393 (0.081)* 0.558 (0.112)*
Schooling -0.122 (0.025)* -0.050 (0.018)* -0.047 (0.013)* 0.030 (0.008)* -0.045 (0.011)*
Tenure -0.001 (0.011) 0.011 (0.008) 0.018 (0.006)* -0.009 (0.004)* 0.012 (0.005)*
Close -0.730 (0.118)* -0.433 (0.090)* -0.182 (0.074)* 0.102 (0.038)* -0.188 (0.055)*
Written notice -0.643 (0.262)* 0.234 (0.199) -0.004 (0.161) 0.009 (0.085) -0.033 (0.118)
Constant 2.206 (0.418)* 2.065 (0.313)* 3.519 (0.253)* 2.504 (0.187)*
Observations 2818 2674 2522 2837 2837
Scale parameter 1.393 (0.027)*
Shape parameter 0.787 (0.060)*
Notes: The dependent variable, unemployment duration, is measured in logs.
Regression results based in 2837 observations.
Table 3.12: Unemployment duration regression results for 2005-07
Quantile Regression
Q20 Q50 Q80 Cox AFT
Age 0.018 (0.005)* 0.023 (0.004)* 0.018 (0.004)* -0.010 (0.002)* 0.016 (0.003)*
Male -0.043 (0.161) -0.051 (0.116) 0.036 (0.134) 0.045 (0.061)* -0.038 (0.084)*
White -0.538 (0.146)* -0.243 (0.106)* -0.433 (0.122)* 0.192 (0.056)* -0.304 (0.078)*
Married -0.135 (0.147) -0.231 (0.106)* -0.269 (0.122)* 0.070 (0.051)* -0.156 (0.070)*
Married female 0.351 (0.225) 0.208 (0.163) 0.292 (0.188) -0.077 (0.081)* 0.172 (0.112)*
Schooling -0.048 (0.024)* -0.015 (0.017) -0.028 (0.018) 0.015 (0.008)* -0.021 (0.011)*
Tenure 0.004 (0.010) 0.030 (0.007)* 0.033 (0.008)* -0.016 (0.004)* 0.024 (0.005)*
Close -0.425 (0.118)* -0.283 (0.084)* -0.176 (0.096) 0.105 (0.038)* -0.199 (0.055)*
Written notice -1.203 (0.186)* -0.204 (0.127) -0.049 (0.142) 0.132 (0.085) -0.226 (0.118)
Constant 0.844 (0.410)* 1.437 (0.288)* 3.030 (0.328)* 1.975 (0.187)*
Observations 2159 2102 1943 2199 2199
Scale parameter 1.434 (0.027)*
Shape parameter 0.587 (0.060)*
Notes: The dependent variable, unemployment duration, is measured in logs.




Some covariates, however, have impacts that are far from proportional.
The impact of schooling, written notice and plant closure are clearly de-
creasing with unemployment duration. The longer the individual stays
unemployed, the smaller the impact of these factors on the escape rate
from unemployment. These effects would not be detected by conventional
hazard rate models.
As mentioned in section 3.3, from a methodological point of view, these
results reveal that the hazard ratios estimated from models for conditional
quantiles encompass the proportional hazard models as they allow suffi-
cient flexibility for some regressors to have a proportional impact, while
others depict effects that are duration dependent.15
Appendix C - Sensitivity analysis regarding
the state of the labor market
Unobserved ability of displaced workers may depend on the state of the
labor market. In a boom the average ability might be lower than in a re-
cession because in a boom only “bad” firms close while in a recession also
“good” firms may close. In this sensitivity analysis two peaks are com-
pared so that the distribution of unobserved ability is similar. I collected
from DWS data from 1992 and 2012. We chose 1992 and 2012 because
it fulfills the following two attractive features. First, in both years, the
unemployment rate was in a high peak. Second, it allows for a period of
analysis that is big enough to use the proposed methodology in order to
find any effect.
The results of the comparison are given in tables 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15
in the Appendix. Between the 1992 and 2012 survey, the distribution
15There are hazard function models which can allow for different effects across dif-
ferent quantiles (See section 3.3 and Donald et al. (2000)).
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of unemployment duration shifted to the right, most notably at higher
percentiles. Whereas unemployment duration increased by 6.7 weeks at
the median it increased by 26.7 weeks at the 8th decile (see the third
column of Table 3.13). In accordance with the main results, it is clear
from columns 4th and 5th that (aggregate) structural changes in the labor
market continue to play a pivotal role.
Table 3.13: Contributions to changes in the quantiles of the unemploy-
ment distribution (weeks)
Marginals Aggregate contributions
1992 2012 Change Covariates Coefficients
10 th quant. 1.650 1.854 0.204 0.152 0.051
1.619;1.681* 1.816;1.892* 0.155;0.253* 0.105;0.200* 0.027;0.075*
20 th quant. 2.761 3.244 0.483 0.323 0.160
2.719;2.803* 3.175;3.312* 0.403;0.563* 0.236;0.410* 0.125;0.194*
30 th quant. 4.278 5.857 1.579 0.720 0.859
4.202;4.354* 5.698;6.017* 1.407;1.752* 0.517;0.923* 0.786;0.933*
40 th quant. 6.861 10.394 3.533 1.426 2.107
6.729;6.994* 10.149;10.639* 3.257;3.809* 1.096;1.757* 1.990;2.223*
50 th quant. 10.211 16.896 6.684 2.206 4.479
10.025;10.398* 16.567;17.225* 6.308;7.061* 1.746;2.666* 4.306;4.651*
60 th quant. 14.729 25.953 11.225 2.996 8.229
14.506;14.951* 25.487;26.420* 10.708;11.741* 2.323;3.668* 7.955;8.503*
70 th quant. 20.834 38.548 17.714 3.585 14.129
20.515;21.154* 37.934;39.163* 17.015;18.413* 2.726;4.444* 13.794;14.465*
80 th quant. 29.577 56.255 26.678 3.993 22.685
29.203;29.952* 55.452;57.059* 25.793;27.563* 2.862;5.125* 22.190;23.180*
90 th quant. 44.757 85.347 40.590 4.361 36.229
44.197;45.317* 84.338;86.356* 39.468;41.712* 2.982;5.741* 35.663;36.795*
Notes: Median and 95% interval estimates (in weeks) of the changes in
the quantiles (2012“minus” 1992) of the marginal and of the counterfac-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In table 3.14 we observe the individual role of the composition changes
and the results confirm that the composition effects, in particular those
related to age, appear to have played an important role. This result
between 1992 and 2012 confirms the results between 1988 and 1998. We
find that composition effects related to schooling decreased unemployment
duration by 3 week at the 8th decile.
The results using 1992 and 2012 are largely in accordance with those
of the baseline. However, there are two differences that are worth noting.
Between the 1992 and 2012 survey, the distribution of unemployment
duration shifted to the right, most notably at higher percentiles. Whereas
unemployment duration increased by 6.7 weeks at the median it increased
by 26.7 weeks at the 8th decile (see the third column of Table 3.13).
These results are broadly explainable by the particular nature of the crisis
covered by the 2012 survey.
The second difference regards the individual role of the structural
changes (Table 3.15). It was revealed that in a period where the un-
employment rates are higher the sorting effect of education is stronger.
The schooling coefficient implied between 1992 and 2012 a decrease in
the unemployment duration by 6.7 weeks at the 8th decile while between
1988 and 2008 the increase was by 6.4 weeks at the same decile. When
the unemployment rate is higher the unemployment duration is decreased





losses of displaced workers
4.1 Introduction
Every year, thousands of workers all over the world are affected by the
negative consequences of displacement (Kuhn (2002)). Worker displace-
ment is the subject of an extensive and growing literature. The costs of job
loss in terms of unemployment, future employment and earnings-change
have been the most studied aspects of job displacement. Displaced work-
ers are defined in this chapter as all workers who separate from a dying,
or shrinking firm in a given year.
During the 1980s a number of empirical studies appeared analyzing
workers’ post-displacement wages in the U.S. [(see, for instance, Podgursky
and Swaim (1987), Kruse (1988), Addison and Portugal (1989), Klet-
zer (1989)].1 Basically, these studies provide a snapshot view of short-
term earnings losses, defined as the difference between pre- and post-
displacement earnings of displaced workers.
However, this type of analysis, focusing solely on workers who have
1See Hamermesh (1989) for an enlightening discussion of this literature.
4.1. Introduction
been displaced, is likely to underestimate the magnitude of wage losses,
since it does not account for the earnings growth that would have oc-
curred in the absence of job loss. A simple comparison of pre- with
post-separation earnings for displaced workers is insufficient. The seminal
paper by Jacobson et al. (1993) introduced a different approach to the
study of worker displacement and earnings losses. These authors com-
pare the earnings changes of displaced workers over a long-term period
with the earnings changes that would have occurred if the displaced had
not lost their jobs. Since this latter outcome variable is not observable,
a comparison group of non-displaced workers is used. The emphasis in
worker displacement research has shifted from short-term wage losses to
long-term dynamics. In fact, in recent years the existence of suitable lon-
gitudinal data sets in the U.S. and Europe matching workers and firms
enable the comparison of wage patterns for displaced and identical non-
displaced workers.
Few of these studies, however, attempted to appropriately decompose
the earnings gap between displaced and non-displaced workers into its
main determinants. Understanding the causes of these reductions might
shed some light on potential policy options to ease the burden of adjust-
ment on these workers.
Hence, the main goal in this study is to measure the earnings losses
of displaced workers resulting from firm closure, collective or individual
dismissals having in mind that as in Jacobson et al. (1993) joblessness
and wage rate decline play an important role. Furthermore, monthly
wage losses are decomposed into different components related to worker,
firm, and job title characteristics (both observed and unobserved). Taking
into account job characteristics is crucial to obtain reliable estimates of
the earnings losses following displacement, since earlier empirical work
has shown that industry, firm, and match characteristics are an important
determinants of earnings (see, for example, Podgursky and Swaim (1987),
Addison and Portugal (1989), Carrington (1993), Neal (1995)).
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Joblessness can depreciate general, sector and firm specific human
capital and, compared to a similar worker who was not displaced, it pre-
vents the accumulation of human capital through on-the-job training. It
is worth noting that human capital has a decisive role during the early
phase of the unemployment spell. It can be argued that larger human cap-
ital endowments are associated with greater job opportunities and higher
opportunity costs of unemployment that necessarily erode with the pro-
gression of the unemployment spell. A number of explanations can be
suggested here. Human capital depreciation, unobserved individual het-
erogeneity correlated with the measures of human capital, or stigmati-
zation by employers would lead to a fading human capital effect on the
transition rate out of unemployment. Mroz and Savage (2006) find that
young workers that experience involuntary unemployment invest more in
the short run in their human capital in order to mitigate any adverse ef-
fects coming from unemployment. Nevertheless, they are not able to fully
recover from these adverse effects.
Several papers have studied the sources of the growth of wages in light
of the human capital theory (Dustmann and Meghir (2005), Gathmann
and Schönberg (2010) and Amann and Klein (2012)). The contribution of
human capital to the wage growth has been decomposed in several compo-
nents, the contribution of the acquisition of general, firm and job (or task)
-specific human capital. In this chapter we explore these components to
desintangle the wage loss that workers experience after displacement.
Regarding the wage rate decline, from a theoretical point of view,
it is to be expected that reemployment wages of displaced workers will
be lower than those of workers who remain employed. As mentioned by
Fallick (1996), there are at least four reasons that can explain this pat-
tern. First is the loss of human capital specific to the firm or industry.
To the extent that these skills are non-transferable, their contribution to
worker’s productivity is permanently lost when a job loss occurs. Second,
payments by seniority in order to provide incentives not to shirk may
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delay higher earnings to the latter part of the career. In this case, a per-
manent separation reduces lifetime earnings. Third, there is the loss of a
high quality job match between the worker and the firm.2 In fact, some
authors find that standard estimates of the return to job-specific training
are biased upward by job match and individual unobserved heterogeneity.3
A long job tenure may signal a high quality match between the firm and
the worker and/or a high ability worker, because more able workers and
workers in good jobs are less likely to separate. Along this line of research,
Addison and Portugal (1989) and Kletzer (1989) showed that tenure in
the pre-displacement job is positively associated with post-displacement
earnings, reflecting heterogeneity in worker ability and the transferability
of skills. Fourth, to the extent that the firm’s and/or industry character-
istics also play a role in the process of wage determination, a displaced
worker may lose some wage premium that he was previously receiving,
such as insider rents, union premiums, or efficiency wage differentials.
Thus, beyond worker and firm characteristics, a third important di-
mension of wage formation is considered in this study - job title hetero-
geneity. Job title heterogeneity may influence wage rates for a number of
reasons. First, it is well known that tasks that involve risks of death or se-
rious accident are better paid than less risky tasks. One should therefore
expect significant compensating differentials for occupations such as deep
sea divers or bullfighters. Second, jobs that need to be executed under
difficult or stressful conditions are also expected to be better remuner-
ated than jobs that take place under pleasant conditions. For example,
one should observe higher wages for individuals working on offshore oil
platforms or in mines. Third, the complexity of some tasks may require
intense special training and/or unusual skills. This is the reason why, for
example, brain surgeons or jet fighter pilots have higher earnings. Fourth,
2However, displacement might increase earnings. For instance, if displacement
dissolves a bad job match which was not perceived as such by the employee.
3See, among others, the studies of Abraham and Farber (1987, 1988), Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and Dustmann and Meghir (2005).
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some occupations are known to be chronically overcrowded, whereas oth-
ers are thought to be in excess demand. For instance, for decades it has
been argued that there is an oversupply of teachers and an undersupply
of nurses. Fifth, by their nature some jobs put the workers in a position
where they can inflict serious losses on their employers and/or the society.
In such cases, the trade unions are powerful enough to extract significant
rents in the form of higher wages. Industrial action by commercial airline
pilots, flight controllers, train motormen, or more generally, by workers
that are part of the natural monopolies workforce, often leads to a sub-
stantial wage premium. Sixth, entry barriers to some occupations, such as
those ruled by worker associations (for example, closed shop occupations,
medical associations, lawyers’ associations, etc.) also enhance the labor
income of their members. Seventh, the kind of technology being used may
favor the organization of labor through unionization of the workplace, al-
lowing unions to push for higher wages. Production activities that imply
the concentration of a large number of workers in a single plant (say,
the auto industry or ship building) facilitate industrial action, and thus,
better worker conditions.
Potential losses of displaced worker can be related to the firm and
job-title that they held before and after displacement. The heterogeneity
among firms wage policies is very large and accounts for more than one
third of the wage total variation (Torres et al. (2012)). Different wage
policies are favored by the existence of industry rents (due to unionization
or incentive pay premiums) or the operation of wage efficiency policies.
In such an environment, the worker may benefit from engaging in job
search to locate the firms with more suitable (more generous) wage offers.
Good matches will be made and survive. Bad matches will be resisted and
undone. However, with the occurrence of a displacement event, successful
job searchers may loose their “job shopping” investment.
The role of job-title heterogeneity explaining total variation is also
significant (around 50 percent). Job-titles summarize the general and
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specific skills of the worker, in particular those that are industry and oc-
cupation specific. Given the way those job titles were identified, they may
also reflect the bargaining power of the workers. Because job-titles con-
tain the skill requirements of the position held by the worker, it will also
retain the hierarchical standing of the workers. Again, with the event of a
displacement, a human capital will be destroyed, largely associated with
the loss of his pre-displacement job-title. This was previously measured
by looking at the effect of industry and occupation mobility. Our study
adds to the existing literature by addressing directly this source of wage
loss by looking at job-title fixed effects.
To properly incorporate these plethora of wage determinants a wage
equation with three high-dimensional fixed effects - worker, firm, and
job title - will be estimated using a nationally representative matched
employer-employee data set - Quadros de Pessoal. The universal coverage
of the employed population in the private sector in Portugal combined
with the appropriate tools creates the optimal conditions for this exercise.
Two main objectives drive the investigation. The first is to investigate
the monthly earnings losses by following Jacobson et al. (1993) (JLS)
methodology, including transitions to zeros whenever the individuals are
out of work. The second objective is to extend the Jacobson et al. (1993)
(JLS) methodology by incorporating firm and job title fixed effects in the
monthly wage equation (excluding transitions to zeros), allowing us to
estimate the monthly wage losses of displaced workers. We decompose
the monthly wage losses into their main sources using the methodology
developed in Gelbach (2010). Basically, we use the fixed effects to explain
part of the wage loss.
The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows. In Section
2 a brief review of the literature is given. Section 3 summarizes the
institutional wage setting in Portugal. Section 4 describes the data and
the sample construction. The empirical strategy is presented in Section 5
and Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 concludes.
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4.2 Earlier literature on earnings losses of
displaced workers
As mentioned before, there is an extensive empirical literature on the
earnings impact of worker displacement.4 For a variety of surveys and
methodologies the studies for the U.S. have established that displaced
American workers usually experience short spells of unemployment, but
substantial and persistent reductions in earnings - on the order of 8 to 25
percent for prime-aged workers, in comparison with their non-displaced
counterparts (Couch and Placzek (2010)) lasting over 15-20 years (von
Wachter (2010)). This literature also establishes two stylized facts - high-
tenure workers and industry switchers suffer the greatest earnings losses
(see, for example, Kletzer (1989), Jacobson et al. (1993), Carrington
(1993), Neal (1995) and Stevens (1997)).
Ruhm (1991) and Stevens (1997) use the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) and find that in the 1970s and early 1980s, the post-
displacement earnings of displaced workers dropped between 7 and 13
percent.
Jacobson et al. (1993) use administrative earnings records from the
Unemployment Insurance (UI) system of Pennsylvania for the period
1974-86. Their sample includes workers aged between 20 and 49 who re-
ported positive earnings in the first quarter of the sample’s period, were
continuously employed during the first six years in a firm with at least 50
employees, and reported positive earnings at least once thereafter. Work-
ers are considered to be displaced whenever their firm faces a drop in
employment of at least 30% in the year before displacement. They found
that high-tenure displaced workers suffer long-term earnings losses aver-
aging 25 percent per year six years after displacement. These losses start
to appear approximately three years before separation and are substantial
even for workers reemployed in similar firms.
4See Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998) for surveys.
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Couch and Placzek (2010) have cast some doubts on the magnitude
of the estimates obtained by Jacobson et al. (1993). They argue that
the results should be interpreted with some caution, as in the late 1970s
and early 1980s U.S. industry suffered a significant restructuring that
had a considerable impact on the state of Pennsylvania in particular.
Using data for the state of Connecticut for the 1993-2004 period, their
estimates are roughly half those found for Pennsylvania. They also found
that long-term earnings losses are greater among unemployment insurance
(UI) recipients, which seems to explain the difference in the earnings losses
estimates across the two samples, as the data for Pennsylvania report a
high incidence of UI receipt when compared with the Connecticut data.
The studies by Schoeni and Dardia (2003) and von Wachter et al.
(2009) for California, and by Kodrzycki (2007) for Massachusets based on
data for the 1990s, show that the magnitude and persistence of the losses
are fairly consistent across different states of the U.S.
Using data from the Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) for different
time periods, Farber (1993, 1997, 2005) finds that displaced American
workers lose around 8 to 12 percent in comparison with their non-displaced
counterparts. Using also DWS data for workers who lost their jobs in the
recent recession of 2007-2009, Farber (2011) reports an estimate of 11
percent, i.e., full-time job losers who find new full-time jobs earned 11
percent less, on average, at their new jobs than they would have had they
not been displaced.
Regarding losses by worker characteristics such as gender, age, and
education, some conclusions seem to emerge in the most recent studies
for the U.S. Using data from the DWS for 1981 to 2003, Farber (2005)
finds that while in the 1980s more educated displaced workers experi-
enced smaller earnings decreases in comparison with their less-educated
nondisplaced counterparts, the situation seems to be reversed in the early
2000s. Regarding gender or race, no significant differences were found.
von Wachter et al. (2009) also found that in California, in the 1990s,
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workers with a college degree had smaller earnings losses than workers
without a high school degree, who, on the other hand, performed better
than workers with some college or a high-school degree.
Chan and Stevens (2001) use the Health and Retirement Surveys
(HRS) and find that older displaced workers suffer greater losses in earn-
ings than those found for prime-aged workers when using DWS or PSID
data. Kletzer and Fairlie (2003) use the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youths (NLSY) to analyze the earnings losses of young workers, aged
between 14 to 36 years, in the period from 1979 to 1993. They find that
younger workers have similar long-term earnings losses in comparison with
individuals having greater labor market experience.
For Europe the empirical evidence is less clear-cut. Some studies have
concluded for the existence of large earnings losses (Bender et al. (2002)
and Lefranc (2003)), while others have concluded for the existence of
reduced earnings losses (Burda and Mertens (2001), Lehmann et al. (2005)
and Hijzen et al. (2010)). On one point, however, these studies seem to
be in agreement. A displaced worker who experiences a period of non-
employment suffers a large penalty in earnings (Gregory and Jukes (2001),
Bender et al. (2002) and Abbring et al. (2002)).
Burda and Mertens (2001) provide estimates for Germany using data
from both the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) and the Social In-
surance File (IAB) covering the 1985-94 period. They found a modest
wage decline upon reemployment (about 3.6% in the year following dis-
placement). They also concluded that large wage losses are associated
with changes of industry, but not of firm.
Couch (2001) also used the GSOEP from 1988 to 1996 in order to ex-
amine the effects of displacement due to plant closure on annual earnings
and unemployment duration. He reported an estimated loss of around
13.5% in the displacement year and a loss of 6.5% two years later.
Lefranc (2003) analyzed the sources of wage losses of displaced workers
in France and the U.S. using micro-data from labor force surveys. He
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showed that while the magnitude of the wage losses are very similar in the
two countries (around 10 to 15 percent), the sources of wage adjustment
differ considerably. In the U.S., earnings losses stem mostly from the
loss of search rents on the displacement job, while in France, most of the
earnings losses result from the loss of accumulated firm-specific human
capital.
Using labor force survey data from Estonia covering the period from
1989 to 1999, Lehmann et al. (2005) find that the main cost of displace-
ment is the cumulative income loss measured as the difference between
wages and out-of-work benefits, which is large for the minority of workers
who experience long-term non-employment.
Hijzen et al. (2010) used a matched employer-employee data set for the
U.K. to estimate the income loss of displaced workers from firm closure
and mass layoffs. They showed that workers whose firm closes down lose
18-35 percent per year of their income, while workers who exit a firm that
suffers a mass layoff lose 14-25 percent. In contrast to JLS, they found
that income losses are driven mainly by non-employment spells rather
than by wage losses.
Dustmann and Meghir (2005) study the sources of wage growth of
young German workers estimating the returns to experience, sector tenure
and firm specific tenure, identifying respectively the contribution of gen-
eral, sector and firm specific human capital. Displaced workers due to
firm closure are used to control for selection due to unobserved hetero-
geneity. Better types of workers find a job quickly and therefore, there is
a potential problem of endogeneity. Dustmann and Meghir (2005) use a
control function as Heckman and Robb (1985) using age as an instrument
in the entire sample of new jobs and including the residual terms for en-
dogeneity and selection correction in the wage function. They find that
unskilled workers benefit from being attached to a particular firm while
skilled workers benefit from the acquisition of transferable skills.5
5Jacobson et al. (1993) explain on page 696 that the selectivity bias can be sub-
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Amann and Klein (2012) analyze the contribution of the acquisition
of general skills and firm-specific skills to the wage growth. The returns
to firm tenure might be biased because tenure is endogenous to wages.
Therefore, they also use a control function estimator but instead of age
they use with-in job variation in tenure as the instrument. They extend
the Altonji and Shakotko (1987) by adding the interaction term between
the endogenous variable and the first-stage residual. This allows them to
find that longer lasting matches are characterized by high wage growth
in the first five years and higher wages on average.
Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) use data on tasks performed in oc-
cupations from Germany to analyze skill transfers between occupations.
Using a measure of the skill distance between occupations they are able
to summarize the similarity of occupations in terms of different tasks (an-
alytical, manual and interactive tasks). They find that individuals move
to occupations that are at a short distance in terms of skill requirements.
This distance decreases with the actual worker experience. The task-
specific human capital explains up to 52% of overall wage growth over
the career. Wage losses of displaced workers will be 10 percentage points
larger for workers reemployed in a very distant occupation, that is, as a
bank or insurance clerk, than for workers who can find employment in an
occupation with similar skill requirements, for example, as a warehouse
keeper.
4.3 Wage setting in Portugal
Portugal is considered to have a regulated labor market, with minimum
wages, strong employment protection, and collective bargaining widely
applied (OECD (2001) and Cardoso (2006)). In the 1990s Portugal was
characterized by low unemployment rates, approximately 3-4 percentage
stantially reduced by restricting the attention to workers who separate from firms that
closed down.
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points below the EU-15 average. In 1994, the minimum legal monthly
wage was 246 euros, representing around 37% of the median total monthly
earnings of full-time employees (Eurostat).6
The Portuguese Constitution provides the juridical principles of col-
lective bargaining, and grants unions the right to negotiate. The effects
of the agreements are formally recognized and considered valid sources of
labor law.
Concerning the bargaining mechanisms, a distinction should be made
between the conventional regime and the mandatory regime. Conven-
tional bargaining results from direct negotiation between employers’ and
workers’ representatives. A mandatory regime, on the other hand, does
not result from direct bargaining between these two, but is instead dic-
tated by the Ministry of Labor. The Ministry can extend an existing
collective agreement to other workers initially not covered by it or it can
create a new one if it is not viable to extend the application of an ex-
isting document. A mandatory regime is applied when workers are not
covered by unions, when one of the parties involved refuses to negotiate,
or bargaining is obstructed in any other way.
Beyond the existence of compulsive extension mechanisms, voluntary
extensions are also possible, when one economic partner (workers’ repre-
sentative or employer) decides to subscribe to an agreement that it had
initially not signed. Therefore, the impact of collective bargaining goes
far beyond union membership and the distinction between union and non-
union workers or firms becomes largely meaningless.
Collective negotiations are conducted at the industry, or occasionally,
at the occupation level. Firm-level negotiation, which for a time was a
common practice in large public enterprises, has lost importance. The
law does not establish mechanisms of coordination between agreements
reached in different negotiations; however, preference is given to verti-
6Minimum wage is updated every year by government proposal, taking into account
inflation and GDP growth as well as the social partners’ expectations.
102
Chapter 4. Determinants of earnings losses of displaced workers
cal over horizontal agreements, and the principle of the most favorable
condition to the worker generally applies.
Since most collective agreements are industry-wide, covering compa-
nies with very different sizes and economic conditions, their contents tend
to be general, setting minimum working conditions, in particular the base
monthly wage for each category of worker, overtime pay, and the normal
duration of work.7 Moreover, only a narrow set of topics is updated an-
nually, and therefore the content of collective agreements is often pointed
out as being too immobile and containing little innovation.
Whatever the wage floor agreed upon for each category of worker at
the collective bargaining table, firms are free to pay higher wages, and they
often deviate from that benchmark, adjusting to firm-specific conditions.
Cardoso and Portugal (2005) call this the “wage cushion”, the difference
between the contractual part of the wage and the actual wage. They
estimate that in 1999 actual wages exceeded the level of bargained wages
by 20-50%.
4.4 The Data
4.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal data set
It is well established that the nature of the data sets implies the use of
different identification strategies and may lead to distinct results. Survey
data usually contain more detailed information on observable worker and
firm characteristics than administrative data. However, administrative
data sets typically cover a long time span, are larger, allow one to follow
workers and firms over the years, and just as survey data it enables the
use of a control group of non-displaced workers. The use of administrative
data in comparison with retrospective survey data reduces recall and re-
porting errors (Calderwood and Lessof (2009)). Administrative data also
7See Hartog et al. (2002) for the effects of bargaining regimes.
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usually provide more accurate identification of the timing and nature of
the separation arising from firm closure or collective dismissals.
In this study, a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set,
called Quadros de Pessoal (QP – “Lists of Personnel”) is used for the
1997-2008 period. The data are gathered annually by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment, based on an inquiry that every establishment
with at least one wage-earner is obliged by law to fill in.8 Reported data
cover the firm, the establishment, and each of its workers.9 Currently
QP gathers information for more than 300,000 firms and about 3 million
workers. Given the mandatory nature of the survey plus the fact that
these data cover all wage earners in the private sector in Portugal, prob-
lems commonly associated with panel data sets, such as panel attrition,
are considerably reduced.
Reported data on the worker side include gender, age, schooling, and
detailed information on monthly earnings - base wages, regular payments
(e.g., seniority), irregular benefits (profits distribution and premiums),
overtime payments, and hours of work (normal and overtime). The infor-
mation on earnings is reported by the employer, which is known to be sub-
ject to less measurement error than worker-provided earnings data. All
earnings variables were deflated using the Consumer Price Index (with
base-year 2008). The notion of job title comes simply from the iden-
tification of distinct occupational categories within each collective wage
agreement. In Quadros de Pessoal each worker in each year is assigned
to the conflation of its professional category and corresponding collective
agreement. In each year there are about 300 collective agreements which
define wage floors for on average 100 occupational categories. The firm
data include detailed information on region, industry, ownership type,
and size.
It is worth noting that workers also have an identification number
8From 1994 onwards the information refers to the month of October of each year.
9See Cardoso(2006) for more details.
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based on a (scrambling) transformation of his/her social security number,
which allows us to follow them over the years and to match workers and
their firms.
4.4.2 Sample Construction
The samples used in this study are selected as in Jacobson et al. (1993)
and Couch and Placzek (2010). Thus, we considered displacements due
to firm closure, collective dismissals and individual dismissals. In the
next section, we explain how firm closures and collective dismissals were
identified. To be included in the sample a worker must report positive
earnings in the year that immediately precedes the displacement event
(reference year is D0) and must be continuously employed with the same
employer during the first three years (screening period).10 This means
that workers are selected into the sample with at least three years of tenure
by the time of the reference year. Furthermore, a worker must report
positive earnings at least once thereafter, and have known information on
their age, gender and education. The sample was restricted to full-time
wage earners in the private non-farm sector aged between 20 and 49 years
during the final year of the screening period and that were employed in a
firm with at least 20 employees (these exclusions reduced the sample size
by 21%).11
To construct the estimation sample, we proceed as follows. We sep-
arate the sample into a control and a treatment group for each possible
year of displacement (all years between 2002 and 2006). For example, the
10In order to guarantee that the worker was employed with the same employer three
years before separation, we control for worker’s admission year in the firm. In the
year prior to displacement the worker must have at least two years of tenure with the
employer.
11It should be noted that of the total number of displaced workers due to firm
closure, 19%, 18%, 17%, 15% left the firm respectively four, three, two and one year
prior to the firm closing down. Thus, it is not possible to observe a clear change in
the pattern of early leavers. They might have left for different reasons, e.g. quit or
retirement and therefore it was important not to include them in the analysis.
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2002 treatment group comprises individuals who were working in 2002 and
experienced a displacement event between years 2002 and 2003 (the firm
closed down between November 2002 and September 2003).12 The 2002
control group is the one with those who did not experience any separation
between October 2002 and September 2003.
For estimation purposes we define a measure of time relative to the
displacement event (D0). For example, we define D0 in 2002 for the 2002
displaced group, D0 in 2003 for the 2003 displaced group, and so on. The
data set combines five cohorts (2002-2006) ranging from D−6 up to D6.
13
Table 4.1: Displacement events in the reference period, 2002-2006
Firm Collective Individual
Year closure dismissals dismissals
2002 2591 9755 7552
2003 2121 6593 5448
2004 2008 5368 4638
2005 3100 6250 3806
2006 1579 3576 3084
Total 11,399 31,542 24,528
Notes: This table reports the number of displacement spells per year
resulting from firm closure, collective dismissals and individual dis-
missals, that meet the conditions. The sample includes all displaced
individuals who are employed in the year of the displacement D0 and
at least two periods before displacement (D−2) and who are in reem-
ployment in at least one year before the end of the sample period.
As mentioned above, the sample includes all displaced individuals who
are employed in the year of the displacement D0 and at least two periods
before displacement (D−2) and who are present in the QP registers in
at least one year of the post-displacement period. Table 4.1 reports the
number of displacement events in each year. 11,399 displaced due to
12Thus, a worker should be identified as displaced in year t if (s)he was employed in
year t-1 and experienced a separation between year t-1 and t.
13It should be noticed that worker files are not available for the year 2001.
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firm closure and 31,542 displaced due to collective dismissals meet these
conditions.
Table 4.2: Sample composition, 1997-2008
Displaced
Firm Collective Individual
Year Non-displaced closure dismissal dismissal
1997 222576 7379 20503 15508
1998 242560 7764 21812 17069
1999 274808 9249 25566 20056
2000 308367 9547 26000 20485
2002 308006 11312 31455 24524
2003 247774 7621 21864 18027
2004 241190 7374 20039 16722
2005 242018 7576 20373 16675
2006 235030 6903 18734 16420
2007 226502 8012 22489 17613
2008 262536 8810 24432 18794
Total 2,811,367 91,547 253,267 201,893
Notes: This table reports the sample composition in terms of non-displaced and
displaced workers resulting from firm closure, collective dismissals and individual
dismissals, by year.
After excluding those observations with missing values in the explana-
tory variables and the extreme values in wages (0.1% top and bottom
observations), we obtained a control group composed of 2,811,367 non-
displaced worker/year and 91,547 displaced worker/year resulting from
firm closure and 253,267 displaced worker/year due to collective dismissals
and 201,893 displaced worker/year due to individual dismissals. Table 4.2
reports the number of worker/years in the sample, namely non displaced
workers, workers displaced due to firm closure and workers displaced due
to collective dismissals. To clarify the link between the two tables, take,
for example, firm closures occurring in 2002. 2591 workers were displaced
in 2002 due to firm closures (see first line, second column on Table 4.1).
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The total number of individuals that were displaced over 2002 and 2006
that were working in 2002 is 11312. The difference between 11312 and
2591 were individuals that experienced a displacement event due to firm
closures after 2002 and were, of course, observed in the pre-displacement
period.
Table 4.6 in Appendix 4B presents the descriptive statistics of the
key variables in the data set in the reference year. The statistics are
presented separately for the group of displaced and non-displaced workers.
Displaced workers are slightly younger, with fewer years of education and
tenure in comparison with their non-displaced counterparts. Moreover,
the proportion of women is higher in both groups of displaced workers
when compared with the group of non-displaced. As expected, firms
that close down are smaller and are mainly operating in the sectors of
manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade.
A simple descriptive statistics comparison suggests that displaced work-
ers experienced substantial long-term monthly earnings losses. As shown
in Figure 4.1, the average monthly earnings of workers that separated in
2002 fell sharply in comparison with their non-displaced counterparts.
4.4.3 Identification of displacements due to firm clo-
sure
The data set has a longitudinal dimension, which makes it particularly
well suited for analyzing the issues of firms’ entry and exit. Each firm
entering the database is assigned a unique identifying number and the
Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a firm that has already
reported to the database is not assigned a different identification number.
Using this identifier it is possible to pinpoint all firms that have entered
and exited economic activity. In particular, an exit from the database
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should signal a firm that has ceased its activity.14
To ensure that we are in the presence of firms’ true closures and not
mergers or acquisitions, we also excluded from the sample those workers
that appeared in the database in the period following displacement with a
year of admission in the new job less than the year of displacement minus
one.15 These exclusions reduced the sample size by around 0.1%.
14This criteria, however, is not entirely accurate, due to the fact that some of the
firms may temporarily exit the database. A temporary exit may occur for a number of
reasons other than cessation of activity, a very likely reason being that the survey form
was not received in the Ministry of Employment before the date when the recording
operations were closed. Almost all of these temporary exits last less than two years, but
can still cause an identification problem if they occur in the terminal years. In order
to account for this problem, the information on the last two years after displacement
was used solely to control for temporary exits in the intermediate years. Thus, a firm
is classified as an exiting firm in year t+1 if it is present in year t, but absent in t+1
and t+2. Mergers and acquisitions were used. Only false mergers were excluded.
15If, for example, a worker’s displacement year is 2002 and (s)he appears in the
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Within the reference period, some individuals observe successive spells
of firm closure in firms that are necessarily different. For identification
purposes, and to be more precise we only used information from the first
firm closure within the reference period. Thus, only the first firm closure
is used to identify a displacement and the years before and after are
used relative to that year of displacement. Thus, the group of displaced
workers due to firm closure includes 5 cohorts of workers that lost their
jobs between 2002 and 2006.16
4.4.4 Identification of displacements due to collec-
tive dismissal
To identify a displacement due to a collective dismissal we follow the
identification strategy used by Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and
Placzek (2010). An individual is displaced due to a collective dismissal
between t and t+1 if the firm’s employment dropped between year t and
year t+1, 30 percent or more below its level at year t. The group of
displaced workers due to collective dismissal includes 5 cohorts of workers
that lost their jobs between 2002 and 2006.
When calculating these employment changes, the magnitude of the
flows is much more volatile for small employers. For this reason, and
following again Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010),
those working for employers with fewer than 20 employees are removed
from the sample.
Within the reference period, some individuals observe successive spells
of collective dismissals in firms that are necessarily different. For identi-
database in the post-displacement period with a year of admission in the new job of
2001 or earlier, (s)he is excluded from the sample.
16It should be noted that of the total number of displaced workers due to firm
closure, 19%, 18%, 17%, 15% left the firm respectively four, three, two and one year
prior to the firm closing down. Thus, it is not possible to observe a clear change in
the pattern of early leavers. They might have left for different reasons, e.g. quit or
retirement and therefore it was important not to include them in the analysis.
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fication purposes, we only used information from the first collective dis-
missal within the reference period. Thus, only the first collective dismissal
is used to identify a displacement and the years before and after are used
relative to that year of displacement.
4.4.5 Identification of individual dismissals
To identify an individual dismissal we follow the identification strategy
used by Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010). A worker is
displaced due to an individual dismissal between t and t+1 if he separated
from a firm where there was no mass layoff or firm closure. The group
of displaced workers due to an individual dismissal includes 5 cohorts of
workers that separated from their jobs between 2002 and 2006.
When calculating these employment changes, the magnitude of the
flows is much more volatile for small employers. For this reason, and
following again Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010),
those working for employers with fewer than 20 employees are removed
from the sample.
Within the reference period, some individuals observe successive spells
of individual dismissals in different firms. For identification purposes,
we only used information from the first separation within the reference
period. Thus, only the first individual dismissal is used to identify a
separation and the years before and after are used relative to that year of
separation.
4.4.6 Identification of non-displaced workers
The group of non-displaced workers (the control group) includes all indi-
viduals that were employed at year t in a firm that did not close in year
t+1 and the firm’s employment did not drop 30 percent or more and they
were not subject to an individual dismissal. The group of non-displaced
workers was also restricted to full-time wage earners in the private non-
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farm sector aged between 20 and 49 years during the final year of the
screening period with at least 3 years of tenure and that were employed
in a firm with at least 20 employees.
In order to guarantee that the worker was employed with the same
employer in the pre-displacement period, we checked the firms identifying
number assigned to the worker over that period. These workers were
followed over the post-displacement period if they remained with the same
employer over that period. Thus, to be included in the sample the worker
should appear in at least one of the years between t+1 and t+6.
4.5 Empirical strategy
This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first presents the
methodology used by Jacobson et al. (1993). In the second we explore
the empirical model with controls for worker, firm and job title observed
and unobserved permanent heterogeneity. Later in this section, we show
how to disentangle the independent contribution of each fixed effect to
the wage losses of displaced workers, using the methodology developed in
Gelbach (2010).
4.5.1 Jacobson et al. (1993) statistical specifications
To evaluate the effect of displacement on earnings we use the method-
ological framework used by Jacobson et al. (1993). The first statistical
specification assumes that workers’ earnings at a given time period de-
pend on displacement and on some controls for fixed and time-varying
characteristics:
wit = αi + γt + βXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδk + εit (1)
where wit represents the earnings (in euros) for each individual i in year t.
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Labor earnings are taken as zero whenever the individuals are out of work.
Dkit are dummy variables where k is equal to −m,−(m− 1), ..., 0, 1, 2, ...,
which represent jointly the event of displacement.δk represents the effect
of displacement on worker’s earnings k years prior to, and following, its
occurrence, the worker fixed effect, αi, captures the impact of permanent
differences among worker’s observed and unobserved characteristics, and
γt are calendar year fixed effects and they are included to capture the
general aggregate time pattern of earnings in the economy. Finally, the
vector Xit controls for age and age squared. εit is an error term, assumed
to be uncorrelated with the covariates. Our identification strategy follows
closely the one explored by Jacobson et al. (1993). In a nutshell, we
compare the earnings changes of displaced workers over a long-term period
with the earnings changes that would have occurred if the displaced had
not lost their jobs. Since this latter outcome variable is not observable, a
comparison group of non-displaced workers is used. We assume that after
controlling for the relevant covariates, the displaced workers would have
behaved as the non-displaced in the absence of the displacement event.
The displacement event is assumed to be uncorrelated with the out-
come variable. The empirical model that we explore controls for observed
and unobserved worker permanent heterogeneity, which is likely to atten-
uate the source of endogeneity.
Jacobson et al. (1993) used another specification to allow for the pos-
sibility that workers have different trend rates of earnings and firms react
to these patterns, firing or hiring workers with specific trends. This is
modeled by the following equation:
wit = αi + ωit+ γt + βXit +
∑
k≥−m
Dkitδk + εit (2)





4.5.2 Individual unobserved fixed effect contribution
It is possible to calculate the independent contribution of each unobserved
fixed effect to the monthly wage losses of displaced workers. We use the
methodology developed in Gelbach (2010), which appeals to the omitted
variables bias formula to compute a detailed decomposition.













where δbasek are the relevant coefficients. This equation has omitted vari-
ables bias. It is also necessary to represent the full model with the three
fixed effects:











This equation adds the three fixed effects to the base model. The base-
full difference equals the sample analogue of the omitted variables bias
formula. Gelbach’s algorithm allows us to decompose the difference δbasek −
δfullk into the separate effect deriving from each excluded variable (each
fixed effect). The algorithm is as follows: use ordinary least squares to
estimate the vector of coefficients on each covariate in the base model in
a set of auxiliary models with each of the three covariates α̂i, θ̂f , and λ̂j
acting as the dependent variable, where all the other variables are used
as explanatory variables; this estimate is τ̂αk , τ̂
θ
k , and τ̂
λ
k , respectively, for
17This specification is estimated by replacing the dependent variable, the time dum-
mies, the Xs, and the displacement dummies by deviations from worker-specific time
trends in these variables. In a second step we estimate the resulting model with the
detrended variables using ordinary least squares (OLS).
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each of the fixed effects.







k , for each time period k.
In summary, the decomposition proposed by Gelbach is a computa-
tionally simple and econometrically meaningful procedure that takes ad-
vantage, in a surprisingly ingenious way, of the conventional OLS omitted
variable bias formula. If the base specification is a parsimonious useful
benchmark, and in our case it is simply a conditional gross measure of
the displacement wage rate losses, the decomposition is also economi-
cally meaningful, providing an unambiguous measure of the contribution
of each omitted variable (each fixed effect) to the change in the origi-
nal coefficients of the displacement dummies. For example, the fact that
the inclusion of firm fixed effects contributes to decrease the wage loss of
displaced workers, simply accounts for the evidence that displaced work-
ers tend to sort themselves into firms that pay, on average, lower wages.
When we compare the impact of firm fixed effects before and after dis-
placement, we are simply isolating the dominant influence of movements
from higher paying firms into lower paying firms. A similar interpretation
applies to the role of job-title fixed effects.
4.6 Empirical Results
The results from the estimation of the JLS model, described in equations
(1) and (2), are summarized in Figure 4.2. In accordance with the in-
dividual trend specification, the monthly earnings losses amount to 587
Euros (72 percent of average pre-displacement wages) 1 year after the
shutdown of the firm, and are attenuated to 416 (51 percent), 6 years
after displacement.18
18As for the fixed-effects specification, the monthly earnings losses amounted to 608
euros (74 percent of average pre-displacement wages) 1 year after the shutdown of the
firm, and decreased to 356 (44 percent), 6 years after displacement.
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Notes: Monthly earnings losses, including transitions to zeros (2008 Eu-
ros). In the horizontal axis, the relative time to firm closure is plotted in
years. In the regressions we control for age and age squared and calendar
year fixed effects.
The size of the loss is largely driven by the joblessness experience of
the displaced workers, where, in accordance with JLS, labor earnings are
taken as zero whenever the individuals are out of work. The upswing of
earnings after the first year of displacement is generated mostly by the
reemployment of workers. Conditional on being displaced and returning,
18 percent of the individuals return in the first year, 27 percent return
after 2 years, 23 percent return after 3 years, 14 percent return after
4 years, 11 percent return after 5 years, and 7 percent return after 6
years. Indeed, the impact of reemployment in earnings recovery more than
offsets the significant monthly wage rate of displaced workers documented
below. Note that the estimates produced by the fixed effects and the
random trend models are identical, as in Couch and Placzek (2010). In
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contrast with Jacobson et al. (1993) but in line with Couch and Placzek
(2010), we fail to observe a severe earnings dip prior to displacement. In
our individual-trend specification there is no indication that earnings had
fallen before the firm closure. For the fixed-effects specification, however,
there is some evidence that earnings fell modestly.
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The results from the estimation of the deepen analysis from equations
(1) and (2) therefore excluding the joblessness events are summarized in
Figure 4.3. When we restrict our analysis to the profile of monthly wages
before and after displacement, we find that wage rates started declining
one year before the shutdown of the firm and continued to decline for
up to five years after firm closure, reaching 17 percent (27 percent) in
the case of the random trend (fixed effects) specification. At least three
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mechanisms may be a work. First, it may be that workers who found rel-
atively higher wage offers returned earlier to employment. Second, longer
joblessness duration may have impaired the human capital of displaced
workers. And third, it may take some time for unemployed individuals to
realize that their expectation about the relevant wage offer distribution is
unrealistic, in particular in a labor market where the potential duration
of unemployment benefits is very generous (reaching up to 57 months).
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When we repeat the same analysis for collective dismissals, we find
broadly similar results (see Figure 4.4). One year after the separation,
earnings fell by 631 Euros (605 Euros), which corresponds to 69 percent
(67 percent) of average earnings, for the random trend (fixed effects)
specification. Conditional on returning, 16 percent of the individuals
return in the first year, 23 percent return after 2 years, 21 percent return
after 3 years, 16 percent return after 4 years, 14 percent return after 5
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years, and 10 percent return after 6 years. Here, not even a small fall
on earnings prior to separation is observed. The overall shape of the
evolution of wage rates again mimics those observed for firm closures,
even if the fall is not as large (see Figure 4.5). Wage rates decline 14
percent for the random trend model and 14 percent for the fixed-effects
model, six years after displacement.
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Figures 4.6 and 4.7 replicate the previous exercise using a third sam-
ple group based on workers that separated due to an individual dismissal.
Workers displaced due to a collective dismissal contrast with the ones from
individual dismissals because their separation is by definition involuntary.
One year after the separation, monthly earnings fell by 721 Euros (606
Euros), which corresponds to 54 percent (64 percent) of average earnings,
for the random trend (fixed effects) specification. The fall in percentage
was smaller for this group. In Figure 4.7 one year after displacement
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workers that lost their job due to an individual dismissal observed virtu-
ally no change in their monthly wages. Only after the third year their
monthly wages start falling. Thus, the loss in earnings was made almost
entirely through the joblessness spell.
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To better understand the nature of the wage rate changes that af-
fected displaced workers in comparison to non-displaced workers, we turn
to the estimation of the three-way high-dimensional fixed effects regres-
sion model as given in equation (5). Computation of the three fixed
effects is based on all the wage earners observed between 1986 and 2008,
corresponding to 28,212,770 observations. The interpretation of the pa-
rameters of this model is straightforward and the decomposition exercise
enabled by it, that is, the role of worker, firm, and job title heterogeneity
- is discussed at length by Torres et al. (2012).
After restricting the data set to the group of displaced workers due
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to firm closure and their control group of non-displaced workers, we end
up with a longitudinal sample of 2,811,367 worker-year observations. We
start by graphing the empirical (log)wage distributions of workers dis-
placed due to firm closures and their non-displaced counterparts in Fig-
ure 4.8 (a). It is clear that the wages of displaced workers are lower (28
percent, on average) and less dispersed when compared with those of the
non-displaced. The overall shape of the wage distribution can be better
understood by looking at the distributions of the worker, firm, and job
title fixed effects.
Figure 4.8 (b) depicts the empirical distribution of permanent worker
heterogeneity, both observed (such as gender or schooling) and unob-
served. A high worker fixed effect (high-wage worker) is an individual
with total compensation higher than expected on the basis of observable
time-varying regressors and for the heterogeneity of firms and job titles. A
distinction is made between continuing and destroyed matches due to firm
closures. The graph is based on the estimation of 409,687 worker fixed
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Job title permanent heterogeneity
Displaced
Non-displaced
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 10,3184
Kernel density estimate
(c) Firm permanent heterogeneity (d) Job title permanent heterogeneity
Notes: This figure plots the empirical distributions of different variables before dis-
placement of workers displaced due to firm closures and their non-displaced coun-
terparts (reference year D0).
effects. Not surprisingly, the shape of the distributions closely resembles
the distributional shape of log wages. The linear correlation between log
wages and worker fixed effects is 0.75. From comparison between displaced
and non-displaced workers it is clear that those workers who exited their
firms have permanent (observed and unobserved) characteristics that are
associated with significantly lower wages.
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Less well studied is the heterogeneity of wage policies across firms. In
Figure 4.8 (c) we present the empirical distribution of the 33,390 firm fixed
effects. A high firm fixed effect (high-wage policy from the firm) is a firm
with total compensation higher than expected on the basis of observable
time-varying regressors and for the heterogeneity of workers and job titles.
The role of firm heterogeneity on wage formation is quite important. The
linear correlation coefficient between log wages and firm fixed effects is
no less than 0.69. Not surprisingly, the comparison between the two
distributions shows that displaced workers earned much lower wages in
large part because the firms from which they separated exhibited a less
generous wage policy. On average the firm fixed effect attached to those
displaced workers is 63% less than those of the control group.
The heterogeneity of job title fixed effects is likely to be generated by
variations across occupations and skills and by differences across collec-
tive wage agreements. As discussed above, the notion of job title comes
simply from the identification of distinct occupational categories within
each collective wage agreement. Over the years of the survey we could
estimate 46,295 job title fixed effects. A high job title fixed effect (job title
premium) is a job title with total compensation higher than expected on
the basis of observable time-varying regressors and for the heterogeneity
of workers and firms. Job title heterogeneity has a non-trivial impact on
the determination of wages. The linear correlation between job title fixed
effects and wages is a respectable 0.45. From panel (d) in Figure 4.8 it
is clear that prior to firm closure displaced workers filled positions that
were paid above those of the non-displaced.
In Figure 4.9 we compare the distribution of wages (and its compo-
nents) of displaced workers before and after displacement. Panel (a) of the
figure shows that the distribution of wages was shifted to the left, evincing
significant wage losses associated with firm closures. Panel (b) exhibits
the worker fixed effect distribution. Except for the self-selection generated
by different timing of reemployment, the two distributions should coin-
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cide exactly, which for the most part they do, suggesting that the time
profile of reemployment is not a serious concern, at least in the worker
heterogeneity dimension. Panels (c) and (d) both reveal that workers
moved to lower paying firms and job titles, especially, in the right tail of
the two distributions. In Appendix, Figure 4.12 is based in Figure 4.9
which allows me to characterize better, who moves down and who moves
up in all sources. 56% of displaced workers move to worse paying firms
while 44% moves to job titles that are worse paid, 25% do not change job
titles and 31% move to job titles that are better paid than their job title
pre-displacement.
To investigate how the coefficient estimates of the displacement dum-
mies change with the inclusion of three fixed effects we implemented
the conditional decomposition method suggested by Gelbach (2010), dis-
cussed above. As hinted earlier, this procedure allows us to unambigu-
ously disentangle the contribution of each excluded variable (each fixed
effect) to the change in the coefficient estimate of the variables under
scrutiny.
The results of the Gelbach decomposition are seen in Table 4.3. The
first two columns of the table give the coefficient estimates for the bench-
mark OLS regression and for a regression that includes, in addition, the
three fixed effects. Thus, in the fourth line of the tables we can see that
three years prior to the shut-down of the firm, displaced workers received
wages that were 298.7 euros below those of the non-displaced. Once we
account for worker, firm, and job title fixed effects, the remaining un-
explained difference in wages falls to -18.4 euros. This means that the
inclusion of the fixed effects accounts for 280.3 euros of the difference
between the wages of displaced and non-displaced workers, where 141.9
euros are accounted for by the worker fixed effect, 184 euros are accounted
for by the firm fixed effect, and 46.2 euros are accounted for by the job
title fixed effect. On average, after displacement, the difference in wages
is 61.1 percent (next to the last line). Worker heterogeneity is responsible
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Figure 4.9: The empirical distribution of wages of displaced work-
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Job title permanent heterogeneity
Pre-displacement
Post-displacement
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 17,5224
Kernel density estimate
(c) Firm permanent heterogeneity (d) Job title permanent heterogeneity
Notes: Displaced workers’ density distributions one year before displacement and
one year after displacement.
for 20.4 percentage points, firm heterogeneity explains 33.6 percentage
points, and 6.4 percentage points are related with job title heterogeneity,
totaling 60.3 percentage points. When we look at average differences in
the periods before and after displacement, we arrive at a wage loss of 22.1
percent (last line). The three fixed effects account for 20.6 percentage,
which can be disentangled as 2 percentage points due to worker compo-
sition, 8.2 percentage points due to sorting into lower paying firms, and
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10.5 percentage points due to sorting into lower paying job titles.19
It makes sense to admit that wages also depend on job tenure. We
performed the decomposition including tenure. The results are in Ap-
pendix on Table 4.16. Tenure is not significant and the other results do
not change significantly.20
Table 4.3: Decomposition of the wage loss - displaced workers
due to firm closure
Period Base Full
relative OLS OLS Worker Firm Job title
to displacement monthly wage monthly wage δbasek − δ
full
k fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
D−6 -270.2 17.6 -287.9 -135.7 -212.9 62.3
D−5 -278.2 8.8 -287.0 -130.4 -213.4 58.0
D−4 -295.4 -2.5 -292.8 -152.8 -181.0 41.7
D−3 -298.7 -18.4 -280.3 -141.9 -184.0 46.2
D−2 -322.0 11.1 -333.1 -151.0 -214.8 33.2
D−1 -395.5 -10.5 -384.9 -168.1 -220.5 4.0
D0 -376.1 32.1 -408.2 -172.8 -229.1 -6.1
D1 -421.2 -12.7 -408.5 -137.4 -237.8 -33.2
D2 -492.6 -6.1 -486.5 -178.8 -253.0 -54.6
D3 -514.6 3.9 -518.4 -185.8 -264.8 -67.9
D4 -574.7 -10.1 -564.6 -198.8 -300.5 -65.4
D5 -508.0 19.3 -527.3 -180.5 -290.6 -56.5
D6 -492.3 -35.4 -456.9 -119.3 -302.3 -35.4
D−6 −D0 -319.4 5.4 -324.9 -150.4 -207.9 34.2
D1 −D6 -500.6 -6.8 -493.7 -166.8 -274.8 -52.2
∆ -181.1 -12.3 -168.8 -16.4 -66.9 -86.3
Results in percentage
D−6 −D0 -39.0 0.7 -39.7 -18.4 -25.4 4.2
D1 −D6 -61.1 -0.8 -60.3 -20.4 -33.6 -6.4
∆ -22.1 -1.5 -20.6 -2.0 -8.2 -10.5
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the three fixed effects of the wage loss of displaced
workers. In the regressions we control for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. In each column,
D−6−D0 is the computed average between the first seven lines (D−6 to D0). D1−D6 is the computed average
between the next six lines (D1 to D6). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the previous two lines.
In the last three lines we compute the results in percentage by dividing the respective numbers by the average
wage of displaced workers in the pre displacement period (819 euros).
19The contribution of the worker fixed effect can be taken as an indication that self-
selection (at least the one that is based on the observable and unobservable permanent
characteristics of the worker) does not play a dominant role.
20Results with the tenure effect when the fixed effects are removed were included in
Appendix. Tenure accounts for a wage loss of 5.1% (Table 4.16). Once fixed effects
are included in the wage regression the loss associated with job tenure is reduced to
0.3% (Table 4.15).
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This suggests that the most important factor driving the wage penalty
of these displaced workers is the fact that they are reemployed into job
categories (and or collective agreements) that are less generously remuner-
ated. The unfavorable allocation into job titles accounts for roughly half
of the total average wage loss. Sorting into firms also plays an important
role, accounting for one third of the total average wage loss.21
Workers in our sample affected by collective dismissals faced a much
lower wage penalty (12 pp) than those that suffered from a firm closure
(see Table 4.14). As before, sorting into job titles is the most influential
factor, accounting for 54 percent of the total average loss. The allocation
into firms with different wage policies, however, explains 44 percent of
the loss. Only a small part of the wage penalty (0.9 pp) could not be
accounted for.
Workers in our sample affected by individual dismissals faced an even
lower wage penalty (8.5 pp) than those that suffered from a firm closure
(see Table 4.5). Contrary to the previous results, sorting into firms is the
most influential factor, accounting for 71 percent of the total average loss.
The unfavorable allocation into job titles does not play a significant role
in explaining the loss of these workers. Only a small part of the wage
penalty (0.3 pp) could not be accounted for.
21The wage change (in particular that associated with the job title and the firm
fixed effect) can be generated by rents or compensating wage differentials, as discussed
above. In the first case a wage drop after displacement can be interpreted as a welfare
loss to the worker, in the second case there may be no welfare loss.
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Table 4.4: Decomposition of the wage loss - displaced workers
due to collective dismissals
Period Base Full
relative OLS OLS Worker Firm Job title
to displacement monthly wage monthly wage δbasek − δ
full
k fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
D−6 -194.9 6.6 -201.5 -86.1 -179.8 65.1
D−5 -229.7 -1.5 -228.2 -99.3 -191.0 63.0
D−4 -220.3 -4.6 -215.7 -96.0 -176.5 57.4
D−3 -212.1 -9.1 -203.1 -87.7 -168.4 53.5
D−2 -232.1 0.3 -232.4 -95.7 -178.0 41.8
D−1 -285.6 -10.5 -275.2 -107.2 -189.2 21.6
D0 -277.0 26.5 -303.5 -117.4 -196.0 10.2
D1 -226.2 -12.4 -213.8 -39.8 -171.4 -2.5
D2 -307.8 -14.4 -293.4 -80.5 -201.3 -11.6
D3 -366.3 -0.4 -365.9 -107.0 -230.4 -28.5
D4 -459.7 -0.3 -459.4 -145.1 -277.0 -37.4
D5 -365.3 -12.4 -352.8 -121.0 -244.2 12.2
D6 -342.2 -4.8 -337.4 -111.8 -235.1 9.3
D−6 −D0 -236.0 1.1 -237.1 -98.5 -182.7 44.7
D1 −D6 -344.6 -7.4 -337.1 -100.9 -226.5 -9.7
∆ -108.6 -8.6 -100.1 -2.4 -43.8 -54.4
Results in percentage
D−6 −D0 -26.1 0.1 -26.2 -10.9 -20.2 4.9
D1 −D6 -38.1 -0.8 -37.3 -11.1 -25.0 -1.1
∆ -12.0 -0.9 -11.1 -0.3 -4.8 -6.0
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the three fixed effects of the wage loss of displaced
workers. In the regressions we control for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. In each column,
D−6−D0 is the computed average between the first seven lines (D−6 to D0). D1−D6 is the computed average
between the next six lines (D1 to D6). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the previous two lines.
In the last three lines we compute the results in percentage by dividing the respective numbers by the average
wage of displaced workers in the pre displacement period (905 euros).
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Table 4.5: Decomposition of the wage loss - displaced workers
due to individual dismissals
Period Base Full
relative OLS OLS Worker Firm Job title
to displacement monthly wage monthly wage δbasek − δ
full
k fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect
D−6 -45.0 -24.2 -20.8 32.4 -86.8 34.2
D−5 -33.2 -18.7 -14.4 39.5 -88.6 34.8
D−4 -4.9 -13.5 8.6 46.1 -65.6 27.9
D−3 -32.7 -21.5 -11.2 29.1 -69.5 29.3
D−2 -29.1 0.8 -29.9 24.6 -81.9 27.8
D−1 -76.4 -22.0 -54.3 16.4 -89.9 19.5
D0 -17.2 75.0 -92.2 -5.1 -101.7 14.8
D1 44.1 4.1 40.1 92.0 -91.8 39.9
D2 -71.9 -0.7 -71.2 30.4 -127.1 25.4
D3 -142.8 -10.6 -132.2 9.0 -153.5 12.2
D4 -185.5 -9.9 -175.6 -12.1 -177.1 13.2
D5 -218.2 -12.6 -205.6 -31.2 -182.1 7.2
D6 -204.7 31.4 -236.1 -42.1 -191.4 -2.9
D−6 −D0 -34.1 -3.5 -30.6 26.1 -83.4 26.9
D1 −D6 -129.8 0.3 -130.1 7.7 -153.8 15.9
∆ -95.7 3.7 -99.5 -18.5 -70.4 -11.0
Results in percentage
D−6 −D0 -3.0 -0.3 -2.7 2.3 -7.4 2.4
D1 −D6 -11.5 0.0 -11.6 0.7 -13.7 1.4
∆ -8.5 0.3 -8.8 -1.6 -6.3 -1.0
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the three fixed effects of the wage loss of displaced
workers. In the regressions we control for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. In each column,
D−6−D0 is the computed average between the first seven lines (D−6 to D0). D1−D6 is the computed average
between the next six lines (D1 to D6). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the previous two lines.
In the last three lines we compute the results in percentage by dividing the respective numbers by the average
wage of displaced workers in the pre displacement period (1126 euros).
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4.6.1 Sensitivity of losses to comparison group
The idea to use a comparison group in the framework proposed by Ja-
cobson et al. (1993) is to estimate the earnings changes that would have
occurred if there was no displacement. Instead of using all non-displaced
workers we can use the co-workers that were in the same firm where the
displacement occurred. In this section we compare displaced workers’
earnings to those of non-displaced workers in the same firm. These work-
ers are a better comparison group because they are more similar to the
displaced workers. In Figures 4.10 and 4.11 we replicate respectively Fig-
ures 4.4 and 4.6 using this new comparison group. We see that results
are not affected by the use of this new comparison group.
Figure 4.10: Sensitivity of monthly earnings losses of collective
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Notes: Monthly earnings losses, including transitions to zeros (2008 Eu-
ros). In the horizontal axis, the relative time to separation through a
collective dismissal is plotted in years. In the regressions we control for
age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. Both lines are based
in the model from equation (1).
These findings suggest that stayers in firms that had individual or even
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Figure 4.11: Sensitivity of monthly earnings losses of individual
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Notes: Monthly earnings losses, excluding transitions to zeros. In the
horizontal axis, the relative time to separation through an individual
dismissal is plotted in years. In the regressions we control for age and
age squared and calendar year fixed effects. Both lines are based in the
model from equation (1).
collective dismissals do not observe any changes in their wages (Jacobson
et al. (1993)). The separations of other workers do not create any pressure
for the earnings of workers that remain working at the firm. These results





Using a rich matched employer-employee data set for Portugal, we stud-
ied the persistent earnings losses of workers displaced due to firm closure,
collective dismissals and individual dismissals. We found that those losses
are rather severe and persistent, representing 51 percent (48 percent and
52 percent) of the pre-displacement wages for firm closures (collective
dismissals and individual dismissals), six years after the separation event.
Those losses are largely explained by the joblessness experience of the dis-
placed workers, during which labor earnings are absent. Wage rates also
tumble for displaced workers, in comparison with non-displaced workers,
amounting to a 19 percent monthly wage fall in the case of firm shut
downs, and 14 percent in the case of collective dismissals, and 10 percent
in the case of individual dismissals, six years after displacement.
Potential losses of displaced worker can be related to the firm and
job-title that they held before and after displacement. We thus explored
the sources of those losses, estimating a three-way high-dimensional fixed
effects regression model, which enabled us to obtain worker, firm, and job
title fixed effects. To investigate the estimates of the wage losses with
the inclusion of three fixed effects, we implemented the conditional de-
composition method suggested by Gelbach (2010). We found that the
allocation into lower-paid job titles plays the most important role in ex-
plaining the wage losses of displaced workers, accounting for half of the
total average wage loss in the case of firm closure, and 54 percent in the
case of collective dismissals, but not in the case of individual dismissals,
where it accounts only for 11 percent of the loss. Given the way those
job titles were identified, they may also reflect the bargaining power of
the workers. Because job-titles contain the skill requirements of the po-
sition held by the worker, it will also retain the hierarchical standing of
the workers. Again, with the event of a displacement, a human capital
will be destroyed, largely associated with the loss of his pre-displacement
job-title.
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Sorting into firms also plays a significant role for workers displaced
through firm closures, accounting for 40 percent of the total average wage
loss, and 44 percent in the case of collective dismissals, and 71 percent of
the loss in the case of individual dismissals. Different wage policies are
favored by the existence of industry rents (due to unionization or incentive
pay premiums) or the operation of wage efficiency policies. In such an
environment, the worker may benefit from engaging in job search to locate
the firms with more suitable (more generous) wage offers. However, with
the occurrence of a displacement event, successful job searchers may loose
their “job shopping” investment.
There are important policy prescription that may be derived from
the evidence given in the chapter. Severe losses in the returns to the
job-title may represent a job downgrading due to depreciation of general
specific human capital. Here, retraining programs may be of some help.
Losses related with the firm fixed effect may mean that a worker is moving
from a “good” match to a “bad” match. If phenomenon is pervasive, job
search assistance programs and mandatory pre- notification of impending




Appendix A - Description of variables
Firm closure: A firm closure is observed if the identification number of
one firm appeared in period t but did not appear in t+1 and t+2.
Collective dismissals: Firms where employment has declined by at
least 30 percent. This reduces the likelihood that voluntary leavers and
workers fired for cause are included in the sample.
Individual dismissals: A worker is displaced due to an individual dis-
missal between t and t+1 if he separated from a firm where there was no
mass layoff or firm closure.
Total monthly earnings: Labor earnings that are a combination of
several components: base wage, regular payments (e.g., seniority and
transportation), irregular benefits (profits and premium), and overtime
hours payments.
Hourly wage: Ratio between total monthly earnings and total hours
of work (normal+overtime) in real euros, measured in logarithms.
Tenure: Number of years an employee has worked for his firm.
Age: Age of the individual measured in years.
Education level: Six education categories were defined: (1) Less than
Basic School, which includes individuals with fewer than 4 years of school-
ing, (2) Basic School, which includes individuals with 4 completed years
of schooling, (3) Preparatory, which includes individuals with 6 completed
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years of schooling, (4) Lower Secondary, which includes individuals with
9 completed years of schooling, (5) Upper Secondary, which includes in-
dividuals with secondary schooling and (6) College, which includes indi-
viduals with at least a bachelor degree.
Firm size: The number of workers currently working in the firm, mea-
sured in logarithm.
Industry: Six categories were defined: (1)Manufacturing, (2)Construc-
tion, (3)Wholesale and retail trade, (4)Transports, (5)Finance and busi-




Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics in reference year (2002)
Firm Collective Individual
Non-displaced closure dismissals dismissals
Age (years) 37 35 34 34
Tenure (years) 11 10 9 8
Female 40 46 46 35
Total monthly wage (2008 euros) 1136 819 905 1126
Minimum monthly wage (2008 euros) 408 408 408 408
Hourly wage (2008 euros) 2,08 1,49 1,64 2,07
Education (percentages):
Less than basic school 1 1 1 1
Basic school 23 30 27 17
Preparatory 23 33 30 23
Lower Secondary 19 15 16 19
Upper Secondary 23 15 19 27
College 11 6 7 14
Firm size (no. co-workers) 1460 195 567 1391
Industry (percentages):
Manufacturing 41 60 53 37
Construction 7 13 12 9
Wholesale and retail trade 20 17 18 30
Transports 10 2 7 5
Finance and business services 13 7 8 16
Education and Health 9 1 2 3
No. Observations 308,006 11,312 31,455 24,524
Notes: This table reports summary statistics (mean) for the reference year used in the analysis to construct the sample. The
second column shows statistics computed using non displaced workers (control group) and on the third, fourth and fifth columns
they are computed using the sample of displaced workers resulting from firm closure and collective dismissals and non-mass layoff
dismissals (treatment groups). Variables represented are those described in detail in Appendix A. The units are explained in front
of the variables while gender, education and industry are shown as a percentage.
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Appendix C
Table 4.7: Detailed results from Figure 4.2
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 -15.1 8.1 -1.9 0.1 -31.0 0.8 D−6 0.3 3.3 0.1 0.9 -6.1 6.7
D−5 -12.3 8.2 -1.5 0.1 -28.3 3.7 D−5 9.3 3.1 3.0 0.0 3.2 15.4
D−4 -19.1 7.7 -2.5 0.0 -34.2 -3.9 D−4 8.4 2.8 3.0 0.0 2.8 13.9
D−3 -13.1 7.3 -1.8 0.1 -27.5 1.2 D−3 2.0 2.2 0.9 0.4 -2.3 6.4
D−2 -22.9 7.4 -3.1 0.0 -37.3 -8.4 D−2 4.9 2.3 2.2 0.0 0.5 9.4
D−1 -64.7 7.4 -8.7 0.0 -79.3 -50.2 D−1 -7.8 2.3 -3.3 0.0 -12.4 -3.2
D0 -60.5 7.1 -8.5 0.0 -74.5 -46.6 D0 -13.6 1.9 -7.2 0.0 -17.4 -9.9
D1 -607.7 7.4 -82.7 0.0 -622.1 -593.2 D1 -586.6 2.3 -255.2 0.0 -591.1 -582.0
D2 -476.2 7.4 -64.1 0.0 -490.8 -461.6 D2 -428.5 2.3 -183.6 0.0 -433.1 -423.9
D3 -455.7 7.7 -59.3 0.0 -470.8 -440.7 D3 -408.0 2.5 -160.7 0.0 -412.9 -403.0
D4 -468.8 8.1 -57.7 0.0 -484.7 -452.8 D4 -455.5 3.1 -147.7 0.0 -461.5 -449.5
D5 -458.5 8.7 -52.9 0.0 -475.5 -441.5 D5 -486.6 3.7 -131.9 0.0 -493.8 -479.4
D6 -356.1 10.0 -35.6 0.0 -375.7 -336.6 D6 -416.0 5.0 -82.8 0.0 -425.9 -406.2
Notes: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for age and
age squared and calendar year fixed effects.
Table 4.8: Detailed results from Figure 4.3
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 -8.9 8.0 -1.1 0.3 -24.6 6.8 D−6 0.3 3.1 0.1 0.9 -5.8 6.3
D−5 -17.6 8.1 -2.2 0.0 -33.4 -1.8 D−5 9.4 3.0 3.2 0.0 3.6 15.2
D−4 -33.5 7.6 -4.4 0.0 -48.5 -18.5 D−4 8.5 2.7 3.2 0.0 3.2 13.8
D−3 -50.9 7.2 -7.0 0.0 -65.1 -36.7 D−3 1.8 2.1 0.9 0.4 -2.3 5.9
D−2 -54.7 7.3 -7.5 0.0 -69.0 -40.4 D−2 4.4 2.2 2.0 0.0 0.1 8.7
D−1 -81.5 7.3 -11.1 0.0 -95.9 -67.2 D−1 -9.0 2.2 -4.0 0.0 -13.3 -4.6
D0 -94.3 7.0 -13.4 0.0 -108.1 -80.5 D0 -14.7 1.8 -8.2 0.0 -18.2 -11.1
D1 -122.5 7.7 -15.8 0.0 -137.7 -107.3 D1 -31.6 2.9 -11.0 0.0 -37.2 -26.0
D2 -143.3 7.4 -19.4 0.0 -157.8 -128.8 D2 -30.5 2.3 -13.0 0.0 -35.1 -25.9
D3 -162.5 7.6 -21.4 0.0 -177.4 -147.6 D3 -48.8 2.4 -20.1 0.0 -53.6 -44.0
D4 -191.4 8.1 -23.6 0.0 -207.2 -175.5 D4 -89.7 3.0 -30.4 0.0 -95.5 -83.9
D5 -223.6 8.7 -25.8 0.0 -240.7 -206.6 D5 -142.7 3.5 -40.7 0.0 -149.6 -135.8
D6 -233.9 10.0 -23.4 0.0 -253.5 -214.3 D6 -159.1 4.7 -34.1 0.0 -168.2 -149.9
Notes: Monthly wage loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for age and age
squared and calendar year fixed effects.
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Table 4.9: Detailed results from Figure 4.4
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 19.4 5.0 3.9 0.0 9.5 29.3 D−6 -0.4 2.7 -0.1 0.9 -5.7 4.9
D−5 28.1 4.9 5.7 0.0 18.4 37.7 D−5 6.2 2.5 2.5 0.0 1.3 11.1
D−4 14.0 4.5 3.1 0.0 5.2 22.7 D−4 8.7 2.1 4.1 0.0 4.6 12.8
D−3 16.2 4.1 3.9 0.0 8.2 24.3 D−3 5.6 1.6 3.5 0.0 2.5 8.8
D−2 10.3 4.2 2.5 0.0 2.1 18.6 D−2 6.1 1.7 3.7 0.0 2.9 9.3
D−1 -14.9 4.3 -3.5 0.0 -23.3 -6.6 D−1 -1.7 1.8 -1.0 0.3 -5.1 1.7
D0 -19.6 4.0 -4.9 0.0 -27.5 -11.8 D0 -13.5 1.4 -9.9 0.0 -16.2 -10.9
D1 -605.2 4.2 -145.5 0.0 -613.4 -597.1 D1 -630.9 1.7 -373.0 0.0 -634.2 -627.6
D2 -475.4 4.2 -111.9 0.0 -483.7 -467.1 D2 -485.8 1.7 -279.3 0.0 -489.2 -482.4
D3 -439.5 4.4 -100.5 0.0 -448.1 -431.0 D3 -448.3 1.8 -242.6 0.0 -451.9 -444.7
D4 -475.3 4.5 -104.8 0.0 -484.2 -466.4 D4 -514.1 2.1 -246.7 0.0 -518.2 -510.0
D5 -394.8 4.8 -82.8 0.0 -404.2 -385.5 D5 -446.4 2.4 -186.0 0.0 -451.1 -441.7
D6 -353.2 5.4 -65.6 0.0 -363.7 -342.6 D6 -426.1 3.1 -136.7 0.0 -432.3 -420.0
Notes: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to collective dismissals, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for
age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects.
Table 4.10: Detailed results from Figure 4.5
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 37.2 4.8 7.7 0.0 27.8 46.7 D−6 -0.4 2.4 -0.2 0.9 -5.1 4.2
D−5 32.0 4.7 6.8 0.0 22.8 41.3 D−5 6.3 2.2 2.9 0.0 2.0 10.6
D−4 5.7 4.3 1.3 0.2 -2.7 14.1 D−4 8.4 1.8 4.6 0.0 4.8 12.0
D−3 -9.6 4.0 -2.4 0.0 -17.3 -1.8 D−3 5.6 1.4 4.0 0.0 2.8 8.4
D−2 -11.2 4.0 -2.8 0.0 -19.1 -3.3 D−2 5.2 1.5 3.6 0.0 2.4 8.1
D−1 -25.4 4.1 -6.2 0.0 -33.4 -17.4 D−1 -3.9 1.5 -2.5 0.0 -6.9 -0.8
D0 -44.6 3.8 -11.7 0.0 -52.1 -37.1 D0 -16.1 1.2 -13.4 0.0 -18.5 -13.8
D1 -74.8 4.4 -17.2 0.0 -83.3 -66.3 D1 -28.3 1.9 -14.8 0.0 -32.0 -24.5
D2 -89.6 4.1 -21.7 0.0 -97.7 -81.5 D2 -38.1 1.6 -23.6 0.0 -41.2 -34.9
D3 -105.2 4.2 -24.9 0.0 -113.5 -97.0 D3 -60.8 1.6 -37.3 0.0 -64.0 -57.6
D4 -125.9 4.4 -28.3 0.0 -134.6 -117.2 D4 -82.2 1.9 -43.3 0.0 -85.9 -78.5
D5 -127.5 4.6 -27.9 0.0 -136.5 -118.6 D5 -108.3 2.0 -52.9 0.0 -112.3 -104.3
D6 -122.0 5.1 -23.8 0.0 -132.0 -111.9 D6 -130.5 2.6 -49.8 0.0 -135.7 -125.4
Notes: Monthly wage loss of displaced workers due to collective dismissals, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for age
and age squared and calendar year fixed effects.
Table 4.11: Detailed results from Figure 4.6
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 -29.3 5.7 -5.1 0.0 -40.5 -18.1 D−6 3.0 3.6 0.8 0.4 -4.1 10.1
D−5 2.6 5.5 0.5 0.6 -8.3 13.4 D−5 3.1 3.3 1.0 0.3 -3.3 9.5
D−4 4.4 4.8 0.9 0.4 -5.0 13.8 D−4 4.2 2.5 1.7 0.1 -0.7 9.2
D−3 35.5 4.4 8.0 0.0 26.8 44.2 D−3 8.8 2.0 4.4 0.0 4.9 12.8
D−2 36.8 4.5 8.2 0.0 28.0 45.6 D−2 4.7 2.1 2.3 0.0 0.7 8.7
D−1 23.1 4.6 5.1 0.0 14.1 32.0 D−1 -2.3 2.1 -1.1 0.3 -6.5 1.9
D0 35.6 4.3 8.3 0.0 27.2 43.9 D0 -13.3 1.7 -7.7 0.0 -16.7 -9.9
D1 -605.8 4.5 -134.5 0.0 -614.6 -596.9 D1 -721.0 2.2 -331.9 0.0 -725.3 -716.8
D2 -479.1 4.7 -102.7 0.0 -488.3 -470.0 D2 -598.2 2.3 -261.4 0.0 -602.7 -593.7
D3 -451.5 4.8 -94.2 0.0 -460.9 -442.1 D3 -584.8 2.4 -242.3 0.0 -589.5 -580.1
D4 -434.3 4.9 -88.0 0.0 -443.9 -424.6 D4 -587.8 2.6 -224.2 0.0 -593.0 -582.7
D5 -436.4 5.3 -83.1 0.0 -446.7 -426.1 D5 -596.8 3.1 -195.0 0.0 -602.8 -590.8
D6 -400.8 6.0 -66.7 0.0 -412.6 -389.0 D6 -585.4 4.0 -147.5 0.0 -593.2 -577.7
Notes: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to individual dismissals, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for
age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects.
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Table 4.12: Detailed results from Figure 4.7
without trends with trends
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 -10.3 4.6 -2.3 0.0 -19.2 -1.4 D−6 1.4 2.6 0.5 0.6 -3.7 6.4
D−5 -14.7 4.5 -3.3 0.0 -23.5 -5.9 D−5 5.9 2.4 2.5 0.0 1.2 10.5
D−4 -23.5 4.1 -5.8 0.0 -31.4 -15.6 D−4 6.0 2.0 3.1 0.0 2.2 9.9
D−3 -13.8 3.8 -3.6 0.0 -21.2 -6.4 D−3 7.1 1.6 4.5 0.0 4.0 10.1
D−2 -13.4 3.8 -3.5 0.0 -20.9 -6.0 D−2 3.9 1.6 2.5 0.0 0.8 7.0
D−1 -27.8 3.9 -7.2 0.0 -35.4 -20.2 D−1 -5.6 1.6 -3.4 0.0 -8.8 -2.4
D0 -30.3 3.7 -8.3 0.0 -37.4 -23.1 D0 -15.3 1.3 -11.5 0.0 -17.9 -12.7
D1 -21.8 4.1 -5.3 0.0 -29.9 -13.8 D1 13.8 2.0 6.8 0.0 9.8 17.7
D2 -46.6 3.9 -11.9 0.0 -54.3 -38.9 D2 -12.0 1.7 -7.0 0.0 -15.4 -8.6
D3 -74.8 4.0 -18.6 0.0 -82.7 -66.9 D3 -51.4 1.8 -28.7 0.0 -54.9 -47.9
D4 -93.4 4.2 -22.2 0.0 -101.6 -85.1 D4 -93.6 2.0 -46.5 0.0 -97.6 -89.7
D5 -105.8 4.5 -23.6 0.0 -114.6 -97.1 D5 -119.2 2.4 -50.6 0.0 -123.9 -114.6
D6 -82.6 5.2 -15.9 0.0 -92.7 -72.4 D6 -112.5 3.1 -35.9 0.0 -118.6 -106.4
Notes: Monthly wage loss of displaced workers due to individual dismissals, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for
age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects.
Table 4.13: Detailed results from Figure 4.10
without trends figure 4.4 Without trends with new comparison group
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 19.4 5.0 3.9 0.0 9.5 29.3 D−6 15.9 5.0 3.2 0.0 6.1 25.8
D−5 28.1 4.9 5.7 0.0 18.4 37.7 D−5 25.5 4.9 5.2 0.0 15.9 35.2
D−4 14.0 4.5 3.1 0.0 5.2 22.7 D−4 11.9 4.5 2.7 0.0 3.1 20.6
D−3 16.2 4.1 3.9 0.0 8.2 24.3 D−3 12.8 4.1 3.1 0.0 4.7 20.9
D−2 10.3 4.2 2.5 0.0 2.1 18.6 D−2 6.4 4.2 1.5 0.1 -1.8 14.7
D−1 -14.9 4.3 -3.5 0.0 -23.3 -6.6 D−1 -17.1 4.3 -4.0 0.0 -25.5 -8.8
D0 -19.6 4.0 -4.9 0.0 -27.5 -11.8 D0 -22.9 4.0 -5.7 0.0 -30.7 -15.1
D1 -605.2 4.2 -145.5 0.0 -613.4 -597.1 D1 -605.8 4.1 -146.1 0.0 -613.9 -597.7
D2 -475.4 4.2 -111.9 0.0 -483.7 -467.1 D2 -476.1 4.2 -112.4 0.0 -484.4 -467.8
D3 -439.5 4.4 -100.5 0.0 -448.1 -431.0 D3 -445.8 4.4 -101.8 0.0 -454.4 -437.3
D4 -475.3 4.5 -104.8 0.0 -484.2 -466.4 D4 -483.6 4.6 -106.1 0.0 -492.5 -474.6
D5 -394.8 4.8 -82.8 0.0 -404.2 -385.5 D5 -401.1 4.8 -83.6 0.0 -410.5 -391.7
D6 -353.2 5.4 -65.6 0.0 -363.7 -342.6 D6 -361.2 5.4 -66.7 0.0 -371.9 -350.6
Notes: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for age and
age squared and calendar year fixed effects. Results from the left side of the table are a replication of “without trends figure 4.4”. Right side of the table
uses the new comparison group.
Table 4.14: Detailed results from Figure 4.11
without trends figure 4.4 Without trends with new comparison group
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
D−6 -29.3 5.7 -5.1 0.0 -40.5 -18.1 D−6 -29.4 5.7 -5.1 0.0 -40.6 -18.1
D−5 2.6 5.5 0.5 0.6 -8.3 13.4 D−5 2.5 5.5 0.5 0.6 -8.3 13.3
D−4 4.4 4.8 0.9 0.4 -5.0 13.8 D−4 4.4 4.8 0.9 0.4 -5.1 13.8
D−3 35.5 4.4 8.0 0.0 26.8 44.2 D−3 35.4 4.4 8.0 0.0 26.7 44.1
D−2 36.8 4.5 8.2 0.0 28.0 45.6 D−2 36.8 4.5 8.2 0.0 28.0 45.6
D−1 23.1 4.6 5.1 0.0 14.1 32.0 D−1 23.1 4.6 5.1 0.0 14.1 32.0
D0 35.6 4.3 8.3 0.0 27.2 43.9 D0 35.6 4.3 8.3 0.0 27.2 44.0
D1 -605.8 4.5 -134.5 0.0 -614.6 -596.9 D1 -605.7 4.5 -134.5 0.0 -614.6 -596.9
D2 -479.1 4.7 -102.7 0.0 -488.3 -470.0 D2 -479.1 4.7 -102.6 0.0 -488.2 -469.9
D3 -451.5 4.8 -94.2 0.0 -460.9 -442.1 D3 -451.5 4.8 -94.2 0.0 -460.9 -442.1
D4 -434.3 4.9 -88.0 0.0 -443.9 -424.6 D4 -434.2 4.9 -88.0 0.0 -443.9 -424.6
D5 -436.4 5.3 -83.1 0.0 -446.7 -426.1 D5 -436.4 5.3 -83.1 0.0 -446.7 -426.1
D6 -400.8 6.0 -66.7 0.0 -412.6 -389.0 D6 -400.8 6.0 -66.7 0.0 -412.6 -389.0
Notes: Monthly earnings loss of displaced workers due to firm closure, including transitions to zeros (2008 Euros). In the regressions we control for age and
age squared and calendar year fixed effects. Results from the left side of the table are a replication of “without trends figure 4.6”. Right side of the table




Figure 4.12: The empirical distribution of wages of displaced
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Notes: Displaced workers’ density distributions difference between one year after
displacement and one year before displacement.
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Appendix E - The three-way high-dimensional
fixed effects regression model
As discussed above, the main contribution of this study is to decompose
the earnings losses due to job displacement into its main sources. To do so
the JLS methodology is extended by incorporating firm and job title fixed
effects in the wage equation defined in (1) and (2). This extension is made
for the monthly wage and discards observations where labor earnings are
zero.
In fact, the QP data set provides a rich set of information that en-
ables us to identify firms and job titles. Each firm entering the database
is assigned a unique identification number, which allows tracking them
over the years. Furthermore, for each worker we are able to identify the
occupational category in each collective agreement.
It is worth noting that the Ministry of Employment collects the QP
data in order to check if employers are complying with the wage floors
agreed upon for each occupational category. The collective agreement
defines wage floors for each job title (called categoria profissional). On
average, the collective agreement defines the wage floor for around 100
job titles. Overall, in a given year, one can classify each worker according
to about 30,000 job title collective agreement combinations.22
Thus, we are confident that by incorporating job title fixed effects in
the wage regression we can account well for job title heterogeneity, and
by so doing, we should be able to provide refined estimates (filtered from
job title heterogeneity) of worker and firm fixed effects.
The baseline specification is:
22It should be noticed that workers in the same occupational category may have
different wages, as they are covered by a different collective agreement, e.g., a secre-




wijft = αi + θf + λj + γt + βXit + εijft (5)
where αi is a worker fixed effect, θf is a firm fixed effect and λj is a job
title fixed effect. wijft represents the monthly wage for each individual i
in job j working for firm f in year t. Xit controls for age and age squared
for each individual i in year t, γt are calendar year fixed effects, εijft is
assumed to follow the conventional assumptions.
In order to estimate this model that incorporates three high-dimensional
fixed effects we need to use a modified version of the methodology initially
developed by Abowd et al. (1999) and Abowd et al. (2002) (developed by
Guimarães and Portugal (2010) to work with large datasets and for three
fixed effects).
In matrix format, the stacked system has the following form:
W = αF1 + θF2 + λF3 + φZ + ε (6)
In this equation, F1, F2, and F3 are high-dimensional matrices for the
worker, firm and job fixed effects, respectively. Z is a matrix of the
explanatory variables and calendar year fixed effects from equation (5).
The least squares estimator of φ, α, θ, and λ solve the following equa-
tions:






































It is computationally difficult to invert the left matrix due to the large
number of workers, firms, and job titles. Herein we use an iterative solu-
tion that alternates between estimation of φ, α, θ, and λ.
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(Z ′Z)−1Z ′(W − αF1 − θF2 − λF3)
(F ′1F1)
−1F ′1(W − θF2 − λF3 − φZ)
(F ′2F2)
−1F ′2(W − αF1 − λF3 − φZ)
(F ′3F3)
−1F ′3(W − αF1 − θF2 − φZ)

It is clear from the previous equations that at each iteration the fixed
effects are simply computed as averages of the residuals. For an example,
(F ′3F3)
−1F ′3 is simply a demeaning operator for the job title fixed effect.
The iteration protocol was developed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010).
The iterative solution alternates between estimation of φ, α, θ, and λ and
proceeds as follows. First, the algorithm makes use of the Frish-Waugh-
Lovell theorem to remove the influence of the three high-dimensional fixed
effects from each individual variable. Through the recursive algorithm
the current value of φ can be used to estimate the current value of α. In
estimating θ the previous values of φ and α are used. In estimating λ the
previous values of θ, φ, and α are used. Then the algorithm restarts and
will converge because the parameter updates are chosen according to the
equations in (7). Next, we estimate the regression using the transformed
variables with a correction to the degrees of freedom. This approach yields
the exact least squares solution for the coefficients and standard errors.
The fixed effects in equation (5) were estimated using the complete
data set that covers the employed population in the private sector in Por-
tugal with all available information from 1986 to 2008. The identification
of the three high dimensional fixed effects given by the worker, firm and
job title effects was circumvented by applying the algorithm by Abowd
et al. (2002) , based on graph theory to determine groups of connected
individuals, firms and job titles. A connected group exists when at least
one element of a worker, job title and firm links the rest of the group.
The largest connected group represents more than 99% of the sample.23
23The worker and the job title fixed effect were normalized to have average zero
while the firm fixed effect was not normalized.
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4.8. Appendix
Appendix F - Decomposition of the wage loss
including tenure - displaced workers due to
firm closure
Table 4.15: Decomposition of the wage loss - displaced workers
due to firm closure (replication of table 4.3 including tenure)
Base Full
Period relative OLS OLS Worker Firm Occupation
to displacement hourly wage hourly wage δbasek − δ
full
k fixed effect fixed effect fixed effect Tenure
D−6 -270.2 17.3 -287.6 -135.6 -214.7 62.2 0.5
D−5 -278.2 8.7 -286.9 -130.4 -214.8 57.9 0.3
D−4 -295.4 -2.5 -292.8 -152.8 -181.9 41.7 0.2
D−3 -298.7 -18.7 -280.0 -141.9 -184.8 46.2 0.5
D−2 -322.0 11.0 -333.0 -151.0 -215.4 33.1 0.3
D−1 -395.5 -10.9 -384.6 -168.0 -221.0 3.9 0.5
D0 -376.1 32.0 -408.1 -172.8 -229.4 -6.1 0.3
D1 -421.2 -12.7 -408.5 -137.4 -238.1 -33.1 0.1
D2 -492.6 -7.0 -485.6 -178.8 -253.3 -54.6 1.1
D3 -514.6 1.9 -516.5 -185.7 -265.0 -67.8 2.1
D4 -574.7 -12.8 -561.9 -198.8 -300.6 -65.4 2.9
D5 -508.0 15.8 -523.8 -180.5 -290.6 -56.4 3.8
D6 -492.3 -39.8 -452.5 -119.3 -302.4 -35.4 4.7
D−6 −D0 -319.4 5.3 -324.7 -150.4 -208.9 34.1 0.4
D1 −D6 -500.6 -9.1 -491.4 -166.8 -275.0 -52.1 2.5
∆ -181.1 -14.4 -166.7 -16.4 -66.2 -86.3 2.1
Results in percentage
D−6 −D0 -39.0 0.6 -39.6 -18.4 -25.5 4.2 0.0
D1 −D6 -61.1 -1.1 -60.0 -20.4 -33.6 -6.4 0.3
∆ -22.1 -1.8 -20.4 -2.0 -8.1 -10.5 0.3
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the three fixed effects of the wage loss of displaced
workers. In the regressions we control for age and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. In each column,
D−6−D0 is the computed average between the first seven lines (D−6 to D0). D1−D6 is the computed average
between the next six lines (D1 to D6). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the previous two lines.
In the last three lines we compute the results in percentage by dividing the respective numbers by the average
wage of displaced workers in the pre displacement period (819 euros). Tenure is computed as the sum between
tenure and tenure squared multiplied by the respective coefficients from the full model.
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Table 4.16: Decomposition of the wage loss - displaced workers
due to firm closure (replication of table 4.3 including tenure)
Base Full
Period relative OLS OLS
to displacement hourly wage hourly wage Tenure
D−6 -270.2 -269.0 -1.2
D−5 -278.2 -277.8 -0.4
D−4 -295.4 -293.7 -1.6
D−3 -298.7 -298.0 -0.6
D−2 -322.0 -320.1 -2.0
D−1 -395.5 -393.9 -1.6
D0 -376.1 -372.0 -4.0
D1 -421.2 -362.7 -58.5
D2 -492.6 -440.5 -52.1
D3 -514.6 -469.3 -45.3
D4 -574.7 -534.6 -40.0
D5 -508.0 -472.3 -35.7
D6 -492.3 -462.1 -30.1
D−6 −D0 -319.4 -317.8 -1.6
D1 −D6 -500.6 -456.9 -43.6
∆ -181.1 -139.1 -42.0
Results in percentage
D−6 −D0 -39.0 -38.8 -0.2
D1 −D6 -61.1 -55.8 -5.3
∆ -22.1 -17.0 -5.1
Notes: This table reports the Gelbach decomposition of the wage
loss of displaced workers. In the regressions we control for age
and age squared and calendar year fixed effects. In each column,
D−6−D0 is the computed average between the first seven lines (D−6
to D0). D1−D6 is the computed average between the next six lines
(D1 to D6). In the line ∆ we compute the difference between the
previous two lines. In the last three lines we compute the results in
percentage by dividing the respective numbers by the average wage
of displaced workers in the pre displacement period (819 euros).
Tenure is computed as the sum between tenure and tenure squared
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